

The Power of Dialogue: Forced Displacement and Social Integration amid an Islamist Insurgency in Mozambique

Henrique Pita Barros*

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Abstract

With global forced displacement at an unprecedented level, there is an increasing demand for low-cost interventions that can reduce tension between displaced persons and host communities. This study undertakes a novel field experiment designed to improve the social integration of internally displaced persons (IDPs) into host communities under conditions of scarce resources and low state capacity. The experiment was conducted in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique's northernmost province, where an Islamist insurgency has resulted in over one million IDPs. Hosts and IDPs participated in joint community meetings in which they discussed topics related to the collective life of both groups, and IDPs also narrated their stories of escape from insurgents. Analysis of survey data, list experiments, the Implicit Association Test, and lab-in-the-field games shows that the community meetings produced immediate and sustained positive effects on the relationship between hosts and IDPs. Religious tolerance also improved, and religious-extremist beliefs decreased, highlighting the potential of intergroup contact to support counterinsurgency efforts. As a novel insight, this study finds that even brief but structured intergroup interactions can have a beneficial long-lasting impact on social cohesion. (*JEL: C93, D74, D83, D91 J15, O15, Z12, Z13*)

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1 Introduction

Mòro wa va'salani ohisa empá.

(A fire in the junkyard can burn the house.)

—Popular saying of the Makua people.

The integration of forcibly displaced individuals, such as refugees or internally displaced persons (IDPs), is a pressing issue faced by low- and middle-income countries. The latest United Nations report on global trends in forced displacement reveals that the world has reached a new peak of 108.4 million forcibly displaced individuals, with 82 million (76%) of them being hosted in low- and middle-income countries (UNHCR 2023). The relocation of such a large number of individuals places a significant burden on hosting communities, with numerous empirical studies finding evidence of negative effects on local labor and housing markets (Depetris-Chauvin and Santos 2018, Jennifer Alix-Garcia and Saah 2012, Morales 2018, Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2015, Tsuda 2022, Tumen 2016), food security (George and Adelaja 2022), and wealth (Alix-Garcia and Saah 2010). The shock generated by the arrival of these individuals can also lead to tension and even conflict between hosts and displaced persons (Albarosa and Elsner 2023, Jennings and Sanchez-Pages 2017, Putnam 2007, Rozo and Vargas 2021). All this evidence highlights the need for effective solutions to integrate forcibly displaced individuals and local hosts, as tension between these two groups can impede long-term socioeconomic development (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004, Knack and Keefer 1997, Sobel 2002, Zak and Knack 2001).

The first-order importance of reducing tension between local hosts and displaced persons has led both academics and policy makers to increasingly think of new policies to address this issue. One common approach is resource focused; it often consists in providing public goods (As-saad, Ginn, and Saleh 2023) or social and economic incentives to advance the socioeconomic self-sustainability of displaced persons and integrate them into the local labor market (Altindag and O'Connell 2023, Battisti, Giesing, and Laurensyeva 2019, Beltramo et al. 2023, Caria et al. 2020, MacPherson and Sterck 2021). Although they have proven to be effective, resource-focused interventions often require significant central planning and financial investment—which may not

always be available to policy makers in low income countries. Another approach is community based, aiming to empower local communities to promote socioeconomic integration with minimal central planning or financial resources. Despite its key importance, this approach has remained scarcely studied.

Using a community-based approach, I designed and conducted a new field experiment to promote the social integration of IDPs into the local hosting community in the city of Pemba, the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado in northern Mozambique. Since October 2017, Cabo Delgado has been affected by an Islamist insurgency that has already led to more than one million IDPs—around 40% of the province’s total population—with 140,000 IDPs currently relocated to Pemba (a city of 200,000 people before the conflict). This sizable increase in Pemba’s population has generated significant social friction between local hosts and IDPs, threatening the efforts of local authorities and their international partners to maintain peaceful coexistence.¹

In my experiment, inspired by Allport’s contact hypothesis (Allport 1954) and building upon a recent and promising body of research measuring the beneficial impact of intergroup contact on marginalized groups (Lowe 2021, Mousa 2020, Rao 2019), I implemented a novel randomized intervention that assigned IDPs and local hosts (in Pemba) to joint community meetings. Lasting a half day and consisting of 8 to 10 participants, community meetings followed a predefined protocol based on the framework of a public dialogue (Herzig and Chasin 2006), which I tailored to the context of Pemba with the support of local community members. The community meetings had a dual objective. The first was to reduce prejudice and promote social integration into the local hosting community. The other objective was to address religious extremism and therefore contribute to deradicalization efforts in a predominantly Muslim region permeated with concerns about insurgents’ infiltration of both locals and IDPs.

The community meetings offered an opportunity for locals and IDPs to discuss the current displacement situation in Pemba, their experiences with each other and the insurgency, and possible paths going forward. IDPs were also invited to voluntarily share their stories of escaping from

¹Supporting evidence is provided in Section 2.2.

insurgents. The objective was to increase participants' awareness of the atrocities committed by insurgents and in turn prompt them to question their beliefs and reduce religious extremism.^{2,3}

To evaluate the treatment effects of the intervention, I employed a variety of outcome measurements, including surveys, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), lab-in-the-field games, and list experiments—including a newly designed graphical list experiment that is uniquely suited for analyzing highly sensitive topics, such as religious extremism.⁴ I measured the effects of the intervention both immediately (after two to three days) and in the medium term (two to three months following the intervention).

This study finds that community meetings, under the defined protocol, achieved their dual objectives of improving the social integration of local hosts and IDPs and decreasing religious-extremist beliefs. Regarding social integration, the community meetings produced positive and significant effects in both the short and medium term. In the short term, locals who participated became more tolerant of IDPs' staying in their neighborhoods (11.5% increase). I observed this even though I detected no significant improvements in the locals' beliefs about IDPs or discrimination against IDPs.

In the medium term, the intervention softened locals' beliefs about IDPs—measured by their association of IDPs with insecurity and worse living conditions (9.2% decrease) and their self-reported trust (10.1% increase). Discrimination against IDPs, measured by a list experiment, decreased by 16.6%.⁵ An analysis of heterogeneous effects reveals that the community meetings

²Recent assessments of the psychology of radicalization have pointed toward this being a process mostly determined by individual-level rather than macro factors (Rink and Sharma 2018). Following this finding, recent research has highlighted that raising doubts about the actions of radicals may be an effective deradicalization strategy (Doosje et al. 2016) and that intergroup contact can also be a catalyst for deradicalization by providing new perspectives that challenge radical views (Khader et al. 2018). This is further detailed in Section 3.

³Blattman and Ralston (2015) also point out that community-based interventions in violent-conflict settings—such as the one proposed in this study—are harder to sabotage by insurgents and therefore easier to implement without producing negative collateral effects.

⁴The IAT is a psychological measure designed to assess the strength of automatic associations between mental representations of objects in memory and is often used to uncover implicit biases and attitudes, such as unconscious preferences or biases toward government authorities versus insurgents, by evaluating the speed and accuracy with which participants categorize paired concepts—for example, pairing each group with positive or negative attributes. The implementation of the IAT is detailed in Appendix B.4.

⁵A list experiment is a survey methodology designed to elicit truthful responses to sensitive questions by having re-

produced differential effects depending on locals' baseline views of IDPs. The immediate improvement in tolerance toward IDPs was driven by locals with more negative baseline views, while the positive shift in beliefs about IDPs was driven by locals with more positive baseline views.

Regarding IDPs, treatment effects measured using survey data suggest that the community meetings immediately improved IDPs' sense of belonging in host neighborhoods and their trust in local hosts (20.6% and 15.1% increases, respectively); these effects' magnitude and precision persisted in the medium term. In addition, IDPs who participated in the community meetings reported being more involved in the civic life of host neighborhoods shortly after the intervention (8.1% improvement), although no significant treatment effect was detected in the medium term. The results from a list experiment suggest that IDPs' sense of being discriminated against by locals decreased by 15.1% in the short term. The community meetings also generated heterogeneous effects among IDPs, with the significant improvements in their social integration being driven by IDPs who felt more marginalized before the intervention.

Regarding religious extremism, this study finds that the community meetings decreased it and promoted religious tolerance among both Muslim locals and IDPs. The decrease in religious-extremist behavior, measured by study participants' preference for insurgents, was only detected in the medium term. Specifically, a newly designed graphical list experiment shows that local hosts' preference toward insurgents decreased by 15.8%, and the results from the IAT show that IDPs' bias against insurgents (as opposed to government authorities) decreased by 8.2%. These results are in line with previous findings by psychologists ([Doosje et al. 2016](#), [Milla and Umam 2019](#)) suggesting that reducing religious-extremist beliefs is a lengthy process. In addition, the community meetings improved IDPs' religious tolerance by 13.9% in the short term, although the effect did not persist in the medium term.

This study makes several important contributions to the literature. It adds the case of an ongoing Islamist insurgency to the body of empirical research on the impact of intergroup interactions

spondents indicate how many items in a provided list apply to them, without specifying which ones, thereby preserving anonymity and reducing response bias. The implementation of list experiments is detailed in [Appendix B.2](#).

on social behavior in developing countries. It builds on previous work on the effects of intergroup interactions in different settings, including schools (Corno, La Ferrara, and Burns 2022, Rao 2019), educational and vocational training programs (Maiti et al. 2022, Scacco and Warren 2018), ethnically and religiously segregated sporting competitions (Lowe 2021, Mousa 2020), post conflict national reconciliation (Cilliers, Dube, and Siddiqi 2016), nation building (Bazzi et al. 2019) or lab-in-the-field experiments (Clochard, Hollard, and Sene 2023).^{6,7}

Complementing all these works, which analyze longer interventions (ranging between several days and months), this study provides new evidence that even brief intergroup interactions can produce long-lasting results. In intergroup-contact literature reviews, Paluck, Green, and Green (2019) and Paluck et al. (2021) indicate that the efficacy of short-term interactions remains underexplored. Most research has either focused on longer-term interventions (spanning weeks, months, or years) or only measured effects soon after the intervention (within the same day). The policy implications of this study are substantial, as policy makers in numerous settings around the world lack the capacity to establish incentives, create labor-participation schemes, or implement resource-focused programs to integrate forcibly displaced individuals. This deficiency often erodes social capital and harms mental health (Chiovelli et al. 2021). This study proposes a new, community-based policy that can generate positive and enduring effects under conditions of resource scarcity or low state capacity. Consequently, it reduces the number of circumstances in which supporting forcibly displaced individuals is not feasible.

Finally, this is the first study evaluating empirically the efficacy of intergroup contact as a counterinsurgency or deradicalization policy. Given that religious-extremist insurgencies often require a minimum level of support or tolerance from the local population (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter

⁶The contact hypothesis, proposed by Allport (1954), has also attracted significant attention from social scientists across different disciplines, resulting in numerous studies since its development (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). Almost the entirety of these works were conducted using small samples inside laboratory settings (Paluck, Green, and Green 2019, Paluck et al. 2021).

⁷Although Mousa (2020) studies a setting of internal displacement in Iraq, the work focuses solely on IDPs (Christians and Muslims). This differs substantially from the setting of Pemba, where both IDPs and local hosts coexist. In addition, Mousa (2020) only focuses on measuring intergroup interactions' effects on the minority group (Christians), without measuring the majority group (Muslims). In this study, I innovate by measuring the effects of intergroup contact on the majority group, which is the subpopulation more empowered to improve the social integration of displaced individuals.

2011), community meetings can be an effective instrument to decrease preference for insurgents among participants while also improving religious tolerance. My results reinforce the role of information provision as an effective counterinsurgency and deradicalization channel. The results align with recent empirical evidence, coincidentally also from Cabo Delgado, that information provision is effective in countering violence and religious-extremist beliefs (Armand et al. 2020, Vicente and Vilela 2022). Complementing these works, this study explores the important role of information directly transmitted by religious extremists’ victims (as opposed to the media, opinion makers, governments, or other indirect channels) in shaping how individuals think about conflict.

The structure of this paper is as follows. First, I explain the context of Cabo Delgado in Section 2. Next, in Section 3, I detail the intervention, including the field-experiment design, baseline statistics, balance tests, and the design of the community meetings. In Section 4, I outline my hypotheses. Section 5 provides an overview of the main qualitative evidence. The main empirical results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.

2 Contextual Background

This paper studies Cabo Delgado, the northernmost province of Mozambique (Figure 1 displays the location of Mozambique within Africa and Cabo Delgado within Mozambique). Despite substantial liquefied natural gas reserves in the area (Idowu 2017), Cabo Delgado continues to be one of the poorest provinces in Mozambique, having a nominal GDP per capita of 243 US dollars—half of Mozambique’s national average (INE 2021).

In October 2017, the region was affected by a violent insurgency launched by the Islamist group locally known as Al-Shabaab, which is affiliated with the Islamic State. The insurgency is motivated by religious extremism, and it resulted from cleavages between conservative Salafi movements in Cabo Delgado and Islamic authorities closely connected to the Mozambican government. Repression of these Salafi movements gradually led to their militarization. Young men were sent abroad for military training—to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Somalia and



Figure 1: The location of Mozambique and Cabo Delgado.

Tanzania—and radical clerics were brought to Cabo Delgado (Estelle and Darden 2021).⁸

At first, the insurgency was confined to the town of Mocimboa da Praia, but it has since spread to most of Cabo Delgado and the surrounding provinces of Niassa and Nampula. Al-Shabaab has primarily targeted rural villages and midsized urban centers (district capitals), destroying public infrastructure and abducting and killing thousands of civilians. The geographical distribution of the insurgents' attacks, as recorded by ACLED and represented in Figure 2, shows the extent of the insurgency as of August 2022.

As of June 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported approximately 946,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to the conflict in Cabo Delgado—equivalent to about 40% of the total population in the province in 2017 according to the Mozambique Census. Of these IDPs, approximately 140,000 resided in Pemba. This substantial inflow of IDPs has resulted in a 70% increase in the population of Pemba, which was 201,000 in 2017 according to the latest Mozambique Census, as depicted in Figure 3.

⁸It is also argued that the tension between civil groups and the government were exacerbated by three main factors. First, the persistent income inequality and poverty. Second, the recent findings of substantial reserves of natural gas in Cabo Delgado have led to the appropriation of natural resources by interest groups. Finally, the neglect of coastal populations which instigated a speech of victimization and resentment (?).




Figure 2: Number of attacks by insurgents in each district of Cabo Delgado (October 2017–August 2022). Source: ACLED Data.





Figure 3: Change in Pemba's population between 2017 and 2022. Sources: [INE \(2017\)](#), [IOM \(2022\)](#).

2.1 Characterization of the IDPs in Pemba

To gain a deeper understanding of IDPs, I conducted an individual-level baseline survey. This survey was designed to be representative of the population and to provide a more comprehensive and granular view of the social situation in Pemba, as existing data on the subject (mostly reported by the International Organization for Migration) was largely aggregated or qualitative. I focused on measuring the journey of IDPs from their homelands to Pemba and the exposure of IDPs to the insurgency, as indicated by whether they personally knew someone abducted or killed by insurgents.




(a) The distribution of IDPs by the year they left their homelands. (b) The distribution of IDPs by year of arrival in Pemba, and the average number of places through which IDPs relocated.

Figure 4: The IDPs' pattern of departure from homelands and arrival in Pemba (2017-2022).

The distribution of surveyed IDPs according to the year in which they left their homelands is shown in Figure 4a. The increasing number of IDPs leaving their homelands until 2020 is consistent with the timing of the conflict. The first reported attack in Cabo Delgado took place in October 2017, and insurgents' activities gradually increased in magnitude and frequency in the years after. A turning point occurred in 2020, when the insurgents advanced territorially in Cabo Delgado by capturing the midsized town of Mocimboa da Praia, which explains the sizable increase in the number of surveyed IDPs reporting having left their homelands in 2020. The next year, 2021, saw reinforcement of government forces fighting the insurgency and support by an international military coalition, which decreased insurgents' activity. This strategic advancement is consistent with the decreased number of surveyed IDPs reporting having left their homelands in 2021 and 2022.⁹

Figure 4b shows the distribution of IDPs according to the year in which they arrived in Pemba. The pattern of arrivals is consistent with the data presented in Figure 4a. Surveyed IDPs were asked how many places they had stayed before moving to their current shelter (as of August 2022). IDPs stayed on average in 2.4 places before settling into their current place of shelter in Pemba (excluding IDPs who arrived in 2022). Although the baseline survey did not ask IDPs to separate shelters en route to Pemba from those within the city, this information is consistent with the re-

⁹Information regarding 2022 continues until August, when the baseline survey was conducted.



(a) Number of IDPs who know someone abducted by insurgents. (b) Number of IDPs with at least one household member that left due to a reason related with insurgents.

Figure 5: Exposure of IDPs to the insurgency.

ports issued by the International Organization for Migration: IDPs tend to stay in multiple places, namely transit camps, before settling.

The baseline survey included two instruments measuring the exposure of IDPs to the current conflict, following the survey modules developed by Bruck et al. (2010; 2013): one instrument captured (i) whether surveyed IDPs knew someone within or outside their household who was abducted by insurgents and (ii) their relationship with that person (displayed in Figure 5a); the other instrument captured whether someone left an IDP's household for a reason directly related to insurgents (displayed in Figure 5b).¹⁰

Starting with the evidence presented in Figure 5a, roughly half of the IDP sample (48.5%) reported knowing someone abducted by insurgents. Most of the reported abductees were relatives (33.6%), which reveals how close surveyed IDPs were to the conflict. Figure 5b corroborates this evidence by showing that 17.5% of surveyed IDPs reported that at least one household member was abducted by insurgents. This figure also shows that 5.4% of surveyed IDPs had at least one household member killed by insurgents—arguably one of the worst types of exposure to in-

¹⁰The measure of whether an IDP's household member was killed by insurgents was not asked directly, as suggested by Bruck et al. (2010; 2013).

surgents. Meanwhile, 5.4% of IDPs reported that at least one household member left to escape insurgents, highlighting the role of the insurgency in splitting households. Finally, 0.6% of IDPs (three individuals) reported that at least one household member left to voluntarily join insurgents, an occurrence that is likely to be underreported because of the sensitivity of the topic.

2.2 Barriers to Social Integration of Locals and IDPs

The massive increase in the population of Pemba has generated significant friction between IDPs and local hosts. Although empirical evidence on this issue is limited, there exist multiple anecdotal accounts of such tension. This tension manifests in various forms, such as barriers to local business development or accessing public services; verbal, physical, or sexual violence; extortion; and forced labor.

During my fieldwork, locals and IDPs cited several reasons for this tension. One of the most salient issues concerned the economic vulnerability of both locals and IDPs. It was difficult for locals to morally accept that the support provided by humanitarian workers and government authorities was almost entirely directed toward IDPs while most of the locals also lived in extreme poverty. This evidence corroborates the similar finding in previous studies ([Ansar, Faisal, and Khaled 2021](#), [George and Adelaja 2022](#)) that tension is accentuated where local hosts are poorer or have lower human capital, such as in Pemba ([Verme and Schuettler 2021](#)). Cultural differences between locals, who came mostly from urban settings, and IDPs, who came from less urbanized areas, were also listed as a significant source of friction. These cultural differences ranged from hygiene routines to social behavior.¹¹

In the baseline survey, I asked multiple questions addressing the beliefs and attitudes of locals and IDPs toward each other. The answers are summarized in Figure 6. The survey results indicate a significant level of intolerance of locals toward IDPs, with 42% of the surveyed locals reporting that IDPs brought insecurity to their neighborhoods, 28% believing that IDPs should be relocated,

¹¹To a lesser extent, competition in business and for the provision of public goods and services (education and health care) were also listed as sources of friction between locals and IDPs, in line with existing research ([Castells-Quintana, del Pilar Lopez-Urbe, and McDermott 2022](#)).

33% thinking that the presence of IDPs is negative to the host neighborhood, and 32% feeling that their living conditions had worsened with the arrival of IDPs (however, the majority of locals, 53%, reported that they trusted IDPs, almost as high as the proportion trusting other locals, 56%). These statistics corroborate my anecdotal evidence that locals did not support hosting IDPs in their neighborhoods.

In contrast, less than half of IDPs (44%) reported trusting locals, while a considerably higher proportion (62%) reported trusting other IDPs. This discrepancy, not observed in locals, suggests a problem of trust among IDPs, which is consistent with my anecdotal evidence of frequent discrimination against IDPs.





Figure 6: The attitudes of locals and IDPs toward each other. $N_{locals} = 416$, $N_{IDPs} = 495$

Finally, the survey results suggest that locals and IDPs held different beliefs about the extent to which the voices of both groups were heard in host neighborhoods (see Figure 7a). While a similar percentage of respondents in both groups believed that the voice of IDPs was more heard than locals' (7.8% vs. 6.8%), sizable disparities existed among the respondents who thought both groups were equally heard (62% and 47% for locals and IDPs respectively) and those who believed that locals were more heard than IDPs (30% of locals and 46% of IDPs).

Following a similar pattern, locals and IDPs also had contrasting beliefs on how neighborhood authorities—the layer of government most present in the daily life of locals and IDPs—treated both groups, as shown in Figure 7b. Both groups believed that neighborhood authorities treated locals better than IDPs (17.8% of locals and 14.3% of IDPs); however, they had differing views on how equally treated the two groups were: 68.9% of locals felt that both groups were treated equally by neighborhood authorities, while 13.3% believed that locals received better treatment; only 55.5% of IDPs believed that both groups were treated equally, and 30.2% felt that locals received better treatment. These different perceptions are consistent with IDPs’ considerably lower trust in locals.



(a) *Voices of IDPs within host neighborhoods.* (b) *Treatment of locals and IDPs by neighborhood authorities.*

In summary, the baseline data underscore significant challenges in socially integrating locals and IDPs. Locals exhibited reduced tolerance for IDPs in their neighborhoods and often held negative beliefs about them. Meanwhile, IDPs reported diminished trust in locals and perceptions of receiving inferior treatment by both locals and neighborhood authorities.

2.3 Religious Tolerance among Locals and IDPs

Locals and IDPs in Pemba expressed concerns about individuals’ support for insurgents. The theoretical and empirical literatures on insurgencies find that some support from the population is necessary for an insurgency to persist, with the population typically providing information, shelter, manpower, and supplies (see [Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011](#)). In Cabo Delgado, local authorities were concerned about the possible infiltration of insurgents among locals and IDPs in Pemba,

who are not necessarily combatants but may sympathize with the insurgency. There is a lack of documented evidence about the extent to which locals and IDPs in Pemba sympathized with insurgents. However, this concern was fueled by several episodes in which insurgents were captured within Pemba while abetted by IDPs, insurgents were seen visiting relatives, and weaponry was found in the homes of local hosts within the city.¹²

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is intertwined with radical Islam. To get an initial quantitative understanding of the prevalence of religious-extremist beliefs in Pemba, the baseline survey measured the religious tolerance of Muslim study participants (locals and IDPs). The definition of religious tolerance used in this study relies on the input provided by local Muslim leaders, and it has two dimensions—imposition of Islam as the unique religion, and enforcement of Islamic law—that were validated by Muslim leaders as closely linked to insurgents’ ideological stances. Religious tolerance was then measured in the baseline survey through two questions, each one capturing one of the two dimensions. Given the sensitivity of this topic, the questions were validated by local Muslim leaders.¹³

The first question measured respondents’ preference for religious freedom by asking with which of two sentences they agreed more: “The Law should force every person to follow the same religion”; and “People should be free to follow any religion, even if I do not like that religion.” The second question concerned respondents’ preference for the imposition of the Sharia over freedom of religion. Respondents were asked which of the following sentences they agreed with more: “The Sharia should be enforced, as almost everyone in Cabo Delgado is Muslim”; “Religious freedom is a right of every person, even if I do not like some religions.” The results are presented in Figure 8.

The evidence presented shows that 34% of both surveyed Muslim locals and IDPs reported preferring that the law force the same religion on everyone rather than allowing people to freely

¹²Anecdotal evidence also suggests that two well-documented mechanisms may partially explain why some locals and IDPs support the insurgents. The first one is grievance (ethnic and religious), as suggested by [Collier and Hoeffler 2004](#)); the other is a low opportunity cost of supporting insurgents ([Dube and Vargas 2013](#)), given the combination of poor socioeconomic status of most locals and IDPs, on one side, and low state capacity to capture insurgents, on the other.

¹³Because of safety concerns and anticipated social desirability bias, the survey did not include questions asking directly about attitudes toward the insurgency but instead relied on religious tolerance as a proxy.




Figure 8: Baseline level of religious tolerance of Muslims.

choose their religion. Regarding the imposition of the Sharia, the opinion of locals and IDPs differed considerably: while 18% of locals reported a preference for imposing Sharia, this number increased to 24% among IDPs (a 33% increase). Overall, locals and IDPs shared similar views on religious freedom (which is not directly related to radical Islam). The considerably higher percentage of IDPs preferring imposition of Sharia to religious freedom (relative to locals) suggests a greater risk of radicalization among IDPs.

3 The Intervention

My intervention consisted in the convening of a single community meeting to a random sample of local hosts and IDPs. The community meetings took place between August and October 2022, and the program of meetings was developed in collaboration with local leaders from the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO). The intervention was endorsed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Mozambique, the Provincial Government of Cabo Delgado, and the Municipality of Pemba.

Each community meeting was moderated by a local leader affiliated with CISLAMO (all men) who was experienced in managing challenging conversations and resolving conflicts. These mod-

erators were also highly respected and well known in Cabo Delgado, regardless of individuals' religion, ethnicity, or status as a local or IDP. I used local community leaders (rather than psychologists or other professionals with Western training) as moderators for two main reasons. One was to incorporate a program design that would be easier to replicate and scale up, as Cabo Delgado (like many similar settings around the world) has a shortage of formally trained professionals, so the population has to rely on local community members. The other reason was to avoid an intervention that would impose Western values on study participants—which could be counterproductive (Verwimp, Justino, and Bruck 2019).

Each community meeting's moderator was randomly assigned. The moderator received training on the meeting protocol, which followed the framework of a *public conversation* (Herzig and Chasin 2006), as detailed in Section 3.1. Throughout each meeting, the protocol was strictly enforced by the moderator. This framework was adapted to the context of Pemba by incorporating the feedback of moderators, local community leaders, and the population. Participants in community meetings engaged in a dialogue, defined as *a conversation in which participants who have different beliefs and perspectives seek to develop mutual understanding* (Herzig and Chasin 2006). There are two principles embodied in this definition of dialogue. First, a dialogue (and therefore a community meeting) is not a debate, meaning that its fundamental purpose is for participants to seek mutual understanding, rather than prove that their beliefs are right. Second, the purpose of a dialogue is not to mediate or solve conflicts nor to promote personal growth—although it may incidentally serve these purposes.

The community meetings had two main objectives. The first one consisted in decreasing prejudice and improving the relationship between locals and IDPs, as suggested by the friction between the two groups measured in the baseline survey: intolerance of locals toward IDPs and lack of trust of IDPs in locals. Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis, according to which engagement between two groups can lead, under certain contact conditions, to a decrease in prejudice and improvement of intergroup relations, suggests that the objective would be achieved. These conditions, as applied to the design of the community meetings, were *equal status of both groups*, meaning there was no hierarchical relationship during intergroup contact; *cooperation*, meaning both groups engaged

with each other in a noncompetitive environment; *common goals*, such that both locals and IDPs engaged in the meeting with the same objectives; and *support from authorities*, meaning that the meetings were regulated by an entity respected by both groups. Section 3.1 provides further details on how Allport's contact conditions were established in the meetings.

The second main objective of the program of community meetings was to improve religious tolerance and to reduce religious extremism among both locals and IDPs—which were closely connected to the ideological stance of insurgents. The efficacy of this objective of intergroup contact, proposed by psychologists (Milla and Umam 2019), has not been empirically tested much. To achieve this objective, community meetings included a component in which IDPs were invited to share their stories about escaping insurgents. This component was intended to trigger two mechanisms. First, by raising compassion toward and understanding of IDPs' experiences and current situation, this component should decrease the ideological appeal of insurgents and cause study participants to question their behavior (a mechanism proposed by Doosje et al. 2016). Second, this component aimed to reduce the *us-versus-them* mindset, as Milla and Umam (2019) suggest that reducing it is effective in countering religious extremism.

3.1 The Design of Community Meetings

Each community meeting followed the same protocol, detailed in Appendix A, and its cohort size ranged between 8 and 10 participants, with a targeted equal split between locals and IDPs. The meeting started with the moderator introducing himself and welcoming participants. The moderator also detailed his role in the meeting and provided other practical information. The moderator proceeded to explain the rules of communication: all participants (regardless of local or IDP status) would be treated equally, the goal of the meeting was to have an open and inclusive conversation, and all participants were expected to maintain a cooperative attitude (not interrupting others, listening carefully, and trying to put themselves in others' position). This explanation was intended to create the social environment Allport (1954) suggests is conducive to intergroup contact.

Participants then started engaging in the meeting. They were initially invited to introduce themselves and share their expectations about the meeting. The meeting proceeded with a go-around format, which consisted in the moderator reading out loud different questions prespecified in the meeting protocol. After each question was read, participants took one minute and thought about what they would like to say. Then each participant spoke for three minutes. In the first go-around question, locals were asked how their lives changed with the arrival of IDPs in their neighborhood. IDPs were instead asked how their lives changed in that neighborhood relative to their homeland before the conflict started. The moderator continued by asking about the main difficulty in integrating IDPs in their neighborhood; he also asked IDPs for one positive aspect of their lives in the host neighborhood and asked locals for one positive thing IDPs brought to the host neighborhood. The moderator then asked IDPs to share their stories of fleeing their homeland and escaping from insurgents.



Figure 9: The setup of community meetings.

The last part of the meeting consisted in an open discussion. Specifically, the moderator encouraged all participants to freely exchange arguments, and he intervened only if a rule of engagement was broken. The moderator and participants were arranged in a circle (displayed in Figure 9). This arrangement ensured that all participants (and the moderator) occupied identical positions, creating a more conducive environment for discussion and engagement.

3.2 Sampling, Randomization, and Baseline Data

Field activities commenced with random sampling of locals and IDPs, as delineated in the timeline in Figure 10. Research staff concentrated on one neighborhood at a time for logistic reasons (political constraints and the mobility of IDPs). Research activities in each neighborhood lasted for five days. The first phase of the project—consisting of sampling, baseline activities, community meetings, and post-meeting activities—took place between August and October 2022.




Figure 10: Project timeline

The sampling of IDPs used the Displacement Tracking Matrix, a database made available to me by the International Organization for Migration and the government of Pemba District. The Displacement Tracking Matrix is derived from the roster of all IDPs who arrived in Pemba; the roster is compiled by neighborhood authorities and transferred to both the International Organization for Migration and the district government. This database catalogs the name, host neighborhood, and contact details of each primary IDP family member and dependents. Leveraging this data set, I selected a random sample of 48 to 60 IDPs from each neighborhood.

The sampling methodology for locals diverged from that for IDPs, primarily because there was no updated census containing comprehensive information on locals. To select local household heads for the intervention, I employed the random-walk technique.¹⁴

On the initial day of field activities, IDPs and locals, having been thoroughly briefed about the project, offered their informed consent to participate in the study. They were then randomly allocated ticket numbers detailing the time and venue of the research activities. This number functioned as a unique identifier, enabling the research team to associate each participant with a specific cohort, which could be designated to either a treatment or control group. All participants randomly placed in the same treatment cohort were selected to engage in the same community meeting and to engage in the surveys and lab-in-the-field games on the same schedule. Participants belonging to the same control cohort were only selected to engage in surveys and lab-in-the-field games following the same schedule. As noted, the size of both treatment and control cohorts ranged between 8 and 10 participants, with a targeted equal mix of locals and IDPs. Beyond the provided schedule and ticket number, participants remained unaware of their cohort or treatment assignment.

During the subsequent two days, participants completed a baseline survey. Those assigned to a treatment cohort moved to a secluded area to engage in the community meeting. Upon arrival, all participants, irrespective of their treatment status, were informed whether they would participate in a community meeting. They had merely been informed that a subset of participants would be randomly selected for such a gathering. Independently of their involvement in the meeting, every participant was compensated with a show-up fee of 100 Mozambique meticalis, equivalent to USD 1.57. Additionally, individuals participating in the community meeting were provided with a snack.

On the fourth and fifth days, participants reconvened for post-meeting activities: a post-meeting survey (mirroring the baseline survey), list experiments, the IAT, and lab-in-the-field games. The

¹⁴The region's political climate necessitated that local enumerators navigate neighborhoods with the assistance of local guides. These guides possessed the requisite political clearance, allowing them to seamlessly approach households and initiate interactions with residents. Throughout this exercise, it was imperative for the enumerators to ascertain that the chosen individuals were genuine locals rather than IDPs. To ensure authenticity, individuals were asked to present their national ID cards, which indicate their city of residency. In the occasional case in which locals lacked such identification, the local guide would vouch for the individual's residency status.

subsequent phase of this study consisted of follow-up activities, spanning November to December 2022 (between two and three months following the community meetings). These activities were identical to those in the post-meeting phase, and they measured the medium-term evolution of the effects observed during the post-meeting activities.

3.3 Sample Balance and Attrition

This section analyzes the sample balance between control and treatment groups. The baseline sample included 415 locals from Pemba and 498 IDPs, totaling 913 individuals.¹⁵ Balance tests for the main individual observable characteristics are presented in Table C2, which separates the statistics between the samples of locals and IDPs as well as between the treatment and control groups.

Table C2 indicates that the sample of locals is generally balanced between the treatment and control groups, as there is no statistically significant difference between the means of both groups for any of the variables. Unlike locals, for IDPs the ethnic composition is less concentrated, with 50% of them being Makua (compared to 81% among locals) and 35% Mwani (five times higher than the 7% among locals). The sample of IDPs is mostly balanced between the treatment and control groups, with the exceptions of individuals with only an elementary education (p-value=0.052) and the Makua (p-value=0.072), who are more represented in the treatment group. Both of these variables are included as controls in all the empirical results presented in Section 6.

As for sample attrition, thoroughly addressed in Appendix E, 20 locals (4.8%) originally surveyed at baseline were absent from the post-meeting phase, escalating to 45 individuals (10.8%) in the follow-up phase. Among IDPs, there were 15 individuals absent from the post-meeting phase (3.0%), increasing to 113 (22.7%) in the follow-up phase. An analysis described in Appendixes E.1 and E.2 finds slight evidence of differential and selective attrition among locals during both

¹⁵Table C1 compares the baseline characteristics of locals and IDPs. Although both groups are similar in most characteristics, they diverge in some dimensions. Lack of any type of schooling is more prevalent among IDPs than locals because most IDPs come from places (minor towns and rural villages) where schooling provision was inferior to what was available to locals in Pemba. IDPs also showed less access to information and less social capital relative to locals. Finally, the Makua ethnic group was more prevalent among locals, while the Mwani ethnic group was more prevalent among IDPs. This is related to the fact that the areas most affected by the insurgency (coastal areas of Cabo Delgado, as displayed in Figure 2) are inhabited by the Mwani people, while the Makua constitute the majority group in the rest of the province.

the post-meeting and follow-up phases and among IDPs only in the post-meeting phase. Appendix E.3 provides evidence, from inverse probability weighting, that despite this issue, the treatment effects discussed in Section 6 are robust. This indicates that the treatment effects are unlikely to have been significantly altered by sample attrition.

4 Research Hypotheses

This section outlines my primary hypotheses and the corresponding instruments used for their measurement, per the registered pre-analysis plan (Barros 2022).

I anticipated that the engagement in community meetings could diminish social exclusion and discrimination and enhance trust (as detailed in Section 3). The tools used to measure these outcomes are survey questions capturing locals' tolerance toward IDPs, IDPs' sense of integration in their neighborhoods, and the preference among both groups for improved treatment of IDPs by local authorities. In addition, trust within and between groups was evaluated (refer to Appendix B.1 for details about the survey instruments used). To mitigate the impact of social desirability bias in survey responses, two list experiments were employed: one assessing discrimination by locals against IDPs, and the other focusing on IDPs' perception of being discriminated against by locals (see Appendix B.2 for details). Additionally, public goods and trust games were administered (details in Appendix D.1), with the prediction that the meetings would induce their participants to increase their monetary contributions in both games, particularly their contributions to members of the other group.

The second focal area of this study is religious extremism sparked by growing concerns in Pemba that insurgents were infiltrating locals and IDPs, particularly those not directly exposed to the conflict. Given the limited data and the sensitivity of this issue, evidence circulating in Pemba stems primarily from anecdotal accounts collected by local field staff. These include sightings or arrests of insurgents within the city, abductions of insurgents' relatives (predominantly spouses) within the city limits, and discoveries and confiscations of weapons by governmental authorities. These observations support the theory that insurgents require local support to obtain information,

manpower, shelter, and supplies (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011).

To address the concern that some locals and IDPs sympathized with insurgents (described in Section 2.3), the community meetings were curated with an emphasis on the insurgency's religious extremism. IDPs were invited to share their personal stories of leaving their homeland, fleeing from insurgents, and settling in Pemba. While not all participating IDPs encountered insurgents during their exodus, fully 48.5% (Figure 5a) knew someone who had been abducted by them. The aim of IDPs sharing these experiences was to raise awareness among all attendees of the violence perpetrated by insurgents in the name of Islam. As suggested by psychologists, these techniques introduce new information potentially contradicting previously held beliefs (Doosje et al. 2016, Milla and Umam 2019). In Pemba, firsthand accounts from IDPs would likely prompt other locals and IDPs to question the insurgents' motives. Recent empirical studies from Cabo Delgado support this prediction, suggesting that fostering critical questioning can effectively challenge the beliefs of insurgents (Vicente and Vilela 2022).

To quantify religious tolerance and extremist inclinations, multiple strategies were employed. First, a religious-tolerance index was constructed from two survey questions about individual preferences regarding religious freedom and the imposition of Sharia (see Appendix B.1). I hypothesized that meeting attendance would improve religious tolerance.

Two other measures centered on gauging individual preferences for insurgents. Given the ethical, political, and security challenges of directly inquiring about insurgent support, indirect methods were used. The first method was a novel graphical list experiment designed for this study. This experiment presented participants with four non-sensitive images and, for a subset randomly selected, an additional image representing Al-Shabaab. Details, including the full image set, can be found in Appendix B.2.2. I hypothesized that meeting attendees would show reduced preference for insurgents, as evidenced by whether those exposed to the sensitive image favored fewer images than the control group.

Last, the IAT was given to capture participants' inherent biases toward government authorities

or insurgents. The IAT assesses implicit biases on sensitive subjects (Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz 1998). Participants were shown images representing either authorities or insurgents and asked to associate them with positive or negative emotions. The underlying theory is that individuals more rapidly associate certain stimuli with emotions if the stimuli align with their inherent biases. In this study, two emotional stimuli (happy and sad faces) and two target stimuli (images of authorities and insurgents, validated by the Pemba community) were used. The resultant IAT score reflected biases toward insurgents versus government authorities (details in Appendix B.4). For instance, a quicker association of positive emotions with authorities and negative ones with insurgents indicated an IAT score closer to preferring government authorities over insurgents. This example corresponds to the testable prediction in this study: by questioning previously held beliefs, preference for insurgents decreases, reflected by a stronger bias toward authorities over insurgents.

5 Qualitative Evidence from Community Meetings

The community meetings' protocol (outlined in Section 3.1 and Appendix A) incorporated two components: an initial structured segment, in which the moderator posed questions to the participants; and a subsequent open discussion. The latter part encouraged an organic exchange of ideas with minimal moderator intervention—which varied across meeting cohorts because of the unique characteristics of each participant group. To capture the substance of the open discussions, moderators were tasked with filling out one-page reports immediately following each meeting. These reports collected qualitative data about the key topics discussed while abstaining from referencing any personal identifiers. Although these reports did not cover all meeting feedback—other insights were communicated verbally and not included in the formal reports—they still offered a snapshot of the main themes discussed.

The reported discussion topics can be broadly divided into three categories: (i) IDPs' recounting their experiences with insurgents and fleeing from conflict, (ii) the relationship between locals and IDPs in the neighborhood, specifically regarding discrimination and unequal access to common goods, and (iii) perceived inadequacies of support from the local government and the humanitarian sector. A visualization of these topics is provided in Figure 11.




Figure 11: Topics discussed in the community meetings, as reported by moderators. On average nine individuals participated in each meeting.

The most recurrent topic, per the moderator reports, was the relationship between locals and IDPs, surfacing in 20 meetings across eight (of nine) neighborhoods. Inadequate support from governing bodies and international organizations was the second most discussed issue, brought up in 19 meetings across six neighborhoods. Tales of flight and experiences with insurgents were the third most frequent theme, appearing in eight meetings across five neighborhoods. Additional minor topics included economic issues, such as inflation and entrepreneurship, and IDPs’ longing to return to their homeland.

In addition to the written reports, verbal feedback from moderators provided further qualitative evidence about how the community meetings unfolded. Though the formal reports only specifically mentioned eight meetings discussing the IDPs’ experiences with insurgents and flight from conflict, moderators verbally reported that almost every meeting featured at least one IDP recounting their story (either during the more structured part of the meeting or in the open-discussion segment). Such narratives invariably stirred emotional reactions among the locals and fellow IDPs. It was also frequently reported that after IDPs expressed their desire to return to their homeland, locals became less concerned about issues related to competition over land.

Post-meeting participant feedback, albeit anecdotal, produced two key insights. First, locals

expressed that participation in the meeting was a pivotal learning experience. Despite residing in the same neighborhood as IDPs, often for several years, locals acknowledged their ignorance regarding the hardships endured by the IDPs and their stories of fleeing from conflict. Second, for the IDPs, the community meeting served as a platform to voice their experiences and emotions. Many IDPs noted that the community meeting marked the first time they were given an opportunity to express their feelings and thoughts about the insurgency and life in Pemba.

6 Empirical Results

To analyze the impact of the intervention, I assessed both immediate and medium-term treatment effects. Immediate effects were evaluated using data from post-meeting activities within two to three days of the intervention, while medium-term effects were measured through follow-up activities two to three months later. To ensure consistency, I applied the same empirical strategy in both phases, limiting the sample to post-meeting or follow-up observations as necessary. The econometric specification used to estimate the treatment effects is detailed in Equation 1.

$$Y_{inc} = \alpha + \beta T_{nc} + \delta \mathbf{N}_n + \theta \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \rho \mathbf{M}_{nc} + \varepsilon_{inc} \quad (1)$$

Y_{inc} refers to the outcome Y of individual i , in neighborhood n , belonging to cohort c . T_{nc} is a binary variable taking value 1 if the individual participated in a community meeting, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient of interest is β , which estimates the effect of participating in a community meeting (T_{nc}). \mathbf{N}_n represents a vector of neighborhood dummies, and \mathbf{X}_{inc} is a set of controls for individual demographic characteristics measured at baseline. For outcome variables measured also at baseline, I include a lagged dependent variable. \mathbf{M}_{nc} is a vector of controls for meetings' characteristics (cohort size, percentage of IDPs/locals in the cohort). ε_{inc} is an individual-specific error term, which is clustered at the cohort level.

Because of the large set of outcomes being estimated, I addressed issues of multiple-hypothesis testing by computing Romano-Wolf stepdown adjusted p-values ([Romano and Wolf 2005a;b; 2016](#)), displayed inside the square brackets). The adjusted p-value displayed within each square

bracket results from testing at the *phase level*—separately for post-meeting and follow-up results—the null hypothesis that the treatment effect for all outcomes is equal to zero.

6.1 Attitudes of Locals toward IDPs

Table 1 illustrates the positive impact of community meetings on local attitudes toward IDPs. The data in columns (1) and (2) suggest that the community meetings served as an effective immediate catalyst in enhancing locals' tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods. An index of survey questions is used as the outcome measure, aggregating the responses from two survey questions inquiring about local tolerance toward IDPs in host neighborhoods (the index ranges within the unit interval, with higher values corresponding to more tolerance toward IDPs).¹⁶

Column (1) displays the effect immediately after the meeting: an 11.5% average increase in tolerance (significant at the 5% level), observed two to three days after the intervention. However, this improvement is not discernible in the follow-up assessment conducted two to three months later, as shown in column (2). This is evident in the near-zero estimated coefficient size in the follow-up and the p-value of 0.066 obtained when testing the equality of immediate and follow-up treatment effects. The absence of significant short-term effects on outcomes related to locals' beliefs, trust, and discrimination against IDPs, illustrated in columns (3), (5), and (7), indicates that, initially, community meetings solely enhanced locals' tolerance without influencing their level of empathy for IDPs.

In the medium term, the evidence from Table 1 suggests, community meetings led to a positive shift in locals' empathy toward IDPs, noticeable across all assessed outcomes (positive beliefs, trust, and discrimination). The locals' positive beliefs about IDPs were evaluated using an index of survey questions designed to measure their associations of IDPs with worse living conditions and heightened insecurity in host neighborhoods as well as a generally negative perception of IDPs' presence. As indicated in column (4), the results demonstrate a 9.2% increase in such positive beliefs among locals in the medium term (significant at the 5% level). Additionally, the level of locals' trust in IDPs was assessed using a survey question that spanned a range from *no trust* to

¹⁶Appendix B.1 provides a detailed explanation of how the tolerance index was constructed.

significant trust on a four-point scale within the unit interval. Consistent with the previous pattern, the level of trust in IDPs, represented in column (6), increased 10.1%, significant at the 10% level.¹⁷

Table 1: The effects of community meetings on the attitudes of locals toward the presence of IDPs in host neighborhoods.

	Tolerates IDPs staying in host neighborhood		Positive beliefs about IDPs in host neighborhood		Trust in IDPs		Discrimination against IDPs	
	Post-meeting	Follow-up	Post-meeting	Follow-up	Post-meeting	Follow-up	Post-meeting	Follow-up
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Treated	0.075** (0.035) [0.079]	0.003 (0.034) [0.931]	0.013 (0.020) [0.802]	0.054** (0.025) [0.089]	0.005 (0.033) [0.941]	0.054* (0.030) [0.089]	0.147 (0.128) [0.525]	0.107 (0.126) [0.614]
Sensitive × Treated							-0.047 (0.195) [0.941]	-0.378** (0.182) [0.089]
Sensitive sentence							0.511*** (0.126) [0.010]	0.269** (0.130) [0.089]
Mean (control group)	0.651	0.827	0.600	0.587	0.531	0.537	2.298	2.277
P-value Post-meeting=follow-up	0.066		0.119		0.202		0.239	
R ²	0.373	0.321	0.346	0.310	0.383	0.380	0.456	0.491
N	367	332	367	332	367	332	354	330
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). The dependent variables in columns (1) to (6) are constructed using survey data. Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable an index measuring the tolerance of locals toward IDPs staying in host neighborhoods, ranging within the unit interval where a higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. Columns (3) and (4) use as dependent variable an index of survey questions capturing the beliefs of locals about IDPs in hosting neighborhoods. This index ranges within the unit interval, where a higher value represents more positive beliefs. Columns (5) and (6) measure locals' trust in IDPs, using as dependent variable a 4-point scale index within the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to more trust. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring locals' discrimination against IDPs, where the dependent variable takes integer numbers ranging from 0 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which locals agree. *Sensitive* is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. *P-value Post-meeting=follow-up* tests the null hypothesis that the treatment effects (columns (1) to (6)) or the interaction (columns (7) and (8)) are equal between post-meeting and follow-up phases. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

To further supplement the analysis of survey outcomes, a list experiment was conducted to assess the level of discrimination by locals against IDPs. In this experiment, each local respondent was read four non-sensitive statements. Additionally, half of the sample was randomly selected to

¹⁷Section D.2 examines the effects of community meetings on locals' trust in diverse individuals, groups, and government authorities. It notes a significant short-term decrease in trust among locals toward fellow residents of Cabo Delgado, Mozambicans more broadly, and the armed forces. There were no discernible alterations in trust in other community members (such as relatives, neighbors, and community leaders) or toward the government. Apart from the improvement in locals' trust in IDPs—also articulated in Table 1—no medium-term effects were observed. I interpret this as a result of IDPs' narrating their escape stories, thereby potentially heightening the salience of distrust of other Mozambicans—given that the majority of insurgents are presumed to be Mozambicans, predominantly from Cabo Delgado—and underscoring the inefficacy of the armed forces in thwarting insurgent activities.

hear a sensitive statement: “I do not like IDPs who live in this neighborhood.” Respondents were then asked to quantify the number of statements with which they agreed. Importantly, enumerators remained uninformed about respondents’ answers to individual statements. A comprehensive description of the execution of the list experiment is provided in Appendix B.2.

Columns (7) and (8) present the results. The dependent variable is an integer value ranging from 0 to 5, representing the total number of statements the respondent agreed with. Using Equation 1, the effects were calculated by incorporating a binary variable (*Sensitive*) to indicate random exposure to the sensitive statement. The interaction between *Treated* and *Sensitive* is the variable of interest, which, contingent upon the random assignment to hear the sensitive statement, quantifies the influence of community meetings on the number of statements respondents concurred with. In the follow-up assessment (column (8)), attendees of community meetings displayed a 16.6% decrease in discrimination against IDPs, evidenced by the fewer statements with which the respondents exposed to the sensitive statement agreed. Examining the indices of beliefs about IDPs, trust, and the list experiment, the substantial p-values (>0.1) attained from testing the equality of post-meeting and follow-up coefficients do not provide sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the effects recorded in both phases are statistically identical.

The findings presented in Table 1 are inconclusive regarding whether the observed absence of significant effects on tolerance toward IDPs in the follow-up, shown in column (2), is due to the diminishing of post-meeting effects, the presence of social desirability effects or experimenter demand effects, spillovers onto the control group, or an underlying secular positive trend in tolerance. Given the time lapse between the community meetings and the follow-up, it is possible that time made locals’ recollections of their experiences gradually less salient, leading post-meeting treatment effects to depreciate. However, it is important to reconcile these results with how, in the medium term, locals can harbor more positive beliefs about IDPs, exhibit increased trust, and demonstrate reduced discrimination while not showing proportionally more tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods (the reason for this result could be that locals, despite their friendlier beliefs and attitudes toward IDPs, still preferred IDPs to be hosted somewhere else). The possibility that social desirability bias or experimenter demand effects primarily influenced the post-

meeting improvement in tolerance toward IDPs also appears remote. If such were the case, other survey measures, such as beliefs about IDPs and trust, would likely have also manifested in sizable coefficients, a scenario not supported by the data in columns (3) and (5).

Concerning the potential presence of spillover effects or a secular positive trend in tolerance, the elevated average tolerance observed in control-group members between the post-meeting and follow-up phases indicates the possible presence of one or both phenomena. If these spillover effects were indeed prevalent in this study, the significant positive outcomes depicted in column (1) might represent an underestimation of the actual impact of the community meetings.

Regarding the robustness of the results detailed in Table 1, all significant findings withstand the rigors of multiple-hypothesis testing, evidenced by the small adjusted p-values (<0.1), following the Romano-Wolf procedure. Regarding the implications of sample attrition—detailed in Section 3.2—on the effects delineated in Table 1, to adjust for the potential bias due to individual attrition, I conducted further analysis: applying inverse probability weighting (IPW) to account for the likelihood of individual attrition. An exhaustive explanation of this technique and the corresponding results can be found in Appendix E.3. This supplementary analysis finds that the coefficients in Table 1 undergo only small changes in magnitude while maintaining their statistical significance.

In conclusion, the data delineated in Table 1 suggest that community meetings systematically modified locals' perceptions of IDPs. Initially, these gatherings enhanced locals' tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods, without altering the underlying empathy levels. Subsequently, between two and three months after the intervention, the meetings fostered more positive beliefs and trust among locals toward IDPs and diminished discrimination against them.

In addition to the results delineated in Table 1, a public goods game was administered to measure the impact of community meetings on real-life decision-making. In this game, individuals participated simultaneously in pairs. Both locals and IDPs were informed about whether their opponent was a local or an IDP, though specific identities remained undisclosed. The dependent variable in this context was the respondents' monetary contribution, which could range from 0 to

130 Mozambique meticaïs (with 64 meticaïs equivalent to USD 1). The interaction between treatment and playing against a participant from a different group (local or IDP) served as the variable of interest. As depicted in Table D1, the findings suggest that community meetings augmented locals' monetary contributions by 36% in the medium term, a shift observed irrespective of the counterparts' group affiliation. This outcome can be interpreted as indicative of heightened prosocial behavior among locals who attended community meetings, manifesting in equitable treatment of individuals from both groups.

6.1.1 The Role of Prior Beliefs in Shaping the Attitudes of Locals toward IDPs

This section explores the influence of prior beliefs on the impact of community meetings regarding locals' attitudes toward IDPs. The sample of locals was divided based on their baseline views about IDPs (either negative or positive). This baseline view was determined by averaging four survey questions that measured locals' beliefs and attitudes toward IDPs. The corresponding results are displayed in Table 2.

Post-meeting outcomes are displayed in Panel A, capturing short-term effects. Column (1) indicates that the increase in tolerance toward IDPs residing in host neighborhoods predominantly resulted from locals harboring more negative baseline views about IDPs, showcasing an average tolerance increase of 31%. Conversely, the community meetings seemed to render no substantial effect on locals with initially positive views about IDPs, as seen in column (2). The effects appear to diverge between locals with more negative and positive baseline views, supported by the p-value (0.050) obtained from testing the equality of coefficients in columns (1) and (2). Panel B shows that the decline in the positive effect on tolerance, discussed in Section 6.1, is principally attributable to locals with initially negative views about IDPs, with their coefficient decreasing from 0.172 to 0.002, whereas the coefficient for those with initially more positive views remains relatively stable, decreasing from 0.032 to 0.012.

Regarding the positive treatment effects on locals' beliefs and trust in IDPs, the medium-term effects delineated in Section 6.1 were driven by locals with initially more favorable views about IDPs. This is inferred from the evidence in Panel B, reflecting a 10.1% increase in locals' beliefs

Table 2: Heterogeneous effects on locals, according to their initial negative or positive view about IDPs.

	Tolerates IDPs staying in host neighborhoods		Positive beliefs about IDPs in host neighborhoods		Trust in IDPs		Discrimination against IDPs	
	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (1)	Positive (2)	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (3)	Positive (4)	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (5)	Positive (6)	Baseline view of IDPs Negative (7)	Positive (8)
Panel A. Post-meeting effects								
Treated	0.172** (0.069)	0.032 (0.050)	-0.002 (0.046)	0.018 (0.036)	-0.054 (0.076)	0.043 (0.053)	0.088 (0.278)	-0.025 (0.188)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							0.101 (0.381)	-0.124 (0.292)
Mean (control group)	0.554	0.717	0.519	0.663	0.505	0.556	2.222	2.361
P-value negative=positive view	0.050		0.946		0.313		0.660	
R ²	0.607	0.516	0.533	0.464	0.517	0.520	0.646	0.599
N	160	201	160	201	160	201	155	193
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Panel B. Follow-up effects								
Treated	0.002 (0.070)	0.012 (0.052)	0.002 (0.049)	0.063* (0.035)	0.011 (0.047)	0.079** (0.040)	0.117 (0.239)	0.210 (0.167)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							-0.722** (0.314)	-0.399 (0.247)
Mean (control group)	0.816	0.833	0.544	0.619	0.520	0.556	2.279	2.289
P-value negative=positive view	0.872		0.234		0.249		0.263	
R ²	0.583	0.434	0.562	0.499	0.685	0.527	0.758	0.651
N	145	182	145	182	145	182	144	181
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are shown inside parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. Post-meeting (short-term) results are presented in Panel A, while follow-up (medium-term) results are presented in Panel B. Holding a *negative* (*positive*) view corresponds to locals with relatively more negative (*positive*) baseline views about IDPs. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is an index in the unit interval that averages the answer of locals to two survey questions measuring tolerance toward IDPs staying in host neighborhoods. A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. Columns (3) and (4) use as dependent variable an index ranging in the unit interval, where a higher value represents a better perception about IDPs in host neighborhoods. Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable a trust index ranging within the unit interval, where a higher index value represents greater trust in IDPs. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring locals' discrimination against IDPs, where the dependent variable is an integer number ranging from 1 to 5, capturing the number of sentences with which respondents agree. *Sensitive* is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

about IDPs (column (4)) and a 14.2% improvement in locals' trust in IDPs (column (6)). Nevertheless, even though the evidence presented suggests that the effects on beliefs and trust among locals with positive views are statistically significant, it is not possible to conclusively state that they differed from the effects observed in locals with more negative views, as indicated by the p-values of 0.234 and 0.249.

Furthermore, the data in columns (7) and (8) indicate that the reduction in discrimination

against IDPs was predominantly driven by locals with initially more negative views about IDPs, displaying an estimated reduction of 31.7%. Similarly to the effects noted in columns (3) to (6), there is no discernible evidence that the coefficients on discrimination significantly differed between locals with negative and positive initial views about IDPs.

A comprehensive interpretation of the results in Table 2 suggests that community meetings may have induced varied effects depending on locals' initial perceptions of IDPs. Those with relatively more unfavorable views at baseline increased their tolerance of and reduced their discrimination against IDPs. However, the meetings did not significantly enhance the degree of locals' affinity toward or trust in IDPs. Conversely, locals with initially more positive views and presumably a greater natural predisposition to adjust their prior beliefs demonstrated more positive beliefs and trust in IDPs. Despite these interpretations, and even though the coefficient magnitudes may substantially diverge between locals with more negative or positive initial views about IDPs, a definitive conclusion regarding the statistical difference in effects on beliefs, trust, and discrimination for both subgroups cannot be reached.

6.2 Social Integration of IDPs

Table 3 displays the effects of community meetings on IDPs' social integration within host neighborhoods. Columns (1) and (2) employ a survey question as the dependent variable, asking IDPs about their sense of integration into their host neighborhood after the intervention compared to before. The coefficients in these columns suggest that community meetings improved IDPs' sense of integration, with effects manifesting immediately and persisting in the medium term (with treatment effects of 20.6% and 19.2%, respectively, both significant at the 1% level). Correspondingly, a significant increase in IDPs' trust in locals occurs immediately after the intervention and remains substantial in the medium term, with effect sizes of 15.1% and 15.5%, significant at the 5% level.¹⁸

Examining the effects on the integration of IDPs into host neighborhoods' civic life, reported in columns (3) and (4), the outcome measure is an index of survey questions measuring IDPs'

¹⁸Section D.2 shows that community meetings improved IDPs' trust in locals but did not alter trust in any other individual or group.

Table 3: The effects of community meetings on the social integration of IDPs.

	Feels better integrated		Participation in neighborhood life		Trust in locals		Feels discriminated by locals	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)	Post-meeting (7)	Follow-up (8)
Treated	0.142*** (0.028) [0.010]	0.132*** (0.033) [0.010]	0.036** (0.015) [0.040]	0.013 (0.020) [0.832]	0.070** (0.035) [0.040]	0.076** (0.033) [0.297]	0.181 (0.120) [0.040]	0.004 (0.144) [1.000]
Sensitive × Treated							-0.344** (0.159) [0.040]	-0.057 (0.203) [0.891]
Sensitive sentence							0.496*** (0.108) [0.010]	0.424*** (0.135) [0.020]
Mean (control group)	0.689	0.686	0.447	0.501	0.463	0.490	2.271	2.335
Post-meeting=follow-up p-value	0.598		0.095		0.631		0.336	
R ²	0.487	0.443	0.336	0.440	0.351	0.388	0.411	0.458
N	401	332	437	332	435	332	419	329
Lagged Dependent Variable	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable a question measuring the extent to which IDPs agree to be feeling better integrated since the onset of community meetings (the variable uses a 4-point scale within the unit interval). A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. The outcome variable in columns (3) and (4) is a survey index in the unit interval that measures whether IDPs feel more included in the neighborhood civic life, with a greater index value representing more inclusion. Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable a survey question measuring the trust of IDPs toward locals in a four point scale within the unit interval. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals, where the dependent variable ranges from 0 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which IDPs agree. Sensitive sentence is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

perception of being heard and support by the host community. Column (3) reveals that community meetings induced an immediate 8.1% increase in IDPs' perceived inclusion in civic life, significant at the 5% level. However, this improvement was not sustained in the medium term as illustrated in column (4), with a decrease in the estimated coefficient magnitude and a rejection of the hypothesis of equality between short- and medium-term treatment effects (p-value=0.095). One plausible explanation is that community meetings amplified IDPs' sense of being heard, enhancing the salience of civic participation, which depreciated over time (in the absence of additional community meetings). Several potential reasons, including a secular upward trend in social inclusion or spillover effects, align with the control group mean's increase between the post-meeting and follow-up phases. Experimenter demand effects are less likely because of the absence of a parallel depreciation in the post-meeting effects of other outcomes.

Potential social desirability bias is addressed in columns (7) and (8) using a list experiment to gauge IDPs' perceptions of discrimination by locals. The sensitive statement for IDPs was "I feel discriminated against by locals in this neighborhood." Column (7) shows a 15.1% short-term decline in perceived discrimination by locals. However, the hypothesis that the post-meeting and follow-up effects are significantly different from each other fails to be rejected ($p\text{-value}=0.336$). It is therefore not conclusive whether the medium-term effects are not detected because of depreciation, reduced statistical power (as the sample size decreased), or spillover effects. One notable observation from the list-experiment results is that IDPs' sentiment of decreased discrimination manifested more promptly than locals' reduced discriminatory tendencies—locals only registered significant effects in the follow-up stage. This discrepancy suggests a behavioral change in locals soon after community meetings—thus resulting in a decreased perception among IDPs of being discriminated against—while their beliefs took more time to change.

The robustness of the results is emphasized by the adjusted p -values. All significant effects displayed in Table 3 withstand the scrutiny of multiple-hypothesis testing, maintaining significance with an adjusted p -value < 0.1 . Estimates from inverse probability weighting, addressing possible concerns of differential and selective sample attrition (outlined in Appendix E.3), corroborate the stability of the coefficients in both magnitude and statistical significance.

IDPs also participated in a public goods game identical to the one played by locals. The results show no evidence that community meetings influenced IDPs' monetary contributions to other IDPs or locals, as outlined in Table D2.

6.2.1 The Role of Prior Beliefs in Shaping the Social Integration of IDPs

This section evaluates the degree to which the observed positive impacts of community meetings on IDPs' attitudes and integration into hosting neighborhoods reflect shifts in IDPs' prior beliefs. The analysis centers on IDPs' initial perceptions regarding their self-assessed marginalization within host neighborhoods. In particular, it compares the perspectives of IDPs who felt less heard by the host-neighborhood community relative to locals, on one side, with those who felt equivalently or

more heard, on the other. Given the hypothesis that community meetings primarily operated by modifying IDPs’ beliefs, I predicted that the effects delineated in Section 6.2 would predominantly result from IDPs with less favorable initial perceptions.

Table 4: Heterogeneous effects on IDPs, according to their baseline perception that IDPs were less heard than locals in hosting neighborhoods.

	Feels better integrated		Participation in neighborhood life		Trust in locals		Feels discriminated by locals	
	Marginalized More (1)	Marginalized Less (2)	Marginalized More (3)	Marginalized Less (4)	Marginalized More (5)	Marginalized Less (6)	Marginalized More (7)	Marginalized Less (8)
Panel A. Post-meeting effects								
Treated	0.238*** (0.045)	0.112** (0.050)	0.058** (0.023)	0.036 (0.019)	0.190*** (0.026)	0.005 (0.047)	0.367** (0.184)	0.077 (0.213)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							-0.762*** (0.263)	-0.097 (0.326)
Mean (control group)	0.674	0.701	0.395	0.486	0.368	0.533	2.333	2.224
More=less marginalized p-value	0.041		0.649		0.001		0.107	
R ²	0.691	0.628	0.586	0.465	0.593	0.531	0.641	0.484
N	189	209	201	235	200	234	193	225
Lagged Dependent Variable	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no
Panel B. Follow-up effects								
Treated	0.094* (0.049)	0.123** (0.055)	-0.020 (0.040)	0.026 (0.038)	0.064 (0.028)	0.071 (0.052)	0.363 (0.297)	-0.175 (0.204)
Treated × Sensitive sentence							-0.645 (0.465)	0.250 (0.302)
Mean (control group)	0.681	0.693	0.488	0.509	0.478	0.500	2.391	2.310
More=less marginalized p-value	0.659		0.407		0.758		0.061	
R ²	0.735	0.625	0.591	0.633	0.723	0.566	0.718	0.712
N	149	180	149	180	149	180	148	178
Lagged Dependent Variable	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. Post-meeting (short-term) results are presented in Panel A, while follow-up (medium-term) results are presented in Panel B. *more* and *less marginalized* refer to IDPs with the baseline assessment of being less/more included in the host neighborhood decision making. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is a survey question measuring whether IDPs self reported being better integrated after at post-meeting and follow-up. It uses a 4-point scale within the unit interval, in which a higher value corresponds to feeling better integrated in hosting neighborhoods. Columns (3) and (4) use as dependent variable an index ranging in the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to IDPs participating more in the neighborhood life. Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable a trust index that ranges within the unit interval and where a higher value corresponds to more trust toward locals. Columns (7) and (8) show the results of a list experiment measuring the discrimination from locals felt by IDPs, where the dependent variable is an integer number ranging from 1 to 5, capturing the number of sentences with which respondents agree. Sensitive is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence in the list experiment. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Immediate post-meeting outcomes, alongside medium-term outcomes, are delineated in Panels A and B, respectively. Columns (1) and (2) depict the influence of community meetings on IDPs’

integration into host neighborhoods. Column (1) unveils a 35.3% impact (significant at the 1% level) among IDPs who initially felt more marginalized, while the effect on IDPs who felt less marginalized was 15.9% (significant at the 5% level). The comparison of effects between these columns leads me to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal ($p\text{-value}=0.041$), thus underscoring the greater positive impact of community meetings on more marginalized IDPs. The follow-up reveals a reversal, with stronger effects materializing for less marginalized IDPs, though statistical evidence to differentiate the effects is lacking ($p\text{-value}=0.659$).

Regarding post-meeting participation of IDPs in host neighborhoods' civic life (columns (3) and (4) in Panel A), the effects appear uniformly distributed among IDPs, irrespective of their initial level of marginalization—as supported by both similar treatment-effect sizes (9.9% and 8.4% for more and less marginalized IDPs, respectively, significant at the 5% level) and a non-rejected null hypothesis of identical coefficients ($p\text{-value}=0.649$). Panel B indicates that the absence of significant treatment effects in Section 6.2 does not indicate any concealed heterogeneity relative to the baseline marginalization of IDPs.

The post-meeting treatment effects on trust in locals, shown in columns (5) and (6) of Panel A, indicate that the positive outcomes noted in Section 6.2 predominantly originated from more marginalized IDPs, a conclusion drawn from a 51.6% increase in trust among this subgroup (significant at the 1% level), contrasted with a negligible, nonsignificant effect for their less marginalized counterparts ($p\text{-value}=0.001$). The medium-term findings in Panel B reveal no distinguishable effects between subgroups.

Columns (7) and (8) underscore the short-term impact of community meetings on the discrimination perceived by IDPs. On this dimension, the evidence from Panel A suggests that the primary beneficiaries of community meetings were IDPs who initially felt more marginalized, with a 32.7% decrease in perceived discrimination (significant at the 1% level), contrasting with the 15.1% effect outlined in Table 3 in Section 6.2. However, the hypothesis of identical discrimination effects between the more and less marginalized IDPs is not rejected, although it borders on insignificance ($p\text{-value}=0.107$).

In summary, the comprehensive evidence presented in this section corroborates that the positive effects of community meetings on IDPs, as detailed in Section 6.2, were substantially driven by the IDPs who initially felt more marginalized. This indicates the effectiveness of community meetings in altering beliefs, particularly among IDPs presenting the most potential for enhancement at baseline.

6.3 Formation of Social Networks

This section explores how participating in community meetings affected the social networks of both locals and IDPs, with a focus on their interactions with other members of the same study cohorts (measured by survey data collected in the post-meeting and follow-up phases). For the treatment group, this means interactions with fellow attendees of a community meeting, while for the control group it involves interactions with participants from the same sessions of surveys and lab-in-the-field games.

Empirical results are presented in Table 5. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) represents the percentage of co-participants from the same meeting cohort with whom the respondent has had contact. The remaining columns offer insights into specific types of contacts: columns (3) and (4) concern connections that did not exist before the intervention, while columns (5) and (6) concern interactions with individuals already known prior to the intervention.

The results, specifically in Panel A (focusing on locals), provide strong evidence that community meetings significantly increase interactions among attendees from the same meeting cohort. These enhancements in social networks were evident immediately following the intervention, and they persisted through the follow-up phase while also remaining robust to multiple-hypothesis testing (adjusted p -values < 0.1). The data reveal a significant short-term impact, reflected by a coefficient estimate of 0.208 (p -value < 0.001), which intensified to 0.397 in the medium term, suggesting a progressive increase in contact intensity.

Table 5: Intra-cohort networks generated by community meetings.

	Percent of within-cohort contacts					
	Anyone in cohort		Persons not known		Persons already known	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)
Panel A. Locals						
Treated	0.208*** (0.042) [0.010]	0.397*** (0.052) [0.010]	0.002 (0.023) [0.495]	0.040 (0.029) [0.842]	0.196*** (0.042) [0.010]	0.371*** (0.051) [0.010]
Mean (control group)	0.128	0.253	0.051	0.088	0.115	0.222
R ²	0.458	0.396	0.304	0.280	0.451	0.389
N	364	331	367	332	365	331
Lagged Dependent Variable	No	No	No	No	No	No
Panel B. IDPs						
Treated	0.185*** (0.037) [0.010]	0.155*** (0.051) [0.168]	0.012 (0.009) [0.531]	-0.018 (0.028) [0.623]	0.162*** (0.038) [0.010]	0.149*** (0.050) [0.198]
Mean (control group)	0.083	0.279	0.004	0.076	0.083	0.250
R ²	0.324	0.416	0.220	0.306	0.318	0.378
N	419	332	437	332	422	332
Lagged Dependent Variable	No	No	No	No	No	No

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3) and (5), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) captures the percentage of cohort members that kept in touch with the respondent. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) restricts the analysis using as dependent variable the percentage of within-cohort contacts with new persons (who the respondent had not met before participating in this study). Columns (5) and (6) use as dependent variable the percentage of within-cohort contacts with persons already known by the respondent before the community meeting. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

The significant effects documented in columns (1) and (2) largely originated from interactions with individuals known before the meetings, as indicated by coefficient estimates of 0.196 and 0.371 for the short and medium term, respectively. In contrast, the meetings had minimal impact on forming new connections. It is crucial to clarify that *known individuals* primarily includes neighbors or persons recognizable by name or face, with a smaller fraction comprising family, friends, or other closer relations.

An identical pattern is observed for IDPs in Panel B. Community meetings significantly increased interactions within cohorts both immediately and in the medium term, with coefficient estimates of 0.185 and 0.155 (p-value<0.001). As with locals, community meetings primarily en-

hanced interactions with individuals already known before the intervention, with minimal impact on creating new relationships. However, there are two key differences: the effect of community meetings on IDPs diminished over time, though remaining statistically significant; and the results in columns (2) and (6) are not robust to multiple-hypothesis testing, as demonstrated by high adjusted p-values (>0.1).

The insights from Table 5 indicate that community meetings intensified interactions within the existing networks of their participants, although they did not enlarge these networks. The immediate increase in network intensity in the post-meeting phase may suggest a role in improving medium-term intergroup attitudes and perceptions, as discussed in previous sections. However, the available data do not conclusively establish a causal link, which should be a focus of future research.

6.4 Religious Tolerance and Extremism

Community meetings sought to not only promote social integration between IDPs and locals but heighten religious tolerance and reduce religious extremism within both groups. Given the Islamist character of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the analysis was restricted to the Muslim population, encompassing both locals and IDPs ($\approx 83\%$ of the study sample). An index composed of survey questions, the IAT, and a graphical list experiment were employed as methodological tools. The results are displayed in Table 6. Panels A and B present the findings corresponding to locals and IDPs, respectively.

Columns (1) and (2) showcase the influence of community meetings on religious tolerance, measured by an index of survey questions within the unit interval. These questions explored respondents' attitudes toward freedom of religion and the application of Sharia, detailed further in Appendix B.1. Panel A reveals that the community meetings produced negligible effects on the locals, with estimated coefficients bordering on zero and displaying no statistical difference between the post-meeting and follow-up phases, substantiated by a 0.635 p-value. Conversely, Panel B demonstrates that community meetings had a significant, positive short-term impact on IDPs'

Table 6: The effects of community meetings on the religious tolerance of locals, bias toward government authorities and insurgents, and anti-social behavior.

	Religious tolerance		Preference for Insurgents			
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	(Implicit Association Test)		(List Experiment)	
			Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)
Panel A. Locals						
Treated	-0.009 (0.044) [0.912]	0.007 (0.049) [0.822]	-0.028 (0.024) [0.555]	-0.010 (0.020) [0.802]	0.097 (0.172) [0.911]	0.341* (0.199) [0.366]
Sensitive × Treated					-0.100 (0.252) [0.911]	-0.692*** (0.220) [0.069]
Sensitive picture					0.096 (0.207) [0.911]	0.366** (0.175) [0.178]
Mean (control group)	0.733	0.796	0.501	0.483	2.826	2.831
Post-meeting=follow-up p-value	0.635		0.414		0.224	
R ²	0.390	0.354	0.323	0.300	0.419	0.517
N	304	278	275	278	304	278
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	no	no	no	no
Panel B. IDPs						
Treated	0.107*** (0.033) [0.010]	-0.025 (0.041) [0.743]	0.024 (0.019) [0.386]	-0.043** (0.022) [0.099]	0.050 (0.161) [0.941]	-0.315 (0.206) [0.139]
Sensitive × Treated					0.070 (0.216) [0.941]	0.236 (0.234) [0.743]
Sensitive picture					-0.039 (0.147) [0.941]	-0.337* (0.172) [0.743]
Mean (control group)	0.676	0.829	0.485	0.488	2.674	2.836
Post-meeting=follow-up p-value	0.005		0.012		0.890	
R ²	0.419	0.375	0.316	0.306	0.501	0.575
N	365	280	333	279	363	280
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	no	no	no	no

OLS estimates. The sample used is restricted to Muslim individuals. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. Adjusted p-values using the Romano-Wolf procedure are presented in square brackets, accounting for the multiple hypothesis test at the post-meeting / follow-up level. The dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are constructed using survey data, and they use as dependent variable an index measuring individuals' religious tolerance. This index is constructed from aggregating the answers of two survey questions, ranging between 0 and 1, and where a higher index value corresponds to greater religious tolerance. Columns (3) and (4) show the results of the implicit association test measuring individuals bias toward government authorities or insurgents. The dependent variable is the IAT score ranging between 0 and 1, where a smaller score value means a greater bias toward authorities, while a higher score value means more bias toward insurgents. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of a graphical list experiment measuring individuals' preference for insurgents, where the dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5 capturing the number of pictures that individuals' like. The sensitive picture is widely famous in Cabo Delgado and it displays the insurgents posing after conquering a local town. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

religious tolerance, significantly increasing it by 15.8% (1% significance level), although this effect dissipated in the medium term.

Unlike with locals, Panel B indicates that community meetings significantly improved IDPs' religious tolerance by 15.8% in the short term. This effect was not observed in the medium term, with the follow-up coefficient being close to zero and the null hypothesis that the two effects are identical being also rejected (p -value=0.005). Either spillovers to the control group or a secular upward trend in religious tolerance among IDPs can justify this pattern, as supported by the increase in religious tolerance among IDPs in the control group from 0.676 to 0.829 (in the post-meeting and follow-up phases, respectively). In the spillover scenario, the follow-up effects displayed in column (2) are underestimates of the actual impact. Other possible explanations include experimenter demand and social desirability, which this study cannot rule out. However, if experimenter demand effects were indeed prevalent, they should have also been associated with the graphical list experiment—which also gathers self-reported information.

Beyond religious tolerance, this study also probed the potential of community meetings to abate religious extremism, focusing on the participants' preference for insurgents. Because of concerns about social desirability bias and the safety of the research staff, only indirect measurement tools like the IAT and a graphical list experiment were used. The results from the IAT were normalized within the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to a greater preference for insurgents.

The results for locals, displayed in columns (3) and (4) of Panel A, do not show any significant effect of a diminished preference for insurgents in the post-meeting or follow-up phase. IAT results, presented in columns (3) and (4), used scores normalized within the unit interval. Higher scores indicate a stronger bias toward insurgents over government authorities, and therefore more preference for insurgents. Starting with Panel A, which presents the effects of community meetings on locals' IAT results, no evidence was found of decreased preference for insurgents either in the post-meeting or follow-up phase (with the 0.414 p -value also leading to the non-rejection of the null hypothesis of both effects' being identical). The IAT results among IDPs, displayed in Panel B, show that although community meetings did not produce any significant effect in the post-meeting phase, they led to an 8.3% decrease in IDPs' preference for insurgents in the follow-up. In fact, the latter effect was significantly different from the one measured in the short term

(p-value=0.012).

The results of the graphical list experiment are detailed in columns (5) and (6). This measure involved showing all respondents four non-sensitive images and randomly selecting half of the sample to be shown a fifth—sensitive—image portraying insurgents. Here, the dependent variable is the count of images that respondents reported liking, with a potential range of 0 to 5. The explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between participating in community meetings and exposure to the sensitive image. As shown in Panel A, community meetings did not produce any significant effects on locals in the short term. However, in the medium term the number of images liked by locals, conditional on being shown the sensitive image, significantly decreased by 24.4% (significant at the 1% level)—indicating a significant decrease in locals’ preference for insurgents. The p-value of 0.224 does not rule out that the effects of community meetings in the post-meeting and follow-up phases were identical. Regarding the effects on IDPs, presented in Panel B, no significant effects were detected in either the post-meeting or follow-up phase, nor did the magnitudes of the coefficients significantly change between phases.

Synthesizing the findings from the IAT and the graphical list experiment, this evidence suggests that community meetings did reduce the preference for insurgents of both locals and IDPs, but this effect emerged more prominently in the medium term. Such a delay might reflect the time respondents need to assimilate their experiences with the community meetings. This pattern is aligned with psychology research positing that reduction of religious-extremist views is a gradual process of belief modification and not an instantaneous shift (Doosje et al. 2016, Milla and Umam 2019). It is also possible that community meetings indirectly decreased preference for insurgents—for example, through fostering tolerance of locals toward IDPs or enhancing IDPs’ integration into and trust in their host neighborhoods. While the exact causal relationships warrant further exploration, these findings shed light on the potential of intergroup contact to mitigate religious extremism, especially in the context of an Islamist conflict.

The different outcome measures showing significant decreases in the preference for insurgents also deserve further discussion. The IAT and graphical list experiment are based on two different

reporting mechanisms, although both aimed to measure respondents' preference for insurgents. The IAT relies on measuring unconscious beliefs—which respondents may not even be aware they hold. In contrast, the graphical list experiment relies on respondents' self-reporting the number of images they like, which implies that respondents are aware of their own preferences. Therefore, the different results among IDPs for the IAT and graphical list experiment suggest that community meetings were mostly effective in shifting beliefs that IDPs were unaware of having or that IDPs were unwilling to self-report. The analogous reasoning applies to locals, who were more aware of their preferences or more willing to self-report them.

All statistically significant results presented in Table 6 are robust to multiple-hypothesis testing, as suggested by the adjusted p-values presented in the square brackets (<0.1). Sample attrition also does not significantly alter any of the results presented in this table, as suggested by treatment effects reweighed for the probability of respondents' attrition.

In addition to Table 6, a joy-of-destruction game was employed to study anti-social behavior, drawing inspiration from the work of [Vicente and Vilela \(2022\)](#), who used this game as a proxy for anti-social behavior in Pemba. In this game, individuals played simultaneously in pairs. Each participant had the option to destroy their opponent's endowment at a fixed cost (more details are provided in Appendix B.3). Players remained unaware of their opponents' identities and were only informed whether they were competing against a local or an IDP. The results, showcased in columns (7) and (8) of Tables D1 and D2, reveal that community meetings had no significant impact on the decision to destroy the opponents' payoff (regardless of whether the opponent is from the same local or IDP group). While community meetings facilitated interactions between locals and IDPs, they do not appear to have altered participants' tendencies toward anti-social behaviors toward individuals of the same or different group (locals or IDPs).

7 Concluding Remarks

This paper highlighted the importance of intergroup contact as a mechanism for promoting social cohesion in conflict-ridden regions. It evaluated the role of community meetings in bringing to-

gether IDPs and local hosts in the midst of an Islamist insurgency in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

The array of measurement tools used in this study consistently indicate that community meetings enhanced tolerance, beliefs, and attitudes of locals toward IDPs while also promoting a sense of better social integration among the latter. These positive effects are conceivably due to shifts in the beliefs of locals and IDPs and due to the formation of social networks. In a contribution to the intergroup-contact literature, which tends to emphasize the need for prolonged interventions, this study finds that even brief but well-tailored intergroup interactions can have a beneficial long-lasting impact on social cohesion. The policy implication is substantial, with community meetings serving as an effective, low-cost strategy to integrate forcibly displaced individuals in areas of limited state capacity, where more resource intensive interventions may be unfeasible.

Community meetings also provided IDPs with the opportunity of voluntarily sharing their stories of escape from insurgents. In this regard, community meetings improved religious tolerance and reduced religious extremism among Muslim locals and IDPs, underscoring the potential efficacy of intergroup contact in countering religious extremism.

The contact hypothesis suggests that the insights presented in this study should hold across different settings, after adjusting the content of community meetings to the context. This is because the framework of community meetings, inspired by [Herzig and Chasin \(2006\)](#), is consonant with the prerequisite conditions proposed by [Allport \(1954\)](#) for successful intergroup contact.

However, this study also suffers two main limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the relationship between shifts in beliefs and the expansion of social networks has yet to be clearly understood. One conceivable mechanism is that as participants' beliefs evolve, they become more open to forging connections outside their immediate circles. Alternatively, an expansion in their networks and exposure to diverse viewpoints could catalyze belief shifts. Future exploration should ascertain whether community meetings fostered a symbiotic reinforcement between these evolving beliefs and the development of social networks in the months following the intervention. Leveraging social-network analysis to trace the dynamics of participants' connec-

tions before and after the intervention, paired with periodic belief assessments, can provide clarity.

Second, this study did not account for potential spillovers to the control group due to the political constraints in Pemba. If such spillovers existed, they would lead to an underestimation of the results reported. A possible mechanism here is that even groups not directly targeted by the study could benefit from its effects, perhaps through informal interactions with direct beneficiaries or by observing changes in the broader community. Analyzing these spillovers is vital for assessing the intervention's cost-effectiveness. Observing the individuals within the pre-intervention social networks of study participants, or the individuals adjacent to control- and treatment-group members, could provide novel insights about the prevalence of spillover effects.

This study also concentrated on a one-time intergroup interaction, leaving the cumulative benefits of prolonged contact unexamined. It is plausible that repeated interactions compound the positive effects or, instead, are counterproductive. Subsequent encounters might reinforce prior shifts in beliefs or give rise to new dynamics as participants become more familiar. This remains a pertinent area for future exploration, especially since increased intergroup contact might not invariably yield positive results. A longitudinal study design tracking participants over multiple interactions could yield new important information.

Finally, future research on forced displacement should investigate the reintegration of forcibly displaced individuals returning to their regions of origin (return migrants). A potential mechanism at play is the multifaceted challenges return migrants face, such as sociocultural re-adaptation, confronting trauma and stigma associated with displacement, or competition for scarce resources in return areas. These remarks offer different pathways for future research.

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A Protocol of Community Meetings

Community meetings protocol
in the next page

Community Meetings Guide

[Translated from the original version in Portuguese]

Version: July 30, 2022

MEETING DEVELOPMENT

[Chronological order]

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1. Moderator's opening message [duration: 5 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: Start by welcoming participants. Let them know that the meeting is intended to give participants the opportunity to develop an **open and constructive dialogue between all those involved, in order to improve coexistence in the neighborhood where they live.**

- b) MODERATOR: detail the role played by you, the duration of the meeting (3 hours), and other practical information (for example, that the light meal may be provided later, at a time to be defined by the moderator or by all participants). The objective is that the moderator can manage, from the beginning of the meeting, participants' expectations.

2. Definition of the rules of coexistence [duration: 5 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: inform the participants about the rules of coexistence and participation that must be followed by all people during the meeting (for example, only speak after putting your arm in the air, do not interrupt the speaker, follow the moderator's instructions).

- b) MODERATOR: It is **very important** that you inform that in this meeting all participants:
 - i) Will be **treated equally**
 - ii) You want all participants **to share the same common goal of having an open and inclusive conversation** about their life in the neighborhood.



- iii) It will be critical that **all participants cooperate throughout the meeting** (not interrupting others, listening carefully and understandingly, and trying to put yourself in the other's position).
- c) MODERATOR: take advantage of this moment to define in which languages people will communicate during the meeting, taking into account the profile of all participants (natural and displaced), and the extreme importance that all participants understand what is said during the meeting . MODERATOR, it is your responsibility to translate the participants' interventions, if necessary.

3. Introductions and Expectations [duration: 18 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: Use this moment to give participants the opportunity to introduce themselves, talk a little about themselves and say what they think will happen during the meeting. Suggest that participants say their names, age, where they are from, what their main occupation has been throughout their lives, etc.
- b) MODERATOR: Let each participant speak for approximately 2 minutes. You can start with the person on your left or right and so on. If someone isn't ready to speak when it's their turn, jump to the next person. At the end of the round, re-voice the person who skipped their turn to speak.

4. Question 1 [duration: 26 minutes]

- a) The purpose of this question is to invite participants to link their perspectives on the relationship between displaced people and natives with their own life experiences.
- b) MODERATOR: ask a different question to displaced people and another to natives:
 - i) **DISPLACED: Compared to the life you had in the village of origin, how has your life changed here in Pemba?**
 - ii) **NATURAL: how has your life changed with the arrival of the displaced here in the neighbourhood?**



c) MODERATOR: After reading the questions, **give participants about 1 minute** to think and reflect on what they think. Then start the participation round and allow approximately 3 minutes for each person to speak.

d) MODERATOR: If the participant still does not trust the rest of the group to share their experiences and perspectives, please try to build their trust by building a welcoming environment for all participants.

5. Question 2 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question seeks to address what, for the participants, is the main obstacle to the good integration of the displaced in the neighbourhood.

b) MODERATOR: ask:

i) **Is the main difficulty in integrating displaced people in this neighborhood?**

c) MODERATOR: Let the participants think for 1 minute. Then start the participation round by choosing someone to be the first to speak. Allow 2 to 3 minutes for each participant to speak. Let participants introduce their own themes.

d) MODERATOR: if no one wants to speak first, suggest some topics (e.g. differences in customs, hygiene standards, differences in the way of speaking and communicating, etc.)

6. Question 3 [duration: 20 minutes]

a) This question is intended for participants to reflect on positive things they have received from the other group.

b) MODERATOR: ask the displaced people and people from the neighborhood the following questions:

i) **To the displaced people: can you tell me one positive thing about your life in this neighborhood, in relation to the life you had in your villages of origin?**

ii) **To natural persons: Can you tell me one positive thing that the displaced have brought to this neighbourhood?**



- c) MODERATOR: Give each person about 2 minutes to speak. Insist if no one says anything. There are always positive things that can be said.

6. **Question 4** [duration: 20 minutes]

- a) This question will be addressed to participants who are displaced.
- b) **MODERATOR:** ask the displaced:
 - i) **Can you share a little of your story with us? In other words, what made you leave your home village and come to Pemba and how was that trip? What did you see and experience, can you share a little with us?**
- c) MODERATOR: Give a maximum of 4 minutes to each displaced person to speak. let all the displaced speak first. Then, let the participants from the neighborhood ask the displaced people questions.
- d) MODERATOR: It is very important that you ensure that the privacy and well-being of IDPs is respected, because these topics are sensitive and difficult for IDPs to talk about.

7. **Question 5** [duration: 26 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: This will be a question defined by **YOU**, based on what you heard during the meeting. Try to identify the most relevant idea to be addressed, with the purpose of promoting the integration of the displaced and the natural. This question may differ from meeting to meeting and from neighborhood to neighborhood. **Moderator: It is up to your own judgment to decide which is the best question to ask at this time.**

8. **Open conversation** [duration: 30 minutes]

- a) At this stage, participants have already shared their experiences and perspectives, guided by the MODERATOR. The confidence of the various meeting participants, both in the MODERATOR and in the other participants, should also have improved.



- b) Now, it's time to open the dialog to a more natural and less structured format. Introduce some question or topic that prompts dialogue, and then let the conversation flow freely. **Intervene only when absolutely necessary.**
- c) Some suggestions on how to start the dialogue. MODERATOR: Start by asking all participants:
 - i) **So far, have you heard anything that made you think in a new and different way? What was this thing? OR**
 - ii) **Is there anything you'd like to add to something that's already been talked about? OR**
 - iii) **Did you hear something different from your opinion that disturbed you in some way?**

9. Last Words [duration: 10 minutes]

- a) MODERATOR: invite participants are invited to say something they have not yet had a chance to say, but would like to share before the end of the meeting.
- b) MODERATOR: **STRONGLY encourage** people to exchange phone contacts with each other so that they build personal relationships from this meeting.
- c) MODERATOR: Say a few words that sum up the meeting and say goodbye to the participants.

END OF MEETING

B Outcomes Measured

The intervention used a combination of different outcome variables to measure both the social integration of IDPs and religious extremism, which are detailed in this section. The social integration of IDPs used variables constructed from: survey questions, measuring the tolerance and beliefs of locals toward IDPs, sense of belonging and civic participation of IDPs, and trust between locals and IDPs; two list experiments, in which one measured locals' discrimination against IDPs, and the other measured IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals; lab-in-the-field public goods and trust games.

An index of religious tolerance was also constructed using survey data. Additionally, a newly designed graphical list experiment was also used, which captured individuals preferences toward insurgents; an implicit association test measuring the unconscious biases of locals and IDPs toward insurgents or government authorities; and a joy-of-destruction game.

The following sections detail each of the outcome variables constructed. Section [B.1](#) focuses on the variables constructed from survey data. The list experiments measuring locals' discrimination against IDPs and IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals, as well as a the graphical list experiment measuring individuals' preference for insurgents are detailed in Section [B.2](#). The public goods, trust and joy-of-destruction games are detailed in Section [B.3](#), while the implementation of the implicit association test is described in Section [B.4](#).

B.1 Survey Outcomes

B.1.1 Survey Outcomes Concerning Locals

Tolerance toward IDPs staying in host neighborhoods (Index): this index ranges from 0 (indicating less tolerance) to 1 (indicating more tolerance). It is constructed by averaging the responses of two binary survey questions that measure whether locals think that IDPs should be moved away from host neighborhoods or sent back to their homelands.

Positive beliefs about IDPs (index): this index ranges from 0 (less positive beliefs) to 1 (more

positive beliefs). It is constructed by averaging the responses to three survey questions that measure the extent to which locals appreciate IDPs. These questions capture whether locals agree that *IDPs brought insecurity to the this neighborhood, the arrival of IDPs made my life worse and the presence of IDPs in this neighborhood is not positive for this neighborhood.*

B.1.2 Survey Outcomes Concerning IDPs

Sentiment of being socially integrated in the neighborhood: This variable is a measure of IDPs' sense of belonging to their hosting neighborhood. It is based on a survey questions asked IDPs whether they had been feeling better socially integrated in the neighborhood over the past few days (short-term assessment) or few months (medium-term assessment). This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value indicating a greater sense of belonging to the neighborhood.

Participation in the civic life of host neighborhoods (index): this index ranges from 0 (less participation) to 1 (more participation). It is based on three survey questions that capture the extent to which IDPs feel heard by the community in the host neighborhood; how IDPs think they were being treated by neighborhood authorities relatively to locals; and how IDPs think neighborhood authorities should treat IDPs relatively to locals.

B.1.3 Survey Outcomes Concerning Locals and IDPs

Trust toward locals and IDPs: to measure trust toward locals and IDPs, respondents were asked to what extent they trust individuals from these two groups in their neighborhood. The responses were provided on a 4-point scale within the unit interval, ranging from *no trust* to *trust a lot*. The resulting variable reflects the level of trust that respondents have toward locals and IDPs in the community.

Index of Religious Tolerance: This variable is derived from averaging the responses to two survey questions, where respondents were asked to choose the sentence that they mostly agreed with. The first question presented a choice between two statements: *the law should make everyone follow the same religion* and *people should be free to follow any religion, even if I do not like that religion.*

The second question asked participants to choose between: *the Sharia should be imposed, as most of Cabo Delgado's population is Muslim* and *freedom of religion is a person's right, even if I don't like that religion*. The resulting index is constructed to take values in the unit interval, with higher values indicating greater religious tolerance.

B.2 List Experiments

B.2.1 Regular list experiments

During the post-meeting and follow-up phases of this project, I conducted a regular list-experiment with study participants. The enumerators read out loud 4 non-sensitive sentences to each participant, which were:

1. *I do not like the tax level in Mozambique;*
2. *I do not like when Pemba becomes too hot;*
3. *I do not like football;*
4. *I do not like the quality of the roads in Pemba.*

In addition, half of the participants were randomly assigned to hear a fifth sensitive sentence. For locals, the sensitive sentence was: *I do not like that IDPs are living in my neighborhood*, which aimed to measure locals' discrimination against IDPs that may be underreported due to social desirability bias. Meanwhile, half of the IDP sample was read the following sensitive sentence: *I feel discriminated by the local population of this neighborhood*. This sentence aimed to measure IDPs' real perception of how welcome they are in the hosting neighborhoods.

To conduct the list-experiment, the enumerator first gave the respondent 4 or 5 stones, depending on whether they were randomly assigned to hear the sensitive question. The stones were placed in the respondent's left hand, and the enumerator instructed the respondent to move one stone from the left hand to the right hand each time they heard a sentence with which they agreed. The enumerator turned away from the respondent and read the sentences out loud. After all sentences were read, the enumerator turned back to the respondent and counted the number of stones in the right

hand, which was taken as the estimate of the number of sentences the respondent agreed with. This count was used as the outcome variable to measure the effects of the list-experiment.

B.2.2 Graphical List Experiment

I introduce a newly designed *graphical* list experiment, which overcomes some limitations of the traditional list experiment. In the specific context of Cabo Delgado, reading out loud sentences related to sensitive topics can generate fear and serious concerns among locals and IDPs. Therefore, instead of reading out loud sentences, study participants were shown images. All individuals were shown 4 non-sensitive images, while others were randomly shown a 5th sensitive image. Figure 12 displays the 5 images exactly as they were presented to study participants. The non-sensitive images include a market in Pemba, Mozambique's military, Mozambicans playing football, and a road in Pemba. The sensitive image showed the insurgent group Al-Shabaab after they conquered Quissanga, a district capital to the north of Pemba. This sensitive image was chosen after consulting with a focus group composed of people from Cabo Delgado, who confirmed that this image was widely recognized in the region.

This graphical list experiment proceeded as follows. The enumerator used a tablet with a 10-inch screen to show the list experiment images. The randomization between 4 or 5 images was done automatically by Qualtrics, with a 0.5 probability of being shown the sensitive image. The enumerator instructed the study participant to look at all images carefully for one minute. All images contained a legend, and study participants were told they could ask for any clarification about the content of the images. At the end, the enumerator asked the number of images that the study participant liked, without indicating which images were sensitive.

The graphical list experiment represents a significant improvement in the measurement of sensitive attitudes and behaviors, and has the potential to be adapted to other contexts with similar sensitivity concerns. Nevertheless, there are several downsides to this method. The first issue is related to the difficulty in controlling the level of attention that individuals pay to the images. Although every local enumerator instructed participants to look closely at each image for one minute and read out the caption of each image upon request, it is impossible to ensure that participants



Figure 12: Images shown in the graphical list experiment.

paid sufficient attention to the images. The second limitation is associated with age-related ophthalmological problems, which could have made it challenging for older participants to see the list experiment images clearly. In such situations, local enumerators provided participants with additional time to look at the images and read out the captions if needed. Despite these limitations, the graphical list experiment remains a promising tool for measuring sensitive attitudes and behaviors.

B.3 Lab-in-the-field Games

Common procedure for all games: Post-meeting and follow-up activities included three lab-in-the-field games: public goods, trust, and anti-social. Due to logistical constraints, individuals played lab-in-the-field games during the post-meeting activities with other players from the same cohort (of 8-10 individuals). During follow-up activities, individuals were totally randomized and

assigned to groups of 7-10 other players of the same neighborhood. The field supervisor started by dispersing all players along the game site (in order to minimize communication or any type of coordination). Then, the research team explained all the details of the game to be played. This explanation was made in all local languages represented in the group taking the game. Next, each player was individually told whether she was playing against a local or IDP. Players then received an envelope and tokens, and they were asked to leave in the envelope the tokens corresponding to their monetary decision (which depended on the game played). At the end of each game, the field supervisor removed the tokens from the envelopes and introduced the corresponding monetary amounts in the project database.

Public goods game: this game was designed to assess cooperative behavior among individuals, particularly when interacting with individuals from different groups. During the game, each participant was given an envelope containing an endowment of 130 meticaïs, equivalent to \$2 USD. They were informed that they would be playing the game simultaneously with another player. Participants had the option of keeping the entire endowment for themselves or contributing a portion of it to a common pot. The research team then increased the total contribution in the pot by 50% before dividing it equally among both players.

Trust game: the purpose of this game was to measure the trust of locals and IDPs in individuals of the other group. The game was played in pairs and sequentially. During the first turn of the game, each player received an envelope with 120 meticaïs (\$1.9 USD). Individuals were instructed that they could send, by leaving inside the envelope, whatever fraction of those 120 meticaïs (including 0 or 120) to the other player. Whatever amount sent would be tripled by the research team, with the remainder being a payoff of the first player. In the second turn, the other player receives the envelope with the tripled amount. Then, this player can keep whatever fraction of the money inside the envelope, and return the remainder to the first player. All this information is common knowledge of both players, and each player was informed whether she was playing with a local or IDP (in both stages of the game).

Anti-social game: This game aimed to assess individuals' tendencies toward anti-social behavior,

as demonstrated by their willingness to sacrifice a portion of their endowment in order to generate an even larger loss in their opponent's endowment. The game was conducted in pairs, with each player receiving an initial endowment of 200 meticaïs (\$3.1 USD). Players had the option to keep their endowment or pay 20 meticaïs, which would result in their opponent losing 100 meticaïs. It was common knowledge that the opponent also had the same options, leading to a situation where both players could potentially sacrifice their endowments. In the event that neither player chose to sacrifice their endowment, both players would finish the game with 200 meticaïs (a unique Nash equilibrium). However, if both players elected to sacrifice their endowments, each player would end up with 80 meticaïs.

B.4 Implicit Association Test

This section describes the implementation of an implicit association test (IAT) with the purpose of measuring the biases of study participants toward insurgents versus government authorities. The IAT is a psychometric assessment tool developed by [Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz \(1998\)](#) to measure individuals' implicit attitudes and beliefs that may be inaccessible through explicit self-reporting methods, namely on sensitive topics – in the case of this study, religious extremism.

The IAT operates on the principle of differential association of two target concepts with an attribute, thereby revealing unconscious cognitive biases. Specifically, the IAT entails a series of rapid categorization tasks in which subjects are required to pair presented stimuli – words or images – with specific attributes.

In the spirit of the successful implementation of an IAT in low-literacy setting in Uganda by [Lowes et al. \(2015\)](#), I opted by using IAT stimuli consisting of images shown on a tablet screen (instead of words). The test included two target categories – *government authorities* and *insurgents* – and two attribute categories – *happy* and *sad* human faces. The full set of stimuli used is shown in Appendix [B.4.1](#).

The IAT proceeded as shown in Figure [B0](#). The test included of multiple trials, each one con-

sisting of one image belonging to one of the four categories (authorities, insurgents, happy and sad). The image presented in each trial was randomly chosen from the stimuli set shown in Appendix B.4.1. In each trial respondents were asked to press *left* or right on the tablet screen as quick as possible and according to the labels in the top of the screen. Using as example the trial displayed in Figure B0, participants were asked to press *left* if the image shown corresponded to the *insurgents* or *happy* categories, and they should press *right* if the images corresponded to the *authorities* or *unhappy* categories. Throughout the test the pairing between target (authorities, insurgents) and attribute categories (happy, sad) were randomly changed, such that each combination was tested in different block of trials.

After all blocks of trials were conducted, a test score aggregating all trials was calculated. This score measured how relatively faster and accurately a respondent classified (i) *insurgents–sad* and *authorities–happy* versus (ii) *insurgents–happy* and *authorities–sad*. The underlying idea is that faster responses and fewer errors occur when the presented pairs align more closely with the individual’s implicit beliefs. If someone was faster and more accurate in classifying the combination (i) relatively to (ii), then the implicit bias toward insurgents would be smaller (corresponding to a lower test score).¹⁹




Figure B0: Example of how images were displayed during the implicit association test.

¹⁹The IAT in this study was conducted on a tablet with a 10-inch screen and using Qualtrics software. The individual-level raw data was then scored using the algorithm proposed by Cui et al. (2021) following the score formula proposed by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003).

B.4.1 IAT Images

INSURGENTS




GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES



HAPPY FACES (POSITIVE ATTRIBUTE)



SAD FACES (NEGATIVE ATTRIBUTE)



C Sample characteristics

C.1 Differences Between Locals and IDPs at Baseline

Table C1: Comparison of the main baseline characteristics of locals and IDPs.

	Sample size		Mean		dif.	σ	p-value
	Locals	IDPs	Locals	IDPs			
Age	413	496	37.644	37.004	.64	.973	.511
Female	415	496	0.766	0.736	.03	.029	.292
Religion							
Catholic	412	495	0.165	.147	.018	.024	.468
Muslim	412	495	0.825	.837	-.011	.025	.656
Other	412	495	0.009	.016	-.007	.007	.398
Education							
No educ.	415	495	0.082	.149	-.068	.022	.002
Informal educ.	415	495	0.041	.043	-.002	.013	.913
Elementary educ.	415	495	0.607	.57	.037	.033	.253
Secondary educ.	415	495	0.253	.222	.031	.029	.277
Higher educ.	415	495	0.017	.016	.001	.009	.933
Information and social capital							
Information index	415	498	3.323	2.97	.352	.04	0
Social capital index	414	497	1.719	1.445	.274	.034	0
Ethnicity							
Macua	415	495	0.820	.493	.327	.03	0
Maconde	415	495	0.099	.119	-.021	.021	.328
Mwani	415	495	0.072	.357	-.286	.026	0
Other ethnicity	415	495	0.009	.03	-.021	.009	.03

C.2 Balance Test Between Control and Treatment Group

Table C2: Summary statistics of locals and IDPs by treatment assignment (baseline survey).

	Locals							IDPs								
	Sample Size		Means			dif	σ	p-value	Sample Size		Means			dif	St Err	p value
	C	T	C	T	C				T	C	T					
Demographic Characteristics																
Age	205	208	37.941	36.976	.966	1.512	.523	252	245	36.119	36.992	-.873	1.315	.507		
Female	206	209	0.796	0.742	.054	.042	.189	251	246	0.745	0.724	.022	.04	.59		
Religion																
Catholic	205	207	.185	.154	.031	.037	.407	251	245	.147	.151	-.004	.032	.91		
Muslim	205	207	.805	.836	-.031	.038	.416	251	245	.841	.829	.012	.034	.719		
Other	205	207	.01	.009	0	.009	.992	251	245	.012	.021	-.009	.011	.456		
Education																
No educ.	205	209	.092	.082	.011	.028	.683	251	245	.176	.122	.053	.032	.099		
Informal educ.	205	209	.039	.048	-.009	.02	.661	251	245	.04	.045	-.005	.018	.78		
Elementary educ.	205	209	.62	.589	.031	.048	.52	251	245	.53	.617	-.087	.044	.052		
Secondary educ.	205	209	.23	.268	-.038	.043	.364	251	245	.243	.196	.047	.037	.206		
Higher educ.	205	209	.019	.015	.005	.013	.685	251	245	.012	.021	-.009	.011	.456		
Indexes																
Information index	206	209	2.982	2.938	.044	.066	.507	253	246	2.683	2.686	-.002	.053	.97		
Social capital index	201	206	1.411	1.395	.016	.051	.753	252	244	1.255	1.27	-.015	.037	.675		
Ethnicity																
Macua	206	209	.801	.828	-.027	.038	.484	251	245	.534	.453	.081	.045	.072		
Mconde	206	209	.117	.091	.026	.03	.394	251	245	.123	.115	.009	.029	.752		
Mwani	206	209	.073	.072	.001	.026	.968	251	245	.323	.392	-.069	.043	.108		
Other ethnicity	206	209	.009	.009	0	.009	.989	251	245	.02	.041	-.021	.015	.175		

C and T refer to individuals in control and treatment groups, respectively. The total number of observations of locals and IDPs does not add respectively to 415 and 498 for all variables due to missing observations.

D Additional analyses

D.1 Lab-in-the-field Games

This section delineates the impact of community meetings on real-life behaviors, assessed through three lab-in-the-field games: public goods, trust, and anti-social. The impacts on decisions made by locals are presented in Table D1. The variables of interest are the treatment effect of community meetings, represented by the variable *Treated*, and the treatment effect explicitly oriented toward individuals from contrasting groups – locals or IDPs (*Different opponent* \times *Treated*).

Columns (1) and (2) display the outcomes of the public goods game, denoting post-meeting and follow-up effects, respectively. The dependent variable is the monetary contribution in Mozambique meticaïs made by locals (refer to Section B.3 for game implementation details), ranging between 0 and 130 meticaïs (approximately USD \$2). The immediate aftermath of the intervention saw negligible shifts in monetary contributions, with effect sizes approximating zero (column (1)). In the medium-term (column (2)), community meetings prompted a significant 36% upsurge in locals' contributions, with no consequential effects noted on allocations specifically to IDPs, indicating a generalized enhancement in pro-social behavior among locals.

Columns (3) to (6) illustrate the results of the trust game, where columns (3) and (4) represent post-meeting and follow-up effects on initial monetary donations, and columns (5) and (6) pertain to the retributed amounts.²⁰ Neither the immediate nor the follow-up phases manifested significant alterations in donations or retributions. Nonetheless, in the medium-term, substantial, albeit non-significant augmentations were observed in locals' donations and retributions to IDPs (39.5% and 78.1%). These findings suggest no significant alterations in trust or pro-social behavior; however, caution in interpreting these results is required due to the relatively smaller sample size, potentially leading to underpowered estimates.

Columns (7) and (8) display the anti-social game results, using a binary dependent variable to

²⁰Political constraints during the post-meeting phase invalidated some trust-game data, accounting for the fewer observations in the trust game compared to the public goods and anti-social games.

denote whether locals expended 20 meticaïs to destroy 100 meticaïs (from 200) belonging to their opponent. The results show that community meetings did not significantly change locals' decision to destroy the endowment of opponents.

Table D1: The effects of community meetings on the monetary contributions of locals in the public goods and trust games, and the decision to destroy opponents' payoffs in the anti-social game.

	Monetary contribution in public good game		Trust Game				Anti-social game (Destroys endowment)	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)	Post-meeting (7)	Follow-up (8)
Different Opponent × Treated	-1.352 (12.235)	4.155 (7.086)	-8.730 (12.315)	13.573 (10.288)	6.037 (21.422)	14.977 (13.142)	0.145 (0.141)	0.030 (0.180)
Treated	-1.028 (10.074)	13.967** (5.439)	-4.239 (10.746)	-7.941 (7.273)	-11.817 (14.963)	-1.815 (9.307)	0.109 (0.111)	0.133 (0.122)
Different Opponent	3.914 (9.187)	-9.994* (5.957)	7.606 (8.129)	-7.981 (5.692)	-9.116 (12.186)	-7.032 (7.175)	0.023 (0.104)	-0.113 (0.126)
Mean (control group)	36.462	38.796	25.893	34.189	20.824	19.167	0.364	0.381
R^2	0.395	0.543	0.491	0.419	0.506	0.372	0.425	0.377
N	228	228	173	227	205	223	227	229
Lagged Dep. Var.	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (4) are constructed using survey data. Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable a question measuring on a scale 1 to 4 the extent to which IDPs agree to be feeling better integrated since the past 2 days (post-meeting assessment) and 2 months (follow-up assessment). A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. The treatment effects on the preference for more political participation of IDPs are shown in columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable is an index taking values between -1 and 1, where a higher value represents a greater preference for more political participation of IDPs. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of a list experiment measuring IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals, where the dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which individuals' agree. Sensitive sentence is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3) and (5), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies.

Table D2 portrays the implications of the public goods, trust, and anti-social games on IDPs, maintaining an identical structure to the table displaying locals' results. The observed absence of significant treatment effects and generally smaller estimated coefficients, compared to locals, underscore no substantial monetary alterations among IDPs, potentially attributable to IDPs more precarious circumstances.

Overall these lab-in-the-field games are marked by a smaller sample size (relatively to other outcome measures), as games were not always implemented due to political constraints. The reduced number of the observations used may have reduced statistical power in the estimates pre-

Table D2: The effects of community meetings on the monetary contributions of IDPs in the public goods and trust games, and the decision to destroy opponents' payoffs in the anti-social game.

	Monetary contribution in public good game		Trust Game				Anti-social game (Destroys endowment)	
	Post-meeting (1)	Follow-up (2)	Donation Post-meeting (3)	Follow-up (4)	Retribution Post-meeting (5)	Follow-up (6)	Post-meeting (7)	Follow-up (8)
Different Opponent × Treated	-12.823 (9.764)	-2.202 (9.845)	-3.238 (10.863)	0.597 (7.802)	13.913 (11.721)	-0.341 (10.103)	-0.136 (0.201)	0.073 (0.160)
Treated	11.846 (7.451)	-3.797 (6.814)	8.923 (12.484)	4.212 (5.478)	2.834 (11.490)	5.450 (7.468)	0.236 (0.150)	0.081 (0.115)
Different Opponent	13.288* (6.805)	0.482 (7.612)	-4.786 (7.018)	3.635 (5.972)	-10.812 (7.801)	6.457 (7.053)	0.018 (0.147)	0.022 (0.102)
Mean (control group)	39.325	45.426	23.628	32.797	17.358	32.103	0.417	0.397
R ²	0.429	0.271	0.451	0.307	0.410	0.335	0.552	0.368
N	253	267	209	268	243	274	189	269
Lagged Dep. Var.	no	no	no	no	no	no	no	no

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (4) are constructed using survey data. Columns (1) and (2) use as dependent variable a question measuring on a of scale 1 to 4 the extent to which IDPs agree to be feeling better integrated since the past 2 days (post-meeting assessment) and 2 months (follow-up assessment). A higher index value corresponds to greater tolerance toward IDPs. The treatment effects on the preference for more political participation of IDPs are shown in columns (3) and (4). The dependent variable is an index taking values between -1 and 1, where a higher value represents a greater preference for more political participation of IDPs. Columns (5) and (6) show the results of a list experiment measuring IDPs' sense of being discriminated by locals, where the dependent variable ranges from 1 to 5 capturing the number of sentences with which individuals' agree. Sensitive sentence is a binary variable measuring whether the individual was read the sensitive sentence. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (3 days after the intervention) are shown in columns (1), (3) and (5), while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in columns (2), (4) and (6). All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies.

sented in this section, thus requiring a cautious interpretation of the results shown. Treatment effects may also not exist if the financial constraint of locals and IDPs is binding. More precisely, if individuals live close to the subsistence level, they have less margin to make higher monetary contributions.

D.2 The Effects of Community Meetings on Trust

This section delineates the impacts of community meetings on trust directed toward various individuals and groups. Table D3 showcases the effects on locals, displaying post-meeting and follow-up impacts in Panels A and B, respectively. Column (1) shows the trust of locals toward IDPs, as previously outlined in Table 1. The post-meeting effects in Panel A suggest that community meetings did not yield any significant impact on the trust of locals toward other community members – either other locals, relatives, neighbors, or community leaders –, individuals of the same ethnic group, or government authorities. Nevertheless, a short-term significant decrease is observed in locals’ trust toward individuals outside their community or group, namely, the people of Cabo Delgado and Mozambicans in general, with the effects being 10.6% and 14.5%, respectively (significant at the 10% level). Additionally, a short-term decline of 11.7% is noted in locals trust toward the armed forces (significant at the 5% level).

Table D3: The effects of community meetings on the trust of locals.

	IDPs	Locals	Relatives	Neighbors	Same ethnicity	Trust in... People of Cabo Delgado	Mozambicans	Armed forces	Community leaders	Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. Post-meeting										
Treated	0.005 (0.033)	-0.053 (0.034)	-0.016 (0.028)	-0.051 (0.032)	-0.045 (0.031)	-0.056* (0.030)	-0.063* (0.033)	-0.074** (0.029)	-0.037 (0.028)	-0.010 (0.024)
Mean (control group)	0.531	0.554	0.802	0.558	0.630	0.530	0.434	0.632	0.670	0.676
R ²	0.383	0.382	0.394	0.424	0.371	0.355	0.445	0.340	0.310	0.378
N	367	367	365	367	367	367	367	367	365	367
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Panel B. Follow-up										
Treated	0.054* (0.030)	0.045 (0.034)	0.004 (0.023)	0.012 (0.039)	0.002 (0.030)	0.048 (0.029)	0.004 (0.026)	0.018 (0.030)	-0.016 (0.027)	-0.004 (0.026)
Mean (control group)	0.537	0.532	0.868	0.612	0.589	0.459	0.367	0.665	0.694	0.690
R ²	0.380	0.341	0.383	0.417	0.396	0.528	0.594	0.346	0.333	0.388
N	332	332	330	330	332	332	332	332	331	332
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (2-3 days after the intervention) are shown in Panel A, while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in Panel B. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (9) are survey questions in a 4-point scale within the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to more trust. The dependent variable in column (10) is an index of three survey questions measuring trust in the district, provincial and national governments. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

Most insurgents in Cabo Delgado are purported to be Mozambicans, primarily from the districts affected by the insurgency. Given that IDPs shared their experiences of escaping insurgents during the community meetings, it's plausible that locals may have begun associating the people of Cabo Delgado and Mozambicans at large with insurgents. This proffers a probable rationale behind the short-term decline in trust toward these groups. Furthermore, the narratives from IDPs highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Mozambican armed forces in counteracting insurgent activities, potentially driving the reduced trust in the armed forces in the short term.

In Panel B, aside from the improvement in locals' trust specifically toward IDPs – as noted in column (1) and previously documented in Table 1 – no substantial effects were observed across the other trust measures. The disappearance of the short-term significant effects on trust toward the people of Cabo Delgado, Mozambicans, and the armed forces implies that these topics, although salient in the aftermath of community meetings, might have depreciated over time over time. Crucially, Table D3 accentuates that the community meetings mainly elevated locals' trust levels directed toward IDPs.

Table D4 displays the impact of community meetings on IDPs' trust. The results in column (2) are identical to those previously presented in Table 3. Besides the enhancement in IDPs' trust toward locals, no other significant effects were discerned, indicating that the community meetings primarily shifted the beliefs and attitudes of IDPs toward locals, leaving the perceptions regarding other individuals and groups unaltered.

Table D4: The effects of community meetings on the trust of IDPs.

	IDPs	Locals	Relatives	Neighbors	Same ethnicity	Trust in... People of Cabo Delgado	Mozambicans	Armed forces	Community leaders	Government
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. Post-meeting										
Treated	-0.041 (0.032)	0.070** (0.035)	0.016 (0.025)	0.037 (0.032)	0.005 (0.030)	0.014 (0.033)	0.021 (0.032)	0.047 (0.029)	0.037 (0.028)	0.008 (0.023)
Mean (control group)	0.643	0.463	0.805	0.514	0.629	0.496	0.416	0.570	0.620	0.684
R ²	0.318	0.351	0.375	0.420	0.424	0.342	0.362	0.401	0.344	0.347
N	437	435	433	434	437	437	436	436	435	437
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Panel B. Follow-up										
Treated	0.020 (0.027)	0.076** (0.033)	-0.029 (0.028)	-0.020 (0.033)	0.001 (0.029)	0.035 (0.031)	-0.017 (0.030)	0.024 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.029)	0.003 (0.026)
Mean (control group)	0.659	0.490	0.893	0.635	0.626	0.422	0.322	0.552	0.682	0.683
R ²	0.351	0.388	0.407	0.390	0.357	0.459	0.572	0.413	0.274	0.364
N	332	332	330	329	332	332	331	331	329	332
Lagged Dependent Variable	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level are presented in parentheses. The effects measured in the post-meeting survey (2-3 days after the intervention) are shown in Panel A, while the results corresponding to the follow-up surveys (2-3 months after the intervention) are shown in Panel B. The dependent variables in columns (1) to (9) are survey questions in a 4-point scale within the unit interval, where a higher value corresponds to more trust. The dependent variable in column (10) is an index of three survey questions measuring trust in the district, provincial and national governments. All specifications include controls for individual characteristics and neighborhood dummies. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% critical level.

E Attrition

This section describes sample attrition in relation to participation in community meetings, identifying attritors and non-attritors across various phases of the study as presented in Table E1. Attrition manifested in a 4.8% loss of locals (20 individuals) and a 3.0% reduction in IDPs (15 individuals) between the baseline and post-meeting phases (separated by an interval of 2-3 days). The attrition rate escalated during the post-meeting to follow-up phases, witnessing an additional loss of 25 locals (6.3% of the post-meeting total) and a substantial decrease of 98 IDPs (20% of the post-meeting total). Considering the overall attrition from baseline to follow-up phases, the study experienced a decrease of 45 locals and 113 IDPs (respectively 10.8% and 22.7% of the baseline totals).

Table E1: Sample attrition across post-meeting and follow-up phases.

Baseline to Post-meeting			
	Non-attritors	Attritors	Total
Locals	395	20	415
IDPs	483	15	498
Post-meeting to Follow-up			
	Non-attritors	Attritors	Total
Locals	370	25	395
IDPs	385	98	483
Baseline to Follow-up			
	Non-attritors	Attritors	Total
Locals	370	45	415
IDPs	385	113	498

E.1 Differential Attrition

Table E2 addresses the potential occurrence of differential attrition, consisting of participation in community meetings influencing individuals' decision to abstain from the post-meeting and/or follow-up phases of the study. This table conducts a regression analysis of a binary variable representing individual attrition status on the treatment variable (columns (1), (3), and (5)), while subsequent analyses incorporate individual demographic characteristics, neighborhood dummies, and controls for meeting characteristics (columns (2), (4), and (6)). Standard errors are clustered at the cohort level.

Results pertaining to local participants are presented in Panel A, revealing that locals who were present at the baseline and engaged in community meetings were significantly less likely to abstain from the post-meeting (columns (1) and (2)) or follow-up stages (columns (5) and (6)). A plausible interpretation of this effect is that treated locals generally found community meeting participation beneficial, resulting in a perceived increase in individual benefit from being part of the study following the intervention. This interpretation aligns with the intervention's positive impact on various dimensions such as tolerance, discrimination, and trust. The inclusion of additional control variables (columns (2), (4), and (6)) doesn't significantly alter the coefficients, suggesting that local participants' decisions to abstain were not predominantly based on observable charac-

teristics. These estimates are based on a small number of local attritors: 20 individuals from the baseline to post-meeting phases, and 45 from the baseline to follow-up phases.

Regarding attrition among IDPs, the findings are depicted in Panel B. From the baseline to post-meeting phases (columns (1) and (2)), there is a 2.9 percentage point increase in attrition probability among IDPs who attended community meetings. However, this effect achieves significance only at the 10% level. This outcome is influenced by 15 missing IDPs, and it can be conjectured that these individuals represent IDPs who found the community meeting participation less agreeable, due to factors such as interacting with locals or sharing personal narratives. There is no statistical evidence to support differential attrition based on treatment status from baseline to follow-up.

Table E2: Differential attrition among locals and IDPs.

	Baseline to post-meeting		Post-meeting to follow-up		Baseline to follow-up	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. Locals						
Treated	-0.069*** (0.021)	-0.062*** (0.018)	-0.011 (0.023)	-0.017 (0.023)	-0.075** (0.031)	-0.072** (0.029)
Mean (control group)	0.083	0.074	0.069	0.074	0.146	0.142
N	415	386	395	370	415	386
Number of attritors	20	16	25	24	45	40
Individual	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Panel B. IDPs						
Treated	0.029* (0.016)	0.027* (0.014)	-0.019 (0.035)	-0.027 (0.036)	0.005 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.037)
Mean (control group)	0.016	0.013	0.212	0.213	0.224	0.223
N	498	453	483	441	498	453
Number of attritors	15	12	98	89	113	101
Individual controls	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes

OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered at the cohort level. The dependent variables are binary, taking value 1 if the study participant was an attritor and 0 otherwise. Columns (2), (4) and (6) include neighborhood dummies, controls for individuals and cohort characteristics.

E.2 Selective Attrition

An alternative possibility is that attrition may be selected by observable factors correlated with treatment status. To assess the potential for selective attrition within the sample of local residents and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), I executed a Wald test contrasting the unrestricted regression, which calculates Equation 2 (where the dependent variable signifies a binary measurement of attrition and the notation is identical to Equation 1), and the restricted regression where $\gamma = 0$.

$$Attrition_{inc} = \alpha + \beta T_{nc} + \delta \mathbf{N}_n + \theta \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \rho \mathbf{M}_{nc} + \gamma T_{nc} [\mathbf{N}_n + \theta \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \rho \mathbf{M}_{nc}] + \varepsilon_{inc} \quad (2)$$

Table E3 displays the p-values computed from the Wald tests. These results infer that treatment assignment significantly affected the likelihood of attrition among locals possessing specific observable characteristics in the post-meeting phase (p-value=0.003, based on 20 missing locals), albeit less significantly in the subsequent follow-up phase (p-value=0.08, based on 45 missing locals). Regarding the IDPs, it appears the differential attrition observed in the post-meeting phase (recorded in Table E2) is significantly correlated with individuals possessing specific observable characteristics (p-value=0.03, based on 15 missing IDPs). Conversely, the Wald test's p-value during the follow-up phase did not yield statistical support for selective attrition among IDPs (p-value=0.142, based on 113 missing IDPs).

Table E3: Selective attrition: wald test p-values for the null hypothesis that restricted and unrestricted models are not statistically significantly different.

	Wald Test P-value	
	Baseline to post-meeting	Baseline to follow-up
Locals	0.003***	0.08*
IDPs	0.03**	0.142

Null hypothesis: $T_{nc}[\mathbf{N}_n + \mathbf{X}_{inc} + \mathbf{M}_{nc}] = 0$

Following the interpretation of the Wald test results displayed in Table E3, the balance of individual observable characteristics conditioned on attrition and categorized by treatment status is

presented in Tables E4, E5, E6, and E7. The attrition of locals from baseline to post-meeting (Table E4) and to follow-up (Table E5) reveals a balance of all observables at any common significance level.

Table E4: locals: baseline to post-meeting attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors					Non-attritors				
	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value
Age	17	3	39.412	31	.413	188	206	37.84	37.418	.779
Catholic	17	3	.353	0	.24	188	205	.166	.151	.694
Muslim	17	3	.647	1	.24	188	205	.824	.839	.683
Other religion	17	3	0	0	.	188	205	.011	.01	.926
No educ.	17	3	.059	0	.686	188	207	.09	.077	.639
Informal educ.	17	3	0	0	.	188	207	.043	.044	.964
Elementary educ.	17	3	.647	.666	.951	188	207	.617	.594	.644
Secondary educ.	17	3	.236	.334	.735	188	207	.234	.271	.406
Higher educ.	17	3	.059	0	.686	188	207	.016	.015	.905
Information index	17	3	3.101	2.619	.262	188	207	3.349	3.327	.716
Social capital index	17	3	1.297	1.167	.618	188	207	1.76	1.722	.523
Female	17	3	1.764	2	.374	188	207	1.798	1.734	.138
Macua ethnicity	17	3	.647	1	.24	188	207	.819	.831	.759
Maconde ethnicity	17	3	.236	0	.374	188	207	.101	.087	.632
Mwani ethnicity	17	3	.059	0	.686	188	207	.074	.072	.94
Other ethnicity	17	3	.059	0	.686	188	207	.005	.009	.621

Table E5: Locals: baseline to follow-up attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors					Non-Attritors				
	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value
Age	30	15	36.233	38.467	.645	175	194	38.27	37.237	.507
Catholic	30	15	.2	.334	.338	175	193	.178	.135	.253
Muslim	30	15	.8	.666	.338	175	193	.81	.855	.253
Other religion	30	15	0	0	.	175	193	.011	.011	.917
No educ.	30	15	.034	.134	.214	175	195	.097	.072	.381
Informal educ.	30	15	.067	.067	1	175	195	.035	.041	.736
Elementary educ.	30	15	.567	.6	.836	175	195	.629	.595	.508
Secondary educ.	30	15	.3	.2	.486	175	195	.223	.277	.233
Higher educ.	30	15	.034	0	.486	175	195	.017	.015	.894
Information index	30	15	3.119	2.933	.327	175	195	3.364	3.346	.774
Social capital index	30	15	1.371	1.234	.296	175	195	1.782	1.752	.617
Female	30	15	1.834	1.667	.214	175	195	1.788	1.744	.309
Macua ethnicity	30	15	.7	.8	.486	175	195	.823	.836	.74
Maconde ethnicity	30	15	.167	.134	.777	175	195	.103	.082	.49
Mwani ethnicity	30	15	.1	.067	.719	175	195	.069	.072	.904
Other ethnicity	30	15	.034	0	.486	175	195	.005	.011	.628

When examining the attrition of IDPs from baseline to post-meeting (Table E6), the samples of

attritors and non-attritors are reasonably balanced, aside from two exceptions pertaining to schooling. The first one consists of a higher prevalence of attritors with secondary schooling in the treatment group than in the control group (p-value 0.041, N=15). The second pertains to non-attritors in the treatment group demonstrating elevated rates of elementary schooling compared to the control group. In analyzing attrition of IDPs from baseline to follow-up (Table E7), the only imbalances observed are a lower prevalence of the Makua ethnicity among attritors in the treatment group and a higher prevalence of non-attritors with elementary education in the treatment group.

Table E6: IDPs: baseline to post-meeting attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors					Non-attritors				
	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value
Age	4	11	30	38	.373	250	232	36.799	37.297	.705
Catholic	4	11	0	.091	.566	250	232	.149	.151	.96
Muslim	4	11	1	.909	.566	250	232	.839	.828	.745
Other religion	4	11	0	0	.	250	232	.012	.022	.42
No educ.	4	11	0	.091	.566	250	232	.177	.125	.111
Informal educ.	4	11	0	.182	.396	250	232	.041	.039	.931
Elementary educ.	4	11	.25	.455	.51	250	232	.536	.617	.076
Secondary educ.	4	11	.75	.182	.041	250	232	.234	.203	.409
Higher educ.	4	11	0	.091	.566	250	232	.012	.017	.64
Information index	4	11	2.607	3.013	.27	250	233	2.957	2.99	.522
Social capital index	4	11	1.188	1.318	.572	250	232	1.448	1.453	.91
Female	4	11	1.75	1.728	.936	250	233	1.746	1.726	.609
Macua ethnicity	4	11	.75	.273	.109	250	232	.524	.466	.2
Maconde ethnicity	4	11	0	0	.	250	232	.125	.12	.886
Mwani ethnicity	4	11	.25	.637	.211	250	232	.331	.375	.31
Other ethnicity	4	11	0	.091	.566	250	232	.02	.039	.227

E.3 Correction of Treatment Effects Using Inverse Probability Weighting

Following the evidence suggesting the existence of differential and selective attrition, I proceeded by analyzing the robustness of the primary results introduced in Section 6 by implementing inverse probability of attrition weights (IPW). The IPW estimates for locals and IDPs are enumerated in Table E8. Comparison of the primary and IPW results for locals (Panel A) reveals that estimated coefficient magnitudes and their statistical significance remain largely unaltered. Notably, the coefficients estimating the treatment effects on tolerance toward IDPs and beliefs about IDPs (presented in Table 1) exhibited both increased magnitude and statistical significance. Trust in IDPs

Table E7: IDPs: baseline to follow-up attrition – characteristics of attritors vs. non-attritors

	Attritors					Non-attritors				
	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value	N_C	N_T	\bar{X}_C	\bar{X}_T	p-value
Age	56	56	37.84	35.875	.48	197	187	36.365	37.764	.34
Catholic	56	56	.107	.178	.285	197	187	.158	.139	.6
Muslim	56	56	.84	.785	.472	197	187	.842	.845	.934
Other religion	56	56	.053	.036	.651	197	187	0	.016	.075
No educ.	56	56	.2	.125	.288	197	187	.168	.123	.217
Informal educ.	56	56	.036	.072	.418	197	187	.041	.037	.873
Elementary educ.	56	56	.4	.465	.498	197	187	.569	.652	.092
Secondary educ.	56	56	.309	.268	.636	197	187	.224	.182	.313
Higher educ.	56	56	.054	.072	.718	197	187	0	.005	.305
Information index	56	56	2.682	2.817	.268	197	188	3.029	3.043	.795
Social capital index	56	55	1.294	1.3	.94	197	188	1.488	1.49	.964
Female	56	56	1.702	1.732	.723	197	188	1.759	1.724	.428
Macua ethnicity	56	56	.572	.34	.013	197	187	.515	.492	.649
Maconde ethnicity	56	56	.107	.161	.41	197	187	.128	.102	.427
Mwani ethnicity	56	56	.303	.411	.24	197	187	.337	.38	.382
Other ethnicity	56	56	.018	.089	.095	197	187	.021	.026	.683

also enhanced during the follow-up stages. All other estimated coefficients preserved their statistical insignificance, and their variation in magnitude was minimal.

The IPW estimates for IDPs in the post-meeting phase (Panel B), reveal the robustness of the main results in IDPs feeling better integrated, trusting locals more, and demonstrating higher levels of religious tolerance – with the IPW coefficients remain statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels, and their magnitudes display slight variation. This result is observed despite Tables E2 and E3 suggest potential differential and selective attrition in the post-meeting phase. Regarding the IPW estimates for IDPs in the follow-up phase, the empirical evidence provided in Tables E2 and E3 did not demonstrate support for differential or selective attrition of IDPs. Consequently, the assumptions applied by inverse probability weighting may inadvertently skew otherwise unbiased estimates of treatment effects for IDPs. Nonetheless, IPW estimates for IDPs in the follow-up phase are also reported, showing a decrease in the statistical significance of trust in locals and the bias toward insurgents measured by the IAT.

In conclusion, evidence described in this section (Tables E2 and E3) suggests there existed differential and selective attrition among locals, notwithstanding the low number of attrited individuals – 20 (4.8%) and 45 (11%) in the post-meeting and follow-up stages, respectively. Employing

IPW estimates to compensate for these factors, the treatment effects demonstrate robustness by retaining statistical significance and minimal fluctuations in the magnitudes of estimated coefficients. With respect to IDPs, evidence supports the existence of differential and selective attrition during the post-meeting phase, driven by a modest quantity of 15 individuals (3% of all IDPs sampled). No evidence was found for differential or selective attrition of IDPs during the follow-up phase. These findings corroborate qualitative evidence collected by field staff indicating that absences among IDPs were predominantly due to migration or illness, factors orthogonal to treatment assignment.

Table E8: Inverse Probability Weighting estimates.

Outcome Variable	Sample size			IPW Estimates		
	Total (1)	Control (2)	Treatment (3)	Coef. (4)	Std. Err. (5)	P-value (6)
Panel A. Locals						
Tolerance toward IDPs (PM)	367	175	192	.086	.036	.019
Tolerance toward IDPs (F-UP)	332	159	173	.019	.031	.538
Beliefs about IDPs (PM)	367	175	192	.028	.016	.091
Beliefs about IDPs (F-UP)	332	159	173	.046	.022	.042
Trust in IDPs (PM)	367	175	192	.022	.03	.464
Trust in IDPs (F-UP)	332	159	173	.089	.045	.052
Religious tolerance (PM)	304	144	160	-.021	.037	.578
Religious tolerance (F-UP)	278	130	148	.093	.072	.198
IAT (PM)	275	131	144	-.013	.022	.548
IAT (F-UP)	278	130	148	0	.013	.995
Panel B. IDPs						
Feels better integrated (PM)	362	173	189	.167	.029	0
Feels better integrated (F-UP)	298	154	144	.133	.029	0
Particip. neigh. life (PM)	437	228	209	.027	.016	.083
Particip. neigh. life (F-UP)	332	172	160	.016	.021	.438
Trust in locals (PM)	435	227	208	.067	.031	.03
Trust in locals (F-UP)	332	172	160	.055	.033	.091
Religious tolerance (PM)	365	193	172	.095	.032	.003
Religious tolerance (F-UP)	280	146	134	-.001	.034	.969
IAT (PM)	333	178	155	.029	.016	.064
IAT (F-UP)	279	145	134	-.029	.019	.122

OLS estimates. A different model is estimated in each row, which varies in the outcome measure being used. PM and F-UP refer to post-meeting and follow-up estimates, respectively. The specifications and samples used are identical to those present in the main results tables.