Refugee Repatriation and Conflict: Evidence from the Maximum Pressure Sanctions

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44+ Million Displaced Across Borders



Displacement is Outpacing “Solutions"







Return is the Preferred Solution

- **Ideal**: Safe and dignified repatriation when conflict ends



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

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

When does mass repatriation occur?

Refugee Repatriation Contexts

- **Improving opportunities in origin country**: security, public services, economic boom, land restitution
  - Black and Koser (1999); Verwimp and Muñoz-Mora (2018); Camarena and Hägerdal (2020); Ruiz and Vargas-Silva (2021); Alrababa'h et al. (2023)

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- **Worsening conditions in host country**: hostility, policy restriction, recession, insecurity
  - Chimni (2004); Schwartz (2022)

Return Contexts and the Consequences of Repatriation

- **Consequences** of Return Shaped by Repatriation **Context**
  - Explanatory role of **economic and social endowments** at moment of return

- **Economic** endowments:
  - Financial + credit constraints
  - Policy environments

- **Social** endowments:
  - Networks and planning
  - Psychological consequences

When **worsening conditions in a host country** induce refugee repatriation, return is associated with **increasing conflict in origin communities**.

Project #1: Evidence from a Large Cash Grant Program in Pakistan in 2016

Encashed Returnees

- Repatriation cash assistance for Afghans in Pakistan doubled
  - Unexpected and large-scale ($\approx$**450,000**)
  - Economically meaningful (**$400 per returnee**)
  - **Start of 2016 fighting season** (Implemented June 29, 2016)
- Historical returnee settlement patterns $\longrightarrow$ Bartik-style DiD
  - **Previously-unreleased** ANSF/NATO combat records

Findings

- Encashed returns **reduced insurgent violence**
  - Opportunity cost channel
- Encashed returns **increased communal violence**
  - Offset by social capital and strong, local institutions

Project #2: Evidence from a Sanctions on Iran in 2018

Evidence from the Maximum Pressure Sanctions

- Maximum Pressure sanctions on Iran nuclear program $\longrightarrow$ massive currency devaluation
  - Disproportionate harm to Afghans migrants in Iran
  - Unexpected and large-scale return ($\approx$**700,000**)
  - Economically meaningful
  - **Start of 2018 fighting season** (Implemented May 8, 2018)

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  - Novel, survey-based validation

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  - Opportunity cost channel
  - No evidence for Iranian covert support
- Impoverished returns did **NOT worsen communal violence**

Context

Afghans Migrants in Iran

- Afghans comprise the **largest refugee population** globally
- 20-30% of all citizens displaced abroad at some point
- In 2018 **3 million Afghans** resided in Iran, **6th largest** global host



Return Induced by the Maximum Pressure Campaign

- April 2018: Bolton announced as National Security Advisor



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

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

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

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

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

Sanctions Were Economically Meaningful

"The collapse of Iran's rial, Iran's monetary unit, has effectively cut remittances from Afghan migrant workers in Iran to almost zero. As a result, absorbing the ***500,000-plus returnees in 2018*** *(compared to 230,000 in 2017) will carry* ***heavy economic and social support burdens in Afghanistan's less stable western provinces****. Of the returnees, 96 percent are unskilled or semiskilled single male laborers under age 30, a population that could be* ***vulnerable to recruitment into extremist groups or the illicit economy****."*[1]

[1] DoD Congressional Report

Sanctions Were Economically Meaningful

- Survey-based validation:
  - Sanctions increased **unemployment** of Afghans in Iran Labor Survey
  - Sanctions decreased **income**, **wage rate**, and **hours worked** of Afghans in Iran Income Survey

Sanctions Induced Mass Return

- **160%** of the mean return from the previous three years



Sanctions Induced Mass Return

- **160%** of the mean return from the previous three years
- Returnees attribute **negative economic conditions in Iran** as reason for return

Returnee Survey | Sample Replacement



Sanctions Induced Mass Return

"It's easy. **More sanctions equal more returnees**."[2]



[2] Department for Refugees and Returnees in Zaranj

Data and Design

Outcome Data

- **Insurgent Violence**: International Distributed Unified Reporting Environment (INDURE)
- **Communal Conflict**: Survey of Returnees + Government Tracker
- **Security and Economic Perceptions**: Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) survey

Repatriation Data

- **Undocumented Refugee Return**: 2012-2015 settlement patterns from IOM



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

Empirical Strategy

- **Bartik Style Difference-in-Differences**
  - Temporal Variation: Sanctions-Induced Shock
  - Cross-Sectional Variation: **2012-2015 Returnee Settlement Patterns** $\left(\frac{\text{District Returns}_{2012-2015}}{\text{Total Returns}_{2012-2015}}\right)$

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- **Reduced form, least squares** equation for behavioral outcomes:

$$Y_{d,t} = \delta(\text{2012-2015 Returnee Share}_d \times \text{Max Pressure}_t) + \alpha_d + \beta_t + \mu(X_d \times \beta_t) + \epsilon$$

- **Reduced form, least squares** equation for survey outcomes:

$$Y_{i,d,t} = \delta(\text{Max Pressure Returnee}_{i,d,t}) + \alpha_d + \beta_t + \mu(X_{i,d,t}) + \epsilon$$

Assessing Pre-Policy Trends



Results: Insurgent Violence

Sanctions-Induced Repatriation Increased Insurgent Violence

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs											
	Extensive Margin						Per 100k Population					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
2012-2015 Returnee Share x Maximum Pressure	0.025**	0.017**	0.017**	0.016**	0.016*	0.015*	1.185***	1.296***	1.469***	1.351***	1.366***	0.701***
	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.386)	(0.332)	(0.382)	(0.369)	(0.378)	(0.218)
Observations	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Parameters												
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnic Shares		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Accessibility Controls			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic Controls				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes
Aid Controls					Yes	Yes					Yes	Yes
Lagged DV						Yes						Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Sanctions-Induced Repatriation Increased Perceptions of Insecurity

	Perceptions of Security							
	Multi-Item Index (ICW)			Constituent Items (=1)				
	(1) Perceived Security	(2) Perceived Security	(3) Perceived Security	(4) Village Secure	(5) Security Trend	(6) Safe Traveling	(7) Roads Secure	(8) Security Problem
2012-2015 Returnee Share x Maximum Pressure	-0.029**	-0.029**	-0.029**	-0.011**	-0.007	-0.007*	-0.004	0.007*
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	159648	159648	159648	159648	159648	159648	159648	159648
Clusters	397	397	397	397	397	397	397	397
Parameters								
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socioeconomic Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household Size		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Robustness: Exploiting Proximity to Iran

	Insurgent-Initiated SIGACTs											
	Extensive Margin						Per 100k Population					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Proximity to Iran Returnee Border Crossing x Maximum Pressure	0.062***	0.060***	0.059***	0.054***	0.053***	0.049***	4.357***	4.363***	4.015***	3.975***	3.926***	1.970***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.988)	(0.998)	(0.831)	(0.857)	(0.812)	(0.349)
Observations	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Parameters												
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnic Shares		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Accessibility Controls			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic Controls				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls				Yes	Yes	Yes				Yes	Yes	Yes
Aid Controls					Yes	Yes					Yes	Yes
Lagged DV						Yes						Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Mechanisms: Insurgent Violence

Two Possible Channels

- Destitute returns $\longrightarrow$ declining **opportunity cost** of fighting

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- Destitute returns $\longrightarrow$ declining **opportunity cost** of fighting
- Deteriorating Iran-US relationship $\longrightarrow$ **Iranian retaliation** in Afghanistan

Returns Reduced Perceived Economic Welfare

	Perceptions of Economy					
	Multi-Item Index (ICW)			Constituent Items (=1)		
	(1) Perceived Economy	(2) Perceived Economy	(3) Perceived Economy	(4) Employed Full-Time	(5) Satisfied with Labor Market	(6) Food Security
2012-2015 Returnee Share x Maximum Pressure	-0.037***	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.011***	-0.004*	-0.013**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Observations	158390	158390	158390	158390	158390	158390
Clusters	397	397	397	397	397	397
Parameters						
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Socioeconomic Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Household Size		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Social Desirability			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Returns Increased Insurgent Reliance on Labor-Intensive Tactics

	Tactical Variation								Tactical Substitution	
	Extensive Margin				Per 100k Population				Labor-Intensive Share	
	(1) Direct Fires	(2) Complex	(3) Indirect Fires	(4) Explosives	(5) Direct Fires	(6) Complex	(7) Indirect Fires	(8) Explosives	(9)	(10)
2012-2015 Returnee Share x Maximum Pressure	0.019*	0.030***	0.017***	0.024***	0.575***	0.099***	0.065**	0.077***	0.017**	0.017**
	(0.010)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.207)	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328	14328
Clusters	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398	398
Parameters										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Specific Month FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnic Shares	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Accessibility Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Economic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Agricultural Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Aid Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Lagged DV	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Insurgent-Initiated Violence (=1)										Yes

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Results: Communal Violence

Sanctions-Induced Repatriation Did Not Worsen Communal Tensions

	Returnee–Stayee Relations							
	Positive Neighborhood Contact (Index)				Experienced a Communal Dispute (=1)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Maximum Pressure Returnee	0.086*	0.067	0.059	0.069	-0.040*	-0.037*	-0.036*	-0.040*
	(0.051)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)
Observations	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
Parameters								
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Age		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Education		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Income		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira		Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Marital Status			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Dwelling			Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Social Desirability				Yes				Yes
Interview Order				Yes				Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

...but this is Heterogeneous by Local Institutions

	Returnee–Stayee Relations									
	Positive Neighborhood Contact (Index)					Experienced a Communal Dispute (=1)				
	(1) Baseline	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6) Baseline	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Maximum Pressure Returnee	0.069	-0.684	-0.776*	-0.727*	-0.780*	-0.040*	0.255**	0.273***	0.276***	0.299***
	(0.054)	(0.438)	(0.439)	(0.425)	(0.423)	(0.022)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.098)	(0.100)
Maximum Pressure Returnee x Dispute Resolution Institutions		1.948*	2.134*	1.991*	2.150**		-0.747***	-0.784***	-0.792***	-0.860***
		(1.102)	(1.102)	(1.068)	(1.065)		(0.274)	(0.279)	(0.271)	(0.278)
Observations	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071	7071
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
Parameters										
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes			Yes	Yes	Yes			Yes	Yes
Social Desirability	Yes				Yes	Yes				Yes
Interview Order	Yes				Yes	Yes				Yes

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Robust, district-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Conclusion

1. Plausibly **causal evidence**

Conclusion

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2. Return may affect **different types** of political and social violence in **different ways**

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Conclusion

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4. Foundation for future research: **social outcomes, internal displacement,** and **contexts**

Supplementary Appendix

Supplementary Appendix

- Global Patterns
  - Categorizing Major Returns
  - Return During Conflict
  - Global Panel
- Survey-Based Validation
  - Replacement Rate
  - Labor Survey
  - Economic Push
  - Push Factors
  - Pull Factors
- Design
  - Event Study
- Main Results (Robustness)
  - Intensive Margin (Insurgent)
- Data Details
  - Migration
  - INDURE
  - ANQAR
  - Returnee Survey
  - Iran Labor Survey

Appendix: Context

Characterizing Global Refugee Return Waves, 1974–2018

Year	Country of Origin	Country of Asylum	# of Returnees	Primary Reason for Return	Sources
1974	Pakistan	Bangladesh	104,320	Improving Conditions at Origin	farzana2009artificial
1978	D.R. Congo	Angola	107,640	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1979	Cambodia	Vietnam	120,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	cutts2000state
1979	Myanmar	Bangladesh	150,680	Worsening Conditions at Host	crisp2018primitive
1980	Angola	D.R. Congo	200,000	Reduction in Mobility Costs	unhcr1980report
1980	Cambodia	Thailand	175,000	Worsening Conditions at Host	[][p. 92]cutts2000state
1980	Zimbabwe	Mozambique	150,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1982	Chad	Cameroon	133,080	Reduction in Mobility Costs	[?]
1982	Uganda	D.R. Congo	110,000	Reduction in Mobility Costs	[?]
1984	Ethiopia	Rwanda	242,140	Worsening Conditions at Host	prunier1995rwanda
1985	Ethiopia	Sudan	115,520	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?, 115]
1986	Ethiopia	Somalia	104,430	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 115]cutts2000state
1986	Ethiopia	Sudan	109,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 115]cutts2000state
1991	Afghanistan	Pakistan	175,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1991	Iraq	Iran	1,333,860	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 216]cutts2000state
1991	Sudan	Ethiopia	370,000	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1992	Afghanistan	Iran	216,600	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1992	Afghanistan	Pakistan	1,360,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1993	Mozambique	Malawi	345,086	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 148]cutts2000state
1994	Afghanistan	Iran	226,669	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1994	Afghanistan	Pakistan	102,658	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1994	Burundi	Tanzania	271,087	Worsening Conditions at Host	hpn1994burundi
1994	Mozambique	Malawi	624,467	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 148]cutts2000state
1994	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	102,753	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 148]cutts2000state
1994	Rwanda	Burundi	338,000	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1994	Rwanda	D.R. Congo	450,000	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1994	Rwanda	Uganda	210,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1994	Rwanda	Tanzania	210,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1995	Afghanistan	Iran	194,287	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1995	Afghanistan	Pakistan	153,274	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1996	Afghanistan	Pakistan	140,390	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1996	Burundi	D.R. Congo	105,653	Worsening Conditions at Host	us1997world
1996	Rwanda	Burundi	127,473	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
1996	Rwanda	D.R. Congo	776,521	Worsening Conditions at Host	pottier1999self
1996	Rwanda	Tanzania	506,073	Worsening Conditions at Host	us1997world
1997	Rwanda	D.R. Congo	178,429	Worsening Conditions at Host	pottier1999self
1998	Liberia	Cote d'Ivoire	100,563	Improving Conditions at Origin	uscr1998liberia
1998	Liberia	Guinea	135,786	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
1998	Sierra Leone	Guinea	115,000	Improving Conditions at Origin	lister1998jubilant
1999	Afghanistan	Iran	161,094	Reduction in Mobility Costs	[?]
1999	Serbia/Kosovo	Albania	435,790	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 241]cutts2000state
1999	Timor-Leste	Indonesia	127,528	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 237]cutts2000state
1999	Serbia/Kosovo	North Macedonia	233,400	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 141]cutts2000state
2000	Afghanistan	Iran	215,566	Reduction in Mobility Costs	[?]
2002	Afghanistan	Iran	376,247	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2002	Afghanistan	Pakistan	1,569,248	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2003	Afghanistan	Iran	269,391	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2003	Afghanistan	Pakistan	375,526	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2004	Afghanistan	Iran	454,547	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2004	Afghanistan	Pakistan	424,477	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2004	Iraq	Iran	191,648	Improving Conditions at Origin	[][p. 146]van2008repatriation
2005	Afghanistan	Iran	289,647	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
2005	Afghanistan	Pakistan	461,118	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
2006	Afghanistan	Iran	243,648	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
2006	Afghanistan	Pakistan	143,019	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
2007	Afghanistan	Pakistan	365,663	Reduction in Mobility Costs	[?]
2008	Afghanistan	Pakistan	274,200	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
2010	Afghanistan	Pakistan	109,383	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
2011	Cote d'Ivoire	Liberia	135,109	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2011	Libya	Tunisia	148,951	Improving Conditions at Origin	[?]
2013	Syria	Turkey	140,756	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]
2016	Afghanistan	Pakistan	381,275	Reduction in Mobility Costs	[?]
2018	Syria	Turkey	177,282	Worsening Conditions at Host	[?]

Return During Conflict







Global Analysis





Appendix: Survey Validation

Sanctions Increase Unemployment of Afghans in Iran

	Individual-Level			
	Unemployed		Skilled Occupation	
	(1)	(2)	(3) Low-Skill	(4) High-Skill
Afghan Migrant in Iran x Maximum Pressure	0.031***	0.021*	-0.035*	0.031
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Observations	318726	229464	229406	229406
Parameters				
Nationality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demograhic Controls		Yes	Yes	Yes
Household FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, province-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Sanctions Reduce Income of Afghans in Iran

	Individual-Level		
	Gross Income (IHS)	**Wage Rate (IHS)**	**Hours Worked (#)**
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Afghan Migrant in Iran x Maximum Pressure	-4.230***	-4.213***	-2.440**
	(0.861)	(0.865)	(1.095)
Observations	73815	73815	73815
Parameters			
Nationality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demograhic Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, province-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Returnees Cite Poor Economic Conditions as Key Push Factor

	Reason for Return: Poor Economic Conditions at Host			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Maximum Pressure Returnee	0.065**	0.068**	0.065**	0.063**
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Observations	7045	7045	7045	7045
Clusters	65	65	65	65
Parameters				
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender		Yes	Yes	Yes
Age		Yes	Yes	Yes
Education		Yes	Yes	Yes
Income		Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity		Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira		Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity			Yes	Yes
Marital Status			Yes	Yes
Dwelling			Yes	Yes
Respondent Comfort				Yes
Interview Order				Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, province-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Returnees' Reported Push Factors

	Reason for Return: Push Factors (=1)				
	(1) Poor Economy	(2) Poor Security	(3) Deported or Forcibly Removed	(4) Unwelcoming Conditions	(5) Lacked Visa/ Permanent Residency
Maximum Pressure Returnee	0.063**	0.021	0.002	-0.016	-0.049***
	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Observations	7045	7045	7045	7045	7045
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65
Parameters					
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Comfort	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, province-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Reported Pull Factors

	Reason for Return: Pull Factors (=1)						
	(1) Improving Economy	(2) Improving Security	(3) Family Reunification	(4) Welcoming Conditions	(5) Improving Education	(6) Patriotism	(7) Insurgent Recruitment
Maximum Pressure Returnee	-0.014*	0.008	-0.022	0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Observations	7045	7045	7045	7045	7045	7045	7045
Clusters	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
Parameters							
District FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country of Asylum	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month of Return	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Registration Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Gender	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Education	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Income	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Urbanicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Tazkira	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Marital Status	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dwelling	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Respondent Comfort	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Interview Order	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, province-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Sanctions Prompted Refugee Return: Replacement Rate

	Sample Replacement				
	Individual-Level				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Afghan Migrant in Iran x Maximum Pressure	0.060**	0.060**	0.065**	0.062**	0.124***
	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.019)
Observations	1568672	1568672	1184191	1078015	1059538
Parameters					
Nationality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE		Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demograhic Controls			Yes	Yes	Yes
Employment Status				Yes	Yes
Household FE					Yes

Note: *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$; Robust, province-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

Appendix: Design

Event Study


Extensive Margin of Insurgent Violence (=1)
DiD Coefficient
.1
.08
.06
.04
.02
0
-.02
-.04
-10 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time Relative to Treatment


Insurgent Violence per 100k Pop.
DiD Coefficient
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
.5
0
-.5
-1
-1.5
-2
-10 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time Relative to Treatment

Appendix: Main Results

Appendix: Data Details

ANQAR Data

- Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) are districts (N=398) allocated to the sampling frame according to proportional stratification
- Districts to visit are chosen from the sampling frame via probability proportional to size (using CSO population estimates).
- Secondary Sampling Units (SSUs) are villages or neighbourhoods randomly chosen from a list, with backup replacement settlements chosen before the fieldwork started.
- Random walk within settlement from random starting point.
- Kish grid to choose respondent within-household

Coding Dependent Variables from ANQAR

Variable	Question	Coding (=1) if	Index
Village Security	How is the security situation in your mantaqa?	Good	Perceptions of Security
Security Trend	Is security in your mantaqa better, the same or worse than it was 6 months ago?	Better	Perceptions of Security
Safe Traveling	How safe do you feel traveling outside of your mantaqa during the day?	Completely safe OR Mostly safe	Perceptions of Security
Road Security	If you use the Ring Road, how safe do you feel using this road?	Completely safe OR Mostly safe	Perceptions of Security
Security Problem	What do you think is the biggest problem facing your district?	Insecurity OR Anti-Government Elements	Perceptions of Security
Employed Full-Time	What is your job status now?	Working Full-Time	Perceptions of Economy
Satisfied with Labor Market	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the provision of jobs/employment in your area?	Very Satisfied	Perceptions of Economy
Food Insecurity	Have there been times in the past 12 months when you or your family had difficulty finding food?	Yes	Perceptions of Economy

TAF Survey of Afghan Returnees

- Fielded in two waves in 2018-2019 by the Asia Foundation in districts in Kandahar, Nangarhar, Kabul, Balkh, and Herat Provinces.
- Returnees residing in settlements were randomly sampled from a frame based on the IOM Baseline Mobility Assessment.
- The sample is population proportional to size within each province, and can be taken as representative of returnees in the five sampled provinces.
- Random walk within settlement from random starting point.
- Kish grid to choose respondent within-household

Coding Returnee–Stayee Relations from TAF

Variable	Question	Coding	Index
No Disputes	Since returning to Afghanistan, have you or family members personally experienced a dispute or conflict with a community member(s)?	No =1	Positive Neighborhood Contact
No Discrimination	I have felt discrimination from others in my neighborhood, because of my language or the way I speak	No = 1	Positive Neighborhood Contact
Neighbors Invite	My neighbors invite me to their ceremonies such as wedding and khatm	strongly agree = 1, strongly disagree = 4	Positive Neighborhood Contact
Neighbors Helpful	I can comfortably go to any of my neighbors for help	strongly disagree = 1, strongly agree = 4	Positive Neighborhood Contact
Neighbors Respectful	My neighbors respect me and my family	strongly disagree = 1, strongly agree = 4	Positive Neighborhood Contact
Neighbors Friendly	My neighborhood has been friendly and welcoming	strongly disagree = 1, strongly agree = 4	Positive Neighborhood Contact