Mentoring Small Businesses: Evidence from Uganda*

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Abstract

We test a cash transfer and mentorship program for Ugandan and refugee microentrepreneurs using a randomized controlled trial. All treatment arms received a cash grant and were eligible for a lottery every two months, which provided a cash reward for having an open business at the time of the draw. In addition to the grant and lottery, some clients were assigned to a mentorship group consisting of 3 clients and a mentor. For some groups, the lottery payouts depend on their individual business performance, and for others, the payouts also depend on their group members' business performance. By giving group members a stake in the others' success, this *shared fate* mentorship model could encourage the group to invest additional effort in each other and disclose valuable information or techniques. Finally, some groups mix nationalities or mix genders to evaluate the value of heterogeneous groups compared to aligned groups on these dimensions. We find that all treatment arms substantially improve business outcomes, with small differences between arms on average. The shared fate addition improves early impacts in heterogeneous groups, but worsens them in aligned groups.

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1 Introduction

Micro-entrepreneurship is a common form of employment for urban residents in lower-income countries, but many small firms yield low profit. Borrowing constraints and a lack of managerial capital may act to constrain business growth (de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008, Brooks, Donovan and Johnson, 2018). These constraints are potentially amplified for groups with limited access to existing business networks, such as refugees and women. With refugee populations across the world increasingly hosted in urban areas, the creation of economic opportunities for, and social integration of, these populations is a pressing policy challenge.

Mentorship by an experienced business owner has the potential to grow existing business networks. Mentors may have valuable information to share and can serve as role models to help build confidence. Further, a program intervention may facilitate exchange across groups that would otherwise have few connections, such as across gender or nationality lines. This contact may also increase intergroup social cohesion, a hypothesis studied by social scientists for decades. However, the mentor's effort is likely difficult for mentees or program facilitators to observe, and the mentor may view the mentees as potential competitors, reducing their incentive to invest in mentorship and share valuable information.

This project tests whether business mentorship improves microenterprise success and social cohesion in Kampala, Uganda, a city that hosts 150,000 refugees. We randomly matched inexperienced microentrepreneurs to four-person mentorship groups consisting of three inexperienced "mentees" and one "mentor" with more business experience who guided the group through a set of weekly, semi-structured meetings for approximately six months. Mentee participants also received business grants of 2,000,000 UGX (about US$524): a separate treatment arm included only a business grant, allowing us to evaluate the marginal value of the mentorship component. To study the impacts of contact across nationality and gender lines, participants were randomly assigned either to *aligned* groups consisting of members of the same nationality and gender or one of two *heterogeneous* group structures: *cross-nationality* groups consisting of two native and two refugee members of the same gender or *cross-gender* groups consisting of two men and two women of the same nationality. Finally, a random subset of mentorship groups was assigned to a *shared fate* component that compensated all group members for the success of their partners' businesses, measured by whether the business was operational at three fixed points spanning the mentorship program. The shared fate arm may better align incentives within groups by giving participants a stake in the each others' success, especially in heterogeneous groups where a lack of familiarity may inhibit non-financial incentives to cooperate.

We find that all treatment arms substantially improve business openness and profit over one year. Averaging across all mentorship group structures, the impacts of assignment to a mentorship group on business outcomes are similar to impacts of the business grant alone, implying that the marginal value of mentorship is small on average. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the added benefit of mentorship: men experience positive added benefits, while the added benefits for women are slightly negative on average. Being matched to a male mentor produces better outcomes for both male and female mentees, whereas the nationality of the mentor makes little difference in business impacts. We also find that the shared fate addition improves business outcomes in heterogeneous groups, but

worsens them in aligned groups, early in the program. We find no consistent evidence of significant changes in inter-group attitudes or social cohesion resulting from heterogeneous mentorship relative to aligned mentorship, or to cash.

These findings improve our understanding of three fundamental constraints to refugees' livelihoods and well-being: physical capital, human capital, and social capital. The large impacts of cash transfers on business outcomes and well-being measures indicate that physical capital constraints are inhibiting small business growth. Mentorship groups and business management training are designed to increase human capital through the provision of business-related skills and knowledge. Our finding that the impacts of business mentorship are highly heterogeneous along both mentee and mentor characteristics implies that screening in more profitable mentors would likely improve business mentorship programs. Finally, heterogeneous mentorship groups are designed to alleviate a social capital constraint, strengthening "weak ties," to test whether deepening the embeddedness of refugees in their host communities is valuable for business success.

Our study relates closely to work on business networks (Brooks, Donovan and Johnson, 2018, Cai and Szeidl, 2018, Fafchamps and Quinn, 2018, Loiacono and Silva-Vargas, 2023) and managerial capital (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007, Bloom et al., 2013). It also relates to work on the graduation model, where programs testing group-based coaching have shown promising effects, including among refugees in rural Uganda (Brune et al., 2023). We contribute to this literature by varying the composition of the groups to test whether expanding business networks across demographic groups can leverage the "strength of weak ties" to improve business performance and can affect social cohesion (Baseler et al., 2023*b*). Finally, this work relates to a vast literature on the use of financial incentives to encourage the transmission of human capital (e.g., Leaver et al., 2021) and on the broader impacts of aligning financial instruments and incentives across different groups (Jha and Shayo, 2019).

A large literature studies the role of intergroup contact in the formation of attitudes, following the contact hypothesis as formulated in Allport (1954). Contact can reduce prejudice when it is collaborative in nature (Mousa, 2020, Lowe, 2021, Corno, La Ferrara and Burns, 2022): see Paluck, Green and Green (2019) for a meta-analysis. In Kampala, Loiacono and Silva-Vargas (2023) find that Ugandan business owners randomly offered a subsidized refugee employee for one week employ more refugees eight months later. However, Enos and Gidron (2018) finds few effects of contact among Israel's Jewish citizens toward Palestinians, and Zhou and Lyall (2022) finds similar null results among Afghan hosts toward internally displaced people.

2 Background

For refugees, Uganda is one of the world's most inclusive hosting environments (Ginn et al., 2022). Refugees are allowed to live outside of the rural settlements, but urban residence means foregoing most assistance like food rations. Out of 1.6 million refugees in Uganda, approximately 150,000 live in Kampala (UNHCR, 2024). Refugees are allowed to start businesses if they obtain the same permits that Ugandans are required to hold and are able to hold formal jobs. The main refugee nationalities in Kampala are Congolese, Rwandans, Somalis, Burundians, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Sudanese, and South

Sudanese, all of which are included in our sample.

3 Experimental Design

We designed seven treatment arms to test whether group mentorship and cash grants can relieve constraints facing small business owners in Kampala, Uganda.

3.1 Sample

The full sample consists of 2,000 inexperienced or prospective micro-entrepreneurs, denoted as the "main" sample, and 600 mentors living in Kampala, Uganda. The sample is balanced on gender and refugee status and selected from a larger registration list to accommodate this balance and the demographics needed for the randomization, discussed below. Participants in the main sample are between 18 and 35 years old, have fewer than six years of business experience, and want to spend at least 20 hours per week on business in the near future. Mentors are at least 25 years old, currently own a business, have at least four years of business experience, and were judged by program staff to have the interpersonal and business skills necessary to be a mentor. All participants must speak either English or Luganda at a conversational level so that they could be randomized into a mixed nationality group. Additionally, all sampled participants were willing to spend three hours each week for six months on the program, including the potential for group meetings or surveys.

3.2 Interventions

Our interventions were deployed by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), a global non-governmental organization which operates humanitarian programs in countries that host refugees, including Uganda. Individuals in our main sample were randomly assigned to receive a cash grant, to join a mentorship group and receive a cash grant, or to a control arm.

Mentorship Groups. Mentorship groups consisted of three mentees from the main sample and one mentor. Group members met at an initial launch event and then were asked to meet once per week for six months at a convenient time and location. Handbooks for mentorship groups provided a suggested curriculum modeled after the IRC's "Learn 2 Earn" classroom business training. The suggested curriculum included business topics and exercises, as well as ice-breaker questions to learn about group members personally. The mentorship bundle additionally included short animated videos which could be sent and viewed on smartphones.[1] In addition to the weekly group meetings, mentors met once per month with each other for the first four months of the program to discuss progress and challenges with the groups in meetings facilitated by the IRC.

Group Composition: Gender and Nationality. Mentorship groups were formed in three possible configurations: *aligned* groups consisting of four individuals of the same nationality and gender, *cross-*

[1] The business training videos can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PL5KpU_czGn__NpQLFEuKCAZ6zpFLyd8Vw.

gender groups consisting of two men and two women of the same nationality, and *cross-nationality* groups consisting of two Ugandans and two refugees of the same gender.

Cash Grants. All treated individuals in the main sample received a cash grant of US $540 (2,000,000 UGX) approximately six weeks after the programs began.[2] The grant was labeled as intended for business purposes, but there was no spending oversight. The six-week window between program launch and cash transfer was intended to provide the groups enough time to build trust and learn from each other how to invest the money and the cash arm enough time to plan their spending. Mentorship groups were not expected to invest in joint projects and were reminded that the grant is theirs individually to invest as they want. The mentors received a grant of US $270, also paid in full after six weeks, and an additional US $54 at the end of the program. After two weeks, each treatment arm was given a transport stipend to cover potential program travel over the six months duration: US $4 for the cash arm, US $54 for the main sample assigned a mentorship group, and US $65 for treated mentors.

Performance-Based Incentives. All mentorship programs included performance-based financial incentives. Each participant with an open business was entered into a lottery at three fixed points: 2, 4, and 6 months from program launch. Business openness was self-reported and verified in-person by IRC staff through spot checks for all lottery winners.[3] Lottery odds were XXX and winners received US $20 each round.

"Shared Fate" Incentives. We randomly assigned some mentorship groups to receive payouts for every mentee in their group who won the lottery. This design gives group members "skin in the game" with respect to others' outcomes, and is motivated by our hypothesis that such "shared fate" financial incentives may help groups overcome barriers created by a lack of familiarity, which may be pronounced in heterogeneous groups. To incentivize effort by mentors, mentors of winning businesses received US $27 each round. In each round, all participants received an SMS announcing the total group winnings and which members won for the group.[4] We refer to mentorship groups receiving these group-based incentives as *shared fate mentorship* groups, and groups receiving only individual-based incentives as *basic mentorship* groups.[5] These two incentive designs are fully interacted with the three possible demographic configurations, forming six mentorship arms in total.

[2] All Ugandan Shilling (UGX) amounts are reported in US Dollars at an exchange rate of 1 USD = 3,703 UGX.

[3] During spot checks, staff were instructed to confirm that the business was operational either directly by verifying that the participant or business capital was present at the business location, or indirectly by checking nearby business owners' familiarity with the participant's business.

[4] A lottery-based design reduces monitoring costs—because only winners need to be verified—and reduces the risk of group tension, as not winning the lottery can be attributed to chance.

[5] The verification of business openness, spot-checks, timing, and amounts for the winning mentees were the same in the basic mentorship and shared fate groups. To equate expected payouts across cash only, shared fate, and basic mentorship groups, individuals assigned to cash only or basic mentorship received a separate, unannounced lump-sum transfer of US $41 three months after the launch event. Mentors in the basic mentorship arm also received fixed payments of US $20 to coincide with the mentees' lotteries at 2 and 4 months, in addition to the US $54 after six months, the end of the program.

Control. The control group received a cash grant 18 months after the program launched. At the time of registration, participants were informed that some transfers would be delayed, and that this would be decided by a computer. The control group was then called while the programs were launching to inform them of the delay. The data presented here were collected before the control group received any transfer from the IRC programs.

Treatment Roll-Out. Individuals assigned to a treatment group were invited to a central location between July 2022 and February 2023 to launch the program. Cash only, basic mentorship, and shared fate mentorship treatment arms were invited on separate days to avoid confusion about the lottery structures. Each launch day included a mix of genders, nationalities, and group compositions that were visible to other participants. At the event, IRC staff introduced the program components with a video and discussion, and mentorship groups met for the first time when applicable. Each participant in the treatment arms received a handbook that includes a description of the program, explanation of the lottery, program timeline, information on the IRC, and consent forms. Handbooks for mentorship arms also included a code of conduct and mentorship meeting guides, discussed below.[6] The program design was informed by piloting described in Baseler et al. (2024).

Information About Refugees. The program video and handbook included basic information about refugees in Uganda, based on the design of Baseler et al. (2023*b*).[7] The handbook notes:

> *The IRC's mission is to support refugees and also the communities that host them. Refugees are people who do not feel safe in their home countries...The IRC started the Re:Build program because refugees live here in Kampala, and we want both refugees and Ugandans who live in Kampala to benefit. Refugees and Ugandans are participating in this program, both as mentors and mentees... Overall, this project is part of the international donations that are shared between refugees and hosts in Uganda. In Uganda, more than 30% of foreign donations for refugees go to supporting Ugandans.*

3.3 Experimental Assignment and Balance

Assignment of sampled individuals to treatment proceeded as follows. First, individuals were recruited to participate in the study as part of a *stratum*. Each stratum consisted of 40 individuals from the same (or adjacent) neighborhoods, with half of its constituents female, and all from the same nationality; strata comprised 12 mentors and 28 mentees. Strata were *paired* so that each refugee stratum was matched with a stratum of Ugandans, with pairing undertaken to minimized the average distance between the neighborhoods of paired strata in the sample.

This configuration ensured that each strata pair contained sufficient numbers to create all possible permutations of the treatments, with individuals in nationality-misaligned mentorship groups paired

[6] The full participant handbooks are available at `www.rebuild.rescue.org/rct-participant-handbook`.

[7] Baseler et al. (2023*b*) finds that information delivered to Ugandans about a national policy that requires international aid for refugees to be partly shared with Ugandans significantly changes attitudes toward refugees. Cross-nationality mentorship groups thus estimate the effects of inter-group contact beyond effects from the information provided in this script.

with those from the opposing stratum. To address integer constraints, strata pairs were assigned to one of two treatment configurations in a first-stage randomization, and then individuals were assigned to the resulting treatments within these blocks in a second stage.

We generated 2,000 such randomizations that passed a constraint of basic balance on IRC registration data. The final treatment assignment was chosen by simple randomization from within these "feasible" randomizations.

Table 11 shows the results of the assignment in terms of the resulting balance on demographics and economic and social outcomes, respectively. Stratification provides effectively perfect balance by gender and refugee status. We observe some imbalance by age and by baseline business capital, but overall the results are consistent with confirmation of successful randomization.

4 Empirical Setup

4.1 Data

Our main data come from five rounds of in-person surveys: a baseline and follow-ups every three months, approximately 3, 6, 9, and 12 months after the launch event. The main and mentor samples were surveyed in all rounds. Surveys were conducted by an independent survey firm, and respondents were regularly reminded that their answers would not be shared with the IRC to facilitate true reporting of social and business outcomes. Attrition is reported in Table 10. The control group was overall more likely to respond than treatment groups. Observations are therefore weighted in the estimating equation using inverse probability weights. The weights are generated by round as a function of treatments, candidate baseline covariates, and their interactions using a lasso.

We also utilize data collected by the IRC: demographic information at registration, attendance at launch events, a survey collected if the participant's business was verified for eligibility into the lottery, and whether the lottery winners were successfully spot-checked. We additionally conducted 40 qualitative interviews in June 2023, about 10 months after the program launched for the majority of participants.

4.2 Outcomes

The main specifications for economic outcomes include only the main sample, excluding mentors. Continuous monetary outcomes like profit, revenue, and capital are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile within survey rounds and treatment arms. If a respondent does not have an open business, these outcomes are included as 0. We otherwise do not impute missing values for outcome variables but do impute missing values for control variables using the baseline mean.

The main specifications for social outcomes include both the main and mentor samples and are presented separately for Ugandans and refugees. Likert scales and other categorical variables are transformed into binary measures split around the median response, with the median resolved toward the smaller group. "Don't know" and other missing values are not included.

Outcomes are grouped in pre-specified domains and combined into indices following Anderson

(2008). Index components with 90% or more of respondents providing a directionally positive response (after transformation from Likert to binary) in the control group are excluded. Results on the pre-specified domains and the component variables are presented in the appendix.

4.3 Baseline Summary Statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics at baseline. Business and household outcomes among Ugandans and refugees in our sample are similar. These outcomes include owning a business, profits, capital, business debt, business practices, household earnings, and meals skipped due to lack of food. Refugees with a business are more likely to report that it is registered with the Ugandan government. Respondents are asked for up to three people they talk to most about business: Ugandans report more contacts overall (1.96 to 1.28) and more contacts with Ugandans (1.81 to 0.26). Refugees report one other refugee on average, while the mean for Ugandans listing refugees among contacts is 0.12.

Table 1: Summary Statistics at Baseline by Demographic (Main Sample)

	Ugandans		Refugees		Men		Women		Main Sample		Mentors	
	Avg	SD	Avg	SD	Avg	SD	Avg	SD	Avg	SD	Avg	SD
Own Business (Binary)	0.73	0.45	0.67	0.47	0.68	0.47	0.72	0.45	0.70	0.46	0.86	0.34
Business Profits (USD)	27.4	45.3	29.6	50.6	34.6	54.7	22.3	39.2	28.5	48.0	58.7	102.2
Weekly Hours Worked (7 Days)	54.0	48.7	37.0	33.2	47.0	40.3	43.9	44.6	45.5	42.5	49.8	33.2
Business Capital (USD)	360.4	733.0	382.2	732.0	438.0	803.4	304.6	647.3	371.3	732.4	764.5	1527.2
Business Debt (USD)	43.2	121.4	40.9	139.0	46.9	138.6	37.2	121.7	42.1	130.5	71.5	213.1
Business Practice Score (Of 13)	8.64	2.83	9.21	2.61	8.99	2.75	8.84	2.73	8.91	2.74	8.67	2.82
Business Registered (Yes/No)	0.12	0.32	0.21	0.40	0.19	0.39	0.13	0.34	0.16	0.37	0.26	0.44
Ugandan Contacts (Count)	1.81	1.10	0.26	0.63	1.09	1.20	0.97	1.17	1.03	1.18	0.95	1.20
Refugee Contacts (Count)	0.12	0.37	1.01	1.11	0.59	0.97	0.53	0.91	0.56	0.94	0.58	1.02
Women Contacts (Count)	0.89	0.97	0.60	0.90	0.43	0.69	1.07	1.06	0.75	0.95	0.69	0.99
Men Contacts (Count)	1.07	1.06	0.68	0.97	1.29	1.12	0.47	0.75	0.88	1.04	0.87	1.11
Household Earnings (USD)	62.8	72.8	57.0	79.2	69.8	81.6	50.1	68.9	59.9	76.1	89.3	156.9
Days HH Member Skipped Meals (Of 7)	1.19	1.71	1.12	1.67	1.09	1.59	1.21	1.78	1.15	1.69	1.05	1.79
Happy Most of the Time	0.36	0.48	0.28	0.45	0.33	0.47	0.31	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.36	0.48
Economic Effect of Refugees on Uganda	0.67	0.47	.	.	0.68	0.47	0.66	0.47	0.67	0.47	0.68	0.47
Support Refugees' Freedom of Movement	0.87	0.34	.	.	0.87	0.34	0.87	0.34	0.87	0.34	0.86	0.35
N	998		999		998		999		1,997		599	

Notes—

The differences among men and women in our sample are more significant, as men report higher profits, business capital, and household earnings. Men report slightly more contacts overall, and more contacts among men, while women report more contacts among women. As with the comparison between refugees and hosts, business networks along this measure are segmented along demographic lines.

As expected, mentors report significantly larger businesses in terms of profits, capital, and debt, as well as higher household earnings and fewer meals skipped. They report slightly smaller regular business contacts that the main sample, among those who have an open business.

4.4 Specification

As set out in our pre-analysis plan (Baseler et al., 2023*a*), the starting point for all analysis of intent-to-treat effects is an ANCOVA specification of the form

$$y_{ist} = \alpha \text{Cash}_{is} + \sum_j \beta_j \text{Mentorship}_{isj} + \gamma y_{i0} + \delta M_{i0} + X_{is0}\Pi + \theta_t + \tau d_{ist} + \kappa_s + e_{ist} \quad (1)$$

where y_{ist} is an outcome for individual i in randomization stratum s measured at time t, with $t = 0$ corresponding to baseline (pre-treatment) values; Cash_{is} is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i was assigned to any treatment arm (all of which received a cash grant); Mentorship_{isj} is a set of six treatment assignment dummies indicating whether individual i was assigned to basic aligned mentorship, basic cross-gender mentorship, basic cross-nationality mentorship, shared fate aligned mentorship, shared fate cross-gender mentorship, or shared fate cross-nationality mentorship, or some aggregation of those dummies; M_{i0} is a dummy equal to 1 if y_{i0} is missing; X_{is0} is a vector of possible controls chosen through double lasso regression; θ_t and κ_s are survey-round and randomization-stratum fixed effects respectively; and e_{ist} is an error term. Given that the roll-out period meant that there is potentially meaningful variation in survey timing even with a follow-up round and randomization stratum (albeit uncorrelated with treatment), we further control linearly for survey timing with the continuous (monthly) date variable, d_{ist}. α estimates the average intent-to-treat impact of the cash grant on y_{ist} relative to the control group, pooling across survey rounds, and conditional on a set of baseline fixed effects and controls. β_j estimates the analogous impact of mentorship group j relative to cash; the impact of mentorship relative to control is given by $\alpha + \beta_j$. Throughout this paper, we discuss the impacts of mentorship compared to cash only—rather than mentorship compared to control—unless otherwise noted.

5 Results

We find that all treatment arms substantially improve business and psychological outcomes, with small additional impacts of mentorship on average. While men and women both benefit from the cash grant, the marginal impact of mentorship is greater for men than for women. We observe few significant differences across mentorship configurations. We find suggestive evidence that the shared fate addition improves business outcomes in heterogeneous groups, but worsens them in aligned groups, especially early in the program.

5.1 Economic Outcomes

Table 2 displays impacts on selected economic outcomes estimated using Equation (1) on our main sample.

Business Success. The cash grant increases average business openness by 15 percentage points (pp) on a control base of 72% ($p < 0.01$) and average profits by \$25 per month on a base of \$44 (effect size = 57%; $p < 0.01$). The additional impact of mentorship—pooling across all six mentorship configurations,

Table 2: Impacts on Business Success Outcomes

	Open Business					Business Profits (USD / 30 Days)				
	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women
Any Cash	0.15***	0.16***	0.13***	0.15***	0.14***	24.87***	25.93***	22.69***	28.27***	24.92***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(5.50)	(8.13)	(7.57)	(8.70)	(6.89)
Any Mentorship	0.02	-0.00	0.03	0.03	0.01	1.17	-2.55	3.63	14.35	-11.15*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(5.52)	(7.31)	(8.17)	(8.83)	(6.44)
Control Mean	0.72	0.74	0.69	0.71	0.73	43.58	45.84	41.10	48.70	38.52
Cash = Any Ment.	0.288	0.855	0.192	0.240	0.758	0.832	0.727	0.657	0.105	0.084
	Business Capital					Household Earnings (USD / 30 Days)				
Any Cash	361.78***	408.07***	291.43***	425.72***	295.90***	28.74***	24.72**	28.96***	38.42***	18.44*
	(59.94)	(76.22)	(90.10)	(101.79)	(59.81)	(7.31)	(11.67)	(9.43)	(10.78)	(10.20)
Any Mentorship	-37.96	-11.13	-68.44	39.56	-90.27	-0.12	-0.68	1.95	17.71	-12.73
	(60.89)	(74.67)	(95.85)	(100.25)	(55.56)	(6.82)	(9.94)	(9.65)	(11.13)	(8.20)
Control Mean	377.16	372.42	382.34	479.66	275.97	89.34	101.91	75.62	91.84	86.87
Cash = Any Ment.	0.533	0.882	0.475	0.693	0.105	0.986	0.946	0.840	0.112	0.121
	Household Well-being Index					Psychological Well-being Index				
Any Cash	0.40***	0.49***	0.29***	0.39***	0.35***	0.27***	0.30***	0.26***	0.27***	0.28***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Any Mentorship	-0.02	-0.07	0.03	0.04	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.10	-0.10	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.07	-0.03
Cash = Any Ment.	0.705	0.215	0.654	0.624	0.709	0.672	0.632	0.660	0.733	0.290
Obs.	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509
Indiv.	1,919	969	950	948	971	1,919	969	950	948	971

which we refer to as *any mentorship*—on business openness is small and statistically insignificant. The average impact of any mentorship on business profit is close to zero on average, but somewhat positive for men (for whom it is \$14 per month) and negative for women (for whom it is \$−11 per month).

There is little heterogeneity in impacts on business success across our six mentorship configurations, as shown in Table 3. Suggestively, basic aligned mentorship and shared-fate cross-gender mentorship increase business openness for men (p-values < 0.05).

Table 3: Impacts on Business Success Outcomes

	Open Business					Business Profits (USD / 30 Days)				
	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women
Any Cash	0.15***	0.16***	0.14***	0.16***	0.14***	25.48***	26.23***	24.11***	30.21***	24.19***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(5.52)	(8.15)	(7.61)	(8.90)	(6.72)
Ment. Aligned	0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.05**	-0.02	-0.70	-3.04	-0.20	13.37	-11.72
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(7.27)	(10.01)	(10.41)	(11.46)	(8.17)
Ment. Diff. Gender	0.01	0.02	-0.00	0.01	0.01	3.48	-1.59	4.91	12.99	-5.42
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(8.94)	(10.78)	(14.12)	(15.00)	(9.40)
Ment. Diff. Natio	0.02	-0.01	0.05	0.02	0.02	2.91	1.70	5.17	18.51	-11.87
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(8.59)	(11.11)	(13.59)	(14.61)	(8.46)
Shared Fate Aligned	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.02	0.05	-6.52	-10.85	-3.00	3.15	-15.78*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(8.68)	(10.20)	(13.95)	(15.28)	(8.80)
Shared Fate Diff. Gender	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.06*	0.01	2.30	-1.16	7.70	13.07	-6.67
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(8.93)	(12.54)	(13.28)	(14.99)	(9.60)
Shared Fate Diff. Natio	-0.01	-0.03	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	6.48	5.76	2.49	22.71	-12.54
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(9.47)	(12.70)	(14.35)	(15.83)	(9.76)
Obs.	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509
Indiv.	1,919	969	950	948	971	1,919	969	950	948	971
Control Mean	0.72	0.74	0.69	0.71	0.73	43.58	45.84	41.10	48.70	38.52
Joint Test	0.738	0.692	0.488	0.321	0.835	0.932	0.915	0.993	0.743	0.623
SF vs BM	0.609	0.772	0.477	0.350	0.438	0.911	0.904	0.993	0.927	0.971
DID Gender	0.862	0.540	0.580	0.096	0.281	0.746	0.652	0.803	0.667	0.845
DID Natio	0.281	0.394	0.352	0.894	0.115	0.498	0.509	0.996	0.554	0.793

Notes— Main Sample. The *Any Cash* coefficient estimates impact of cash regardless of the treatment arm (Cash Only, or any variation of the mentorship component). The next 6 columns report coefficient estimates for each variation of the mentorship arms relative to the Cash Only arm. *Obs.* indicates the number of observations included in the regression, and *Indiv.* the number of individuals this corresponds to. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses under each coefficient. *** indicate significance 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. *Control Mean* reports the Control group mean for the outcome of the regression. *Joint Test* reports the p-value of a joint test of significance of each of the mentorship variations against cash. *SF vs BM* reports the p-value of a test testing the equality of the Mentorship and the Shared Fate arm for each of the three demographic alignment configurations. *DID Gender* reports the p-value of the test of the difference between aligned and misaligned on gender within Basic Mentorship, and that same difference within Share Fate. *DID Natio* reports the p-value of the test of the difference between aligned vs misaligned on nationality within Basic Mentorship, and that same difference within Share Fate.

Business Practices. The cash grant (of about \$540) increases measured business capital by \$362 on average ($p < 0.01$), as shown in Table 2: this impact is greater for hosts than for refugees (\$408 vs. \$291) and for men than for women (\$426 vs. \$296). Impacts of any mentorship on business capital mirror those on profit: they are close to zero on average, slightly positive for men, and slightly negative for women.

Table 4 displays treatment impacts on business capital and a business practices score comprising 13

measures of management practices for each mentorship configuration. We observe few impacts of cash or mentorship on the business practices score, though impacts of mentorship on this score are generally positive, especially for refugees.

Table 4: Impacts on Selected Business Practices Outcomes

	Business Capital					Business Practices (Out of 13)				
	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women
Any Cash	365.88***	414.93***	304.67***	432.98***	300.50***	0.09	0.31	-0.22	0.12	0.02
	(61.00)	(76.36)	(91.90)	(103.51)	(59.53)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Ment. Aligned	-19.14	24.16	-62.26	45.21	-63.78	0.07	0.08	0.13	0.08	0.12
	(74.23)	(98.53)	(106.40)	(119.07)	(68.31)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.22)
Ment. Diff. Gender	-21.35	-104.60	32.44	30.71	-42.31	0.23	0.18	0.39	0.15	0.32
	(82.79)	(105.58)	(125.19)	(141.39)	(72.13)	(0.18)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.22)
Ment. Diff. Natio	-95.79	-20.96	-171.34	-48.56	-130.32*	0.25	0.01	0.54**	0.34	0.22
	(80.77)	(112.59)	(113.89)	(140.98)	(76.97)	(0.18)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Shared Fate Aligned	-104.24	1.63	-180.97*	-52.48	-117.11	0.04	0.02	0.16	-0.31	0.45
	(82.68)	(121.02)	(108.99)	(142.99)	(79.53)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.30)
Shared Fate Diff. Gender	-1.34	-27.53	-7.92	108.32	-80.82	0.08	-0.17	0.49*	-0.19	0.45*
	(99.12)	(129.62)	(151.39)	(170.63)	(74.44)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.27)
Shared Fate Diff. Natio	-10.40	109.21	-136.65	200.72	-179.75**	0.24	0.09	0.48*	0.16	0.33
	(103.84)	(150.91)	(138.78)	(182.69)	(79.70)	(0.21)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.28)
Obs.	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509	5,811	3,127	2,684	2,857	2,954
Indiv.	1,919	969	950	948	971	1,748	911	837	863	885
Control Mean	377.16	372.42	382.34	479.66	275.97	9.23	8.85	9.67	9.24	9.22
Joint Test	0.777	0.886	0.308	0.833	0.349	0.725	0.967	0.267	0.487	0.557
SF vs BM	0.596	0.825	0.608	0.485	0.747	0.928	0.737	0.983	0.443	0.696
DID Gender	0.419	0.608	0.646	0.447	0.890	0.712	0.514	0.871	0.902	0.629
DID Natio	0.186	0.462	0.301	0.137	0.973	0.969	0.778	0.824	0.651	0.611

Notes— Main Sample.

Household Well-Being. Treatment impacts on business outcomes are reflected in broader measures of household well-being. The cash grant increases our index measure of household well-being by 0.4 sd on average ($p < 0.01$), as shown in Table 2. Impacts are greater for hosts (0.49 sd; $p < 0.01$) than for refugees (0.29 sd; $p < 0.01$). Impacts of any mentorship are close to zero on average.

Table 5 displays disagreggated treatment impacts on selected components of the household well-being index. The cash grant increases total household earnings by $29 per month on a base of $89 ($p < 0.01$), similar in magnitude to the impacts on business profits alone, indicating little if any substitution away from other income-generating activities at the household level. Impacts of mentorship on total earnings are generalyl small in magnitude and inconsistently signed across mentorship configurations. Cash lowers the reported incidence of skipped meals by 0.36 days per week on a base of 1 ($p < 0.01$); mentorship impacts on skipped meals are mostly small and inconsistently signed.

Table 5: Impacts on Selected Household Well-Being Outcomes

	Household Well-being Index					Total Household Earnings (USD / 30 days)					Days HH Member Skipped Meals (Out of 7)				
	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women
Any Cash	0.40***	0.48***	0.33***	0.41***	0.37***	29.09***	24.37**	29.52***	40.51***	18.06*	-0.36***	-0.51***	-0.24*	-0.43***	-0.32***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(7.29)	(11.63)	(9.34)	(10.95)	(9.98)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Ment. Aligned	-0.05	-0.14*	0.03	0.02	-0.09	-9.45	-10.79	-5.28	2.63	-18.30*	0.07	0.18*	0.00	0.05	0.14
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(8.76)	(12.58)	(12.38)	(13.80)	(10.42)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)	(0.11)
Ment. Diff. Gender	0.04	-0.11	0.15	0.06	0.05	6.84	-1.87	16.22	16.79	-0.02	-0.09	0.06	-0.26**	-0.09	-0.13
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(10.63)	(13.71)	(16.66)	(17.18)	(12.15)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Ment. Diff. Natio	-0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	10.54	13.80	7.30	44.42**	-16.25	0.04	0.22*	-0.09	-0.05	0.11
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(11.19)	(17.07)	(14.97)	(18.74)	(12.06)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.13)
Shared Fate Aligned	-0.09	-0.02	-0.16	0.10	-0.15	-17.86*	-17.89	-13.48	-5.96	-23.75**	0.12	0.22	0.11	-0.09	0.36**
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(10.06)	(12.93)	(15.53)	(17.50)	(11.77)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.17)
Shared Fate Diff. Gender	-0.03	-0.10	0.06	0.02	0.00	-0.97	0.55	4.98	13.81	-6.03	-0.01	0.12	-0.10	0.01	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(10.96)	(16.31)	(15.31)	(18.67)	(12.78)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Shared Fate Diff. Natio	0.00	0.07	-0.13	0.06	-0.11	13.39	37.83	-6.60	42.17	-8.42	0.04	-0.06	0.17	0.10	0.05
	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(15.51)	(24.77)	(18.41)	(26.64)	(13.69)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.13)
Obs.	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509	6,864	3,544	3,320	3,355	3,509
Indiv.	1,919	969	950	948	971	1,919	969	950	948	971	1,919	969	950	948	971
Control Mean	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.10	-0.10	89.34	101.91	75.62	91.84	86.87	1.00	1.04	0.95	0.98	1.01
Joint Test	0.717	0.361	0.226	0.968	0.406	0.172	0.242	0.754	0.196	0.327	0.337	0.177	0.052	0.696	0.107
SF vs BM	0.732	0.437	0.309	0.814	0.555	0.802	0.782	0.793	0.969	0.886	0.747	0.237	0.175	0.353	0.360
DID Gender	0.743	0.440	0.548	0.461	0.906	0.972	0.676	0.905	0.839	0.977	0.791	0.877	0.794	0.136	0.707
DID Natio	0.677	0.950	0.656	0.986	0.671	0.570	0.302	0.827	0.855	0.500	0.778	0.127	0.486	0.131	0.206

Notes— Main Sample.

5.2 Social Cohesion

Overall, we observe few and generally small treatment impacts on our index measure of social cohesion, as shown in Table 6, which displays treatment impacts on average and within our four non-overlapping demographic subgroups (host men, host women, refugee men, refugee women) as well as within hosts and refugees overall. Across these groups, cash increases our summary measure only for Ugandan women, by 0.21 sd ($p < 0.05$). Impacts of mentorship are generally small and not statistically significant.

Table 7 displays results for other social outcomes. Our measure of inter-nationality contact (outside of program meetings) is modestly higher for hosts in Cash Only, with few additional impacts of either aligned or heterogeneous mentorship. Inter-gender business contact—a measure of the number of other-gender members respondents report as close business contacts—changes little across treatment arms. Impacts on our measure of women's intra-household bargaining power are also small, though we note that there are modest positive effects from both basic and shared-fare cross-gender mentorship for women.

Our cash arm—which included an information script about aid sharing policies between hosts and refugees in Uganda (as explained in Section 3.2)—leads hosts to hold more positive economic views of refugees (by 0.14 sd on a summary index measure, $p < 0.05$) and to support inclusive refugee hosting policies such as freedom of movement and right-to-work (by 0.25 sd on a summary index measure, $p < 0.01$). Assignment to a mentorship group—which included the same informational script—has zero or somewhat negative impacts on these measures. These results are consistent with findings from Baseler et al. (2023*b*) that information about existing aid-sharing policies changes preferences for accepting and integrating refugees, but contact through a cross-nationality mentorship group does not.

Table 6: Impacts on Social Cohesion Index

	Any Cash	Ment. Aligned	Ment. Diff. Gender	Ment. Diff. Natio	Shared Fate Aligned	Shared Fate Diff. Gender	Shared Fate Diff. Natio	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Aligned vs Diff. Natio	DID Natio	Aligned vs Diff. Gender	DID Gender
Social Cohesion Index														
All Hosts	0.06	0.07	0.03	0.07	-0.09	-0.09	0.06	4676	1267	-0.00	0.165	0.153	0.858	0.726
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)							
Host Men	-0.08	0.08	0.05	0.06	-0.13	-0.08	0.05	2314	632	0.21	0.271	0.170	0.840	0.559
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)							
Host Women	0.21**	0.05	-0.01	0.09	-0.04	-0.11	0.03	2362	635	-0.21	0.793	0.900	0.698	0.931
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)							
All Refugees	-0.03	0.08	0.08	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.07	4339	1241	-0.00	0.301	0.162	0.878	0.702
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)							
Refugees Men	-0.09	0.10	0.09	0.15	0.01	0.01	0.21*	2127	614	0.12	0.358	0.422	0.998	0.962
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)							
Refugees Women	0.00	0.11	0.09	-0.16*	-0.06	0.04	0.02	2212	627	-0.12	0.012	0.033	0.747	0.471
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.10)							

Table 7: Impacts on Other Social Outcomes

	Any Cash	Ment. Aligned	Ment. Diff. Gender	Ment. Diff. Natio	Shared Fate Aligned	Shared Fate Diff. Gender	Shared Fate Diff. Natio	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Aligned vs Diff. Natio	DID Natio	Aligned vs Diff. Gender	DID Gender
Inter-Nationality Contact Index														
Hosts	0.11*	-0.03	-0.04	-0.06	0.01	-0.02	0.01	4676	1267	0.00	0.867	0.709	0.947	0.892
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)							
Refugees	0.06	0.06	-0.16**	0.17	-0.02	0.00	0.10	4339	1241	0.00	0.278	0.992	0.013	0.042
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)							
Inter-Gender Business Contact Index														
Men	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	-0.05	0.04	-0.01	4441	1246	-0.05	0.938	0.789	0.694	0.605
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)							
Women	0.11	-0.00	0.02	-0.02	-0.12	-0.14	-0.08	4574	1262	0.05	0.915	0.674	0.952	0.753
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.10)							
Women's Bargaining Power Index														
Women	-0.05	0.06	0.13*	-0.07	0.09	0.15*	0.12	4453	1241	-0.07	0.301	0.219	0.514	0.981
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)							
Social Proximity with Uganda Index														
Hosts	0.06	0.00	0.04	0.18**	0.05	-0.01	0.05	4676	1267	0.00	0.115	0.214	0.788	0.495
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)							
Refugees	0.07	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.08	-0.05	0.02	4339	1241	-0.00	0.649	0.479	0.892	0.667
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)							
Beliefs about Refugees' Economic Effect Index														
Hosts	0.14**	-0.02	0.03	0.12*	0.09	0.00	0.08	4669	1267	0.00	0.133	0.196	0.491	0.233
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.08)							
Support for Inclusive Refugee Hosting Index														
Hosts	0.25***	-0.08	-0.09	-0.12*	-0.22***	-0.07	-0.12	4676	1267	-0.00	0.515	0.256	0.275	0.177
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)							

NOTES— The *Any Cash* coefficient estimates impact of cash regardless of the treatment arm (Cash Only, or any variation of the mentorship component). The next 6 columns report coefficient estimates for each variation of the mentorship arms relative to the Cash Only arm. *Obs.* indicates the number of observations included in the regression, and *Indiv.* the number of individuals this corresponds to. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and reported in parentheses under each coefficient. *** indicate significance 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level. *Control Mean* reports the Control group mean for the outcome of the regression. *Aligned vs Diff. Natio* reports the p-value of a test testing the equality between Aligned and Diff. Natio groups within both variations of the Mentorship. *DID Natio* reports the p-value of the test of the difference between aligned vs misaligned on nationality within Basic Mentorship, and that same difference within Share Fate. *Aligned vs Diff. Gender* reports the p-value of a test testing the equality between Aligned and Diff. Gender groups within both variations of the Mentorship. *DID Gender* reports the p-value of the test of the difference between aligned and misaligned on gender within Basic Mentorship, and that same difference within Share Fate.

5.3 Psychological Well-Being

Treatment impacts on economic outcomes are reflected in measures of psychological well-being, as shown in Table 8. Cash improves our summary index measure by 0.28 sd on average ($p < 0.01$), with few differences across demographic subgroups. Impacts of mentorship are generally small in magnitude and inconsistently signed.

Table 8: Impacts on Psychological Well-Being

	All	Hosts	Refugees	Men	Women
Any Cash	0.28***	0.30***	0.27***	0.28***	0.30***
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Ment. Aligned	-0.09	-0.08	-0.11	-0.10	-0.13*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Ment. Diff.	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.08	-0.04
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Ment. Diff. Natio	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.08	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Shared Fate Aligned	-0.01	-0.09	0.01	0.05	-0.20**
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Shared Fate Diff. Gender	0.00	0.01	-0.07	0.03	-0.10
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Shared Fate Diff. Natio	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01	-0.00	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Obs.	6,863	3,543	3,320	3,355	3,508
Indiv.	1,919	969	950	948	971
Control Mean	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.07	-0.03
Joint Test	0.509	0.674	0.739	0.485	0.239
SF vs BM	0.561	0.758	0.646	0.337	0.735
DID Gender	0.677	0.705	0.300	0.782	0.967
DID Natio	0.170	0.459	0.304	0.130	0.903

Notes—

5.4 Economic Outcomes Over Time

Table 9 shows impacts on business profits and capital separately by survey round and participant gender. Cash impacts on profit are statistically detectable through 12 months for men and 9 months for women; impacts on capital are roughly stable over time. For men, we find suggestive evidence that the shared-fate addition improves outcomes in heterogeneous groups relative to aligned groups at the 3-month follow-up. At this point, impacts on profit are \$8 per month in basic, aligned mentorship compared to -12 and -10 in cross-gender and cross-nationality mentorship respectively. The shared-fate addition reverses this pattern: impacts on profit are \$$-11$ per month in aligned mentorship compared to \$24 and \$12 in cross-gender and cross-nationality mentorship. The p-values on these double differences are 0.003 for gender and 0.04 for nationality. In the six-month follow-up and beyond, these double differences are no longer statistically significant.

5.5 Additional Results

We present additional results in the appendix. We find that profit results are driven by those with higher business practice scores at baseline but minimal heterogeneity by baseline business networks, presented in Table 12. In addition, in Table 14 we find that mentees randomly assigned a mentor with higher profits realized significantly higher profits. Mentees assigned to a female mentor experienced lower profits, and these effects are not explained by other mentor characteristics we have looked at so far including profits, business practices, and capital. Finally, mentees experienced similar profits when assigned to a Ugandan or refugee mentor.

Table 9: Impacts on Economic Outcomes Over Time and by Gender

	Any Cash	Ment. Aligned	Ment. Diff. Gender	Ment. Diff. Natio	Shared Fate Aligned	Shared Fate Diff. Gender	Shared Fate Diff. Natio	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Joint Test	SF vs BM	DID Gender	DID Natio
Business Profits (USD), Men Mentees														
Pooled	21.64***	6.89	4.35	3.98	8.23	16.63	13.57	3252	946	39.23	0.856	0.678	0.520	0.634
	(7.07)	(7.96)	(8.31)	(9.18)	(11.56)	(12.60)	(12.51)							
3-Month	13.75	8.20	-12.47	-10.06	-11.04	24.15	11.51	852	852	44.87	0.066	0.012	0.003	0.037
	(9.64)	(9.91)	(9.20)	(11.06)	(12.48)	(14.98)	(14.56)							
6-Month	28.40***	5.83	4.84	19.51	9.40	20.36	7.48	798	798	35.16	0.884	0.818	0.632	0.587
	(8.67)	(11.18)	(14.18)	(17.37)	(14.17)	(16.80)	(19.80)							
9-Month	30.56***	-0.45	4.32	-15.84	-12.38	17.53	7.65	814	814	39.91	0.368	0.339	0.256	0.112
	(10.91)	(13.06)	(12.01)	(12.98)	(12.40)	(17.74)	(16.01)							
12-Month	16.23*	12.73	16.61	17.50	41.07	12.02	20.63	788	788	36.57	0.618	0.749	0.292	0.447
	(9.76)	(10.27)	(12.48)	(12.90)	(26.93)	(14.86)	(19.58)							
Business Profits (USD), Women Mentees														
Pooled	15.90***	-7.98	-9.12	-6.89	-11.42**	-5.75	-12.85*	3361	970	34.58	0.384	0.744	0.482	0.780
	(4.81)	(6.15)	(5.87)	(5.70)	(5.50)	(6.50)	(6.72)							
3-Month	32.82***	-21.32***	-18.46**	-23.19***	-33.30***	-19.92*	-10.83	888	888	25.69	0.024	0.300	0.415	0.060
	(7.85)	(8.19)	(9.12)	(8.46)	(9.38)	(10.21)	(10.98)							
6-Month	15.23**	-9.21	-11.59	-0.52	-9.51	5.60	-25.40***	817	817	33.71	0.056	0.050	0.210	0.077
	(6.48)	(7.36)	(7.66)	(9.43)	(7.38)	(10.43)	(8.40)							
9-Month	16.61**	-5.18	-12.52	-16.47**	-5.33	-6.72	-17.33*	841	841	39.53	0.480	0.959	0.718	0.959
	(7.78)	(10.81)	(8.61)	(8.16)	(9.19)	(10.01)	(10.04)							
12-Month	-0.09	1.94	7.11	9.18	1.03	1.38	4.83	815	815	40.16	0.968	0.947	0.766	0.822
	(7.34)	(8.73)	(10.35)	(9.28)	(9.14)	(10.20)	(10.21)							
Business Capital (USD), Men Mentees														
Pooled	432.98***	45.21	30.71	-48.56	-52.48	108.32	200.72	3355	948	479.66	0.833	0.485	0.447	0.137
	(103.51)	(119.07)	(141.39)	(140.98)	(142.99)	(170.63)	(182.69)							
3-Month	427.92***	10.43	-72.94	-41.92	-34.80	96.84	183.19	865	865	402.68	0.883	0.526	0.304	0.293
	(113.46)	(129.21)	(125.20)	(156.01)	(137.06)	(167.18)	(214.42)							
6-Month	312.48**	217.84	143.27	19.82	-6.93	273.93	235.91	835	835	589.16	0.769	0.605	0.346	0.201
	(135.96)	(166.07)	(187.79)	(179.58)	(216.95)	(280.54)	(241.98)							
9-Month	717.22***	-313.69*	-91.08	-263.33	-241.13	-157.62	-43.08	843	843	461.33	0.657	0.809	0.680	0.656
	(164.87)	(177.27)	(221.07)	(217.21)	(226.32)	(251.60)	(238.98)							
12-Month	342.48***	159.67	132.97	28.97	-82.92	147.84	344.43	812	812	466.59	0.665	0.379	0.412	0.085
	(105.05)	(137.41)	(201.25)	(159.71)	(187.01)	(192.51)	(263.08)							
Business Capital (USD), Women Mentees														
Pooled	300.50***	-63.78	-42.31	-130.32*	-117.11	-80.82	-179.75**	3509	971	275.97	0.349	0.747	0.890	0.973
	(59.53)	(68.31)	(72.13)	(76.97)	(79.53)	(74.44)	(79.70)							
3-Month	350.32***	-106.10	-71.30	-122.82	-188.57**	-144.96*	-176.45*	901	901	239.11	0.299	0.364	0.931	0.788
	(70.59)	(82.39)	(95.73)	(85.72)	(89.62)	(79.52)	(92.53)							
6-Month	365.45***	-121.02	-112.99	-201.03*	-241.63***	-115.91	-181.96	876	876	301.77	0.210	0.591	0.342	0.339
	(87.22)	(101.10)	(85.27)	(110.14)	(88.12)	(103.42)	(115.55)							
9-Month	293.64***	4.81	39.07	-116.50	55.12	-29.94	-117.41	879	879	253.50	0.642	0.920	0.537	0.783
	(71.34)	(94.64)	(105.04)	(91.09)	(164.62)	(89.21)	(98.56)							
12-Month	237.79***	-92.43	16.48	-60.87	-68.69	7.88	-209.57**	853	853	311.95	0.481	0.715	0.872	0.345
	(71.56)	(84.52)	(93.79)	(110.75)	(107.10)	(151.08)	(102.87)							

Notes—

6 Discussion and Next Steps

The results presented here are preliminary, and additional data collection is ongoing. Nevertheless, we have several notable findings. Cash grants bundled with the lottery show strong effects on individual, firm, and household well-being, persisting at least 9 months for all sub-samples. Mentorship groups show minimal average effects that mask heterogeneity: men mentored by other men benefited from mentorship, while women mentored by other women realized lower profits compared to cash alone. One of our next steps is to explore heterogeneity by mentor characteristics in significantly more detail.

One important, open question in the literature on refugee integration is how well research findings among non-displaced populations apply in displacement settings. In our context, we find that the program had similar results for refugees and hosts, including on returns to capital and minimal average effects of mentorship. Mentorship by a refugee was, on average, not statistically different from mentorship by a Ugandan.

We also measure the program's impacts on attitudes toward refugees. All treatment arms affected Ugandans' policy views towards refugees. We believe this operates through the channel identified in Baseler et al. (2023*b*), informing participants that the program is operating because refugees are present and hosts should benefit too. Intergroup contact, which we tested by varying the composition of the mentorship groups, shows minimal additional effects on attitudes toward refugees.

We plan to pursue a number of next steps. We are currently studying hetereogeneity by group members' baseline attitudes toward refugees (among Ugandans) and toward Ugandans (among refugees), investigating whether a pattern of positive effects coming from "positive matches" discussed by Loiacono and Silva-Vargas (2023) also occurred in our program. We are currently looking at the distribution of effects using quantile regressions, exploring whether mentorship (potentially varying by the mentor characteristics) effected the highest- and lowest-performing busineses differently. We have detailed data on business sectors that could explain some of our findings, for instance if mentorship led to some women to pursue lower-profit sectors. We are also incorporating data on the lottery payouts to assess the returns to the lottery payouts and whether winning the lottery affect social cohesion. Finally, we are incorporating additional social cohesion outcomes, including behavioral outcomes of offering jobs to refugees.

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Appendix

Table 10: Attrition

	Main Sample					Full Sample (Incl. Mentor Sample)				
	Pooled	3-Month	6-Month	9-Month	12-Month	Pooled	3-Month	6-Month	9-Month	12-Month
Any Cash	-0.042**	-0.057***	-0.048*	-0.033	-0.031	-0.047***	-0.068***	-0.058***	-0.030	-0.034
	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Mentorship Aligned	0.001	0.012	0.009	-0.005	-0.013	0.012	0.019	0.018	0.005	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.026)
Mentorship Diff-Gender	0.034*	0.009	0.053*	0.004	0.070***	0.040**	0.026	0.062**	0.010	0.064**
	(0.020)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Mentorship Diff-Natio	-0.008	-0.013	-0.008	0.001	-0.013	-0.001	0.001	0.008	-0.004	-0.007
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.028)
Shared-Fate Aligned	0.032	0.039	0.052*	0.025	0.014	0.040**	0.047*	0.065**	0.030	0.019
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Shared-Fate Diff-Gender	0.009	0.005	0.019	0.012	0.000	0.020	0.012	0.030	0.020	0.019
	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.030)
Shared-Fate Diff-Natio	0.008	0.030	0.037	-0.003	-0.034	0.018	0.041	0.039	0.009	-0.017
	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.033)
Adj. R Squared	0.041	0.017	0.032	0.057	0.038	0.045	0.017	0.039	0.065	0.046
Obs.	7980	1995	1995	1995	1995	10380	2595	2595	2595	2595
Indiv.	1995					2595				
Mean Control	0.889	0.926	0.883	0.889	0.857	0.894	0.936	0.893	0.885	0.860
Joint F Stat.	1.597	1.694	1.326	0.537	1.964	2.298	2.942	2.038	0.573	1.732
F test p-value	0.132	0.106	0.234	0.807	0.056	0.025	0.005	0.047	0.779	0.097

Notes—

Table 11: Balance among Select Covariates and Outcomes

	Cash	Basic Mentorship	Shared Fate	Control Mean	Cash = Basic Ment.	Cash = Shared Fate	Basic Ment. = Shared Fate	Obs.
Woman	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.50	0.96	0.96	0.996	2591
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)					
	[1.00]	[1.00]	[1.00]					
Age	−5.17***	−1.88***	−1.68***	34.14	0.00	0.00	0.669	2591
	(0.57)	(0.48)	(0.53)					
	[0.00]	[0.00]	[0.02]					
Fluent in English	0.06**	0.04	0.03	0.44	0.30	0.27	0.848	2591
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)					
	[0.27]	[0.80]	[1.00]					
Business Openness	−0.05*	−0.03	−0.04	0.77	0.58	0.79	0.764	2591
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)					
	[0.47]	[0.74]	[0.62]					
Business Profits (USD)	−8.40**	−0.63	−0.94	37.21	0.04	0.07	0.926	2591
	(4.18)	(3.49)	(3.88)					
	[0.27]	[1.00]	[1.00]					
Social Proximity Index	−0.04	0.04	0.07	−0.00	0.14	0.05	0.473	2591
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)					
	[1.00]	[1.00]	[0.80]					
Business Practices Score (/13)	0.11	−0.03	−0.08	8.86	0.45	0.35	0.763	1911
	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.18)					
	[1.00]	[1.00]	[1.00]					
N Contacts of Diff Nationality	−0.06	−0.02	−0.03	0.31	0.38	0.58	0.766	2591
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)					
	[0.80]	[1.00]	[1.00]					
N Contacts of Diff Gender	0.05	0.09**	0.02	0.39	0.35	0.46	0.057	2591
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)					
	[0.97]	[0.17]	[1.00]					
Household Earnings (USD)	−6.38	5.69	6.06	63.98	0.04	0.05	0.943	2591
	(6.44)	(5.38)	(5.98)					
	[1.00]	[1.00]	[1.00]					
Business Capital (USD)	−128.04**	−6.29	2.13	487.72	0.03	0.03	0.869	2591
	(62.72)	(52.38)	(58.21)					
	[0.27]	[1.00]	[1.00]					
Input Into Earning An Income	−0.04	0.01	0.00	0.62	0.15	0.30	0.757	1588
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)					
	[1.00]	[1.00]	[1.00]					
Days Happy (30 Days)	−0.02	−0.05**	−0.01	0.35	0.24	0.85	0.129	2587
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)					
	[1.00]	[0.27]	[1.00]					
Overall Econ. Effect of Refugees on Uganda	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.65	0.77	0.62	0.779	1248
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)					
	[1.00]	[1.00]	[1.00]					

Table 12: Impacts on Business Success by Baseline Human Capital

	(1) D1 Index	(2) Business Openness	(3) Business Profits
Panel A: By Baseline Business Openness			
Any Cash=1	0.925***	0.402***	38.667***
	0.115	0.051	11.379
Business Open=1	0.720***	0.503***	14.140*
	0.144	0.044	7.334
Any Cash=1 × Business Open=1	-0.795***	-0.356***	-19.401
	0.125	0.056	13.139
Any Mentorship	-0.036	-0.006	-5.078
	0.089	0.039	11.184
Any Mentorship × Business Open=1	0.085	0.030	8.836
	0.095	0.041	12.573
Panel B: By Baseline Business Practices Score (/11)			
Any Cash=1	0.117**	0.043*	14.342*
	0.059	0.026	8.012
High Business Practices Score=1	-0.333***	-0.142***	-14.857**
	0.077	0.035	7.091
Any Cash=1 × High Business Practices Score=1	0.458***	0.199***	20.008*
	0.097	0.043	11.335
Any Mentorship	0.050	0.023	4.811
	0.042	0.018	7.379
Any Mentorship × High Business Practices Score=1	-0.048	-0.016	-7.200
	0.070	0.030	10.706
Panel C: By Baseline Networks			
Any Cash=1	0.367***	0.150***	26.279***
	0.063	0.028	7.084
High Business Networks=1	0.069	0.033	4.297
	0.084	0.038	6.992
Any Cash=1 × High Business Networks=1	-0.027	-0.006	-4.415
	0.100	0.045	11.140
Any Mentorship	0.037	0.025	-2.369
	0.046	0.020	7.120
Any Mentorship × High Business Networks=1	-0.031	-0.028	10.138
	0.067	0.029	10.765
Control Mean (Post)	-0.000	0.720	43.577
Obs.	6858	6858	6858
Indiv.	1917	1917	1917

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Table 13: Impacts on Business Success by Baseline Human Capital (Men vs Women)

	Men			Women		
	(1) D1 Index	(2) Business Openness	(3) Business Profits	(4) D1 Index	(5) (6) Business Openness	Business Profits
Panel A: By Baseline Business Openness						
Cash	1.043***	0.441***	60.162***	0.788***	0.351***	22.375**
	0.153	0.067	18.862	0.160	0.073	10.802
Any Mentorship	1.049***	0.449***	62.786***	0.725***	0.331***	9.238
	0.128	0.058	10.187	0.143	0.065	8.789
Business Open=1	1.105***	0.513***	31.632***	0.653***	0.361***	2.975
	0.140	0.063	10.478	0.230	0.107	11.107
Cash × Business Open=1	-0.955***	-0.412***	-45.936**	-0.603***	-0.287***	3.062
	0.169	0.073	21.908	0.174	0.079	13.392
Any Mentorship × Business Open=1	-0.863***	-0.384***	-28.676**	-0.539***	-0.252***	5.847
	0.142	0.064	13.868	0.156	0.071	10.795
Panel B: By Baseline Business Practices Score (/11)						
Cash	0.060	0.023	4.914	0.184**	0.064*	25.102**
	0.081	0.035	11.652	0.083	0.037	11.003
Any Mentorship	0.136**	0.049*	25.179**	0.195**	0.086**	14.026*
	0.067	0.028	11.225	0.076	0.034	7.966
High Business Practices Score=1	-0.453***	-0.191***	-32.901***	-0.222**	-0.096*	-5.807
	0.107	0.047	11.953	0.107	0.050	8.482
Cash × High Business Practices Score=1	0.593***	0.244***	43.328**	0.320**	0.151**	-1.065
	0.139	0.060	18.595	0.133	0.060	14.213
Any Mentorship × High Business Practices Score=1	0.568***	0.242***	31.783**	0.270**	0.120**	-1.322
	0.113	0.050	14.477	0.118	0.054	9.719
Panel C: By Baseline Networks						
Cash	0.412***	0.165***	32.925***	0.325***	0.132***	25.248***
	0.093	0.040	11.878	0.082	0.037	8.431
Any Mentorship	0.480***	0.196***	42.624***	0.345***	0.153***	13.865**
	0.078	0.035	9.837	0.072	0.033	5.968
High Business Networks=1	0.136	0.049	16.356	-0.016	0.001	-0.968
	0.116	0.052	11.313	0.121	0.055	9.266
Cash × High Business Networks=1	-0.096	-0.029	-13.327	0.073	0.031	-1.569
	0.144	0.063	18.554	0.140	0.063	13.543
Any Mentorship × High Business Networks=1	-0.099	-0.044	-1.866	-0.038	-0.020	-0.738
	0.126	0.056	16.075	0.131	0.059	11.661
Control Mean (Post)	-0.016	0.707	48.695	0.016	0.733	38.524
Obs.	3353	3353	3353	3505	3505	3505
Indiv.	947	947	947	970	970	970

Notes—

Table 14: Impacts on Business Success by Mentor Characteristics

	(1) D1 Index	(2) Business Ownership	(3) Business Profits
Panel A: Baseline Mentor Profits			
Cash	0.357***	0.147***	24.944***
	0.049	0.022	5.499
Any Mentorship	0.401***	0.177***	18.514***
	0.046	0.021	4.774
Mentor High Profits=1	-0.033	-0.029**	15.744***
	0.034	0.015	5.952
Cash × Mentor High Profits=1	0.000	0.000	0.000
	.	.	.
Any Mentorship × Mentor High Profits=1	0.000	0.000	0.000
	.	.	.
Obs.	6852	6852	6852
Indiv.	1916	1916	1916
Panel B: Mentor Gender			
Gender-Hetero Mentorship	0.402***	0.163***	34.250***
	0.057	0.025	9.517
Woman Mentor=1	-0.123***	-0.033*	-28.370***
	0.042	0.018	7.201
Gender-Hetero Mentorship × Woman Mentor=1	0.117	0.038	16.346
	0.073	0.031	13.672
Obs.	6864	6864	6864
Indiv.	1919	1919	1919
Panel C: Mentor Nationality			
Natio-Hetero Mentorship	0.328***	0.137***	25.268***
	0.062	0.027	7.880
Ugandan Mentor=1	-0.020	-0.007	-5.545
	0.057	0.025	8.717
Natio-Hetero Mentorship × Ugandan Mentor=1	0.100	0.042	14.132
	0.094	0.040	14.607
Obs.	6864	6864	6864
Indiv.	1919	1919	1919

Notes—

Table 15: Domain 1 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
biz success index	0.36***	0.03	6,864	1,919	-0.000	0.439
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.00]	[0.36]				
Own Business (Binary)	0.15***	0.02	6,864	1,919	0.720	0.288
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.00]	[0.28]				
Businesses Profits (USD / 30 days)	24.87***	1.17	6,864	1,919	43.577	0.832
	(5.50)	(5.52)				
	[0.00]	[0.71]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 16: Domain 2 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = A (naive p
social cohesion index	0.10	-0.01	6,864	1,919	-0.068	0.6
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.16]	[0.61]				
Social Proximity Index	0.19***	-0.10**	6,864	1,919	-0.028	0.0
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.00]	[0.03]				
Altruism (out-group)	0.01	-0.01	6,864	1,919	0.196	0.0
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
	[0.30]	[0.22]				
Trust out-group (Ugandan or refugee)	0.00	0.01	3,477	1,857	0.257	0.1
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
	[0.63]	[0.30]				
Open to Collaborate with Other Natio	-0.01	0.01	6,106	1,765	0.970	0.0
	(0.01)	(0.01)				
	[0.30]	[0.13]				
When Ugandans successes are successful refugees benefit	0.00	0.00	6,864	1,919	0.613	0.9
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.63]	[0.65]				
When refugees successes are successful Ugandans benefit	0.01	0.01	6,864	1,919	0.758	0.6
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.61]	[0.61]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 17: Domain 3 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
d3 index	0.23***	0.07	6,864	1,919	-0.000	0.067
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.00]	[0.18]				
Business Registered (Yes/No)	0.03	-0.01	5,811	1,748	0.229	0.727
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.37]	[0.78]				
Business Capital (USD) (winsor99)	390.44***	-54.67	6,864	1,919	377.162	0.341
	(56.15)	(57.39)				
	[0.00]	[0.46]				
Weekly Hours Worked (7 Days)	7.16***	0.34	6,864	1,919	46.908	0.797
	(1.61)	(1.32)				
	[0.00]	[0.80]				
Business Debt (USD) (winsor99)	-1.33	6.52	6,860	1,919	53.586	0.383
	(8.20)	(7.47)				
	[0.80]	[0.46]				
N Contacts in Network	0.06	-0.02	6,864	1,919	1.846	0.695
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.37]	[0.78]				
Business Practice Score (/13)	0.11	0.14	5,811	1,748	9.227	0.232
	(0.16)	(0.12)				
	[0.64]	[0.37]				
Advertising Expenses (Frequency 30d)	0.01	0.04*	6,106	1,765	0.385	0.025
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.78]	[0.09]				
Accounting Records (Frequency 30d)	0.08**	0.03	6,106	1,765	0.553	0.084
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.01]	[0.19]				
Offered New Product (Yes/No 3month)	0.04	0.02	6,106	1,765	0.322	0.376
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.24]	[0.46]				
Thought about Goals (Yes/No 30d)	0.03	-0.01	1,549	1,549	0.898	0.549
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.37]	[0.68]				
Separate Personal Finances (Yes/No)	0.05	0.04*	6,106	1,765	0.692	0.026
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.13]	[0.09]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 18: Domain 4N : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Ca
d4n index	0.15**	-0.04	6,864	1,919	-0.093	
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.01]	[0.65]				
Proportion of Customers from Other Country	0.04	-0.02	6,046	1,764	0.458	
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.37]	[0.65]				
Collaborators from Other Country	0.64**	-0.14	6,824	1,919	1.250	
	(0.21)	(0.20)				
	[0.01]	[0.75]				
Suppliers from Other Country	0.44**	0.04	6,775	1,916	1.699	
	(0.15)	(0.12)				
	[0.01]	[0.98]				
Number of Social Contacts With Outgroup (Ref/Ug) (30 Days)	0.37	0.59	6,843	1,919	6.968	
	(1.25)	(1.24)				
	[0.98]	[0.87]				
bn outsidenatio	0.04	-0.02	6,864	1,919	0.359	
	(0.04)	(0.03)				
	[0.65]	[0.77]				
Frequency of Contact With Outgroup (Ref/Ug)	0.04	-0.03	5,123	1,837	0.731	
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.14]	[0.24]				
Participate in Activities with Outgroup (Ref/Ug) (Y/N)	0.02	-0.01	6,864	1,919	0.819	
	(0.02)	(0.01)				
	[0.65]	[0.87]				
Client Businesses from Other Country	0.86**	-0.05	5,357	1,826	1.012	
	(0.26)	(0.26)				
	[0.01]	[1.00]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 19: Domain 4G : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
d4g index	0.11	-0.03	6,864	1,919	-0.026	0.521
	(0.06)	(0.05)				
	[0.13]	[0.35]				
Contacts of Diff Gender (Count)	0.08	-0.02	6,864	1,919	0.449	0.512
	(0.04)	(0.03)				
	[0.13]	[0.35]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 20: Domain 5 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
d5 index	0.40***	-0.02	6,864	1,919	0.000	0.705
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.00]	[0.96]				
HH Earnings (30 Days)	28.74***	-0.12	6,864	1,919	89.340	0.986
	(7.31)	(6.82)				
	[0.00]	[0.97]				
Business Capital (USD) (winsor99)	390.44***	-54.67	6,864	1,919	377.162	0.341
	(56.15)	(57.39)				
	[0.00]	[0.41]				
HH Econ. Situation (Self Described)	0.14***	0.02	6,864	1,919	0.547	0.311
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.00]	[0.41]				
HH Savings	43.02***	0.91	6,543	1,910	66.470	0.919
	(10.23)	(9.02)				
	[0.00]	[0.97]				
HH Durables Value Change (3 Month)	16.97***	-5.53*	6,834	1,918	12.343	0.052
	(3.06)	(2.84)				
	[0.00]	[0.09]				
HH Debt	-11.46	9.57	6,833	1,918	77.046	0.245
	(9.22)	(8.23)				
	[0.35]	[0.38]				
Skip Meals Due to Lack of Money (Count of Days 7 Days)	-0.36***	0.02	6,864	1,919	0.997	0.645
	(0.08)	(0.05)				
	[0.00]	[0.88]				
Struggle to Afford Basic HH Expenses (30 Days)	-0.06***	-0.00	6,864	1,919	0.917	0.840
	(0.02)	(0.01)				
	[0.00]	[0.96]				
Sell Assets to Afford Basic HH Expenses (Y/N 30 Days)	-0.07***	0.00	6,864	1,919	0.217	0.782
	(0.02)	(0.01)				
	[0.00]	[0.96]				
Unable to Pay Rent (Count of Months 3 Months)	-0.26***	0.03	6,782	1,918	1.209	0.404
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.00]	[0.49]				
Availability of Emergency Funds	0.15***	0.00	6,812	1,918	0.649	0.953
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.00]	[0.97]				
Missed Work Due to Health Condition (Count of Days 30 Days)	-0.25	-0.05	6,825	1,918	2.879	0.795
	(0.23)	(0.18)				
	[0.41]	[0.96]				
Children Working Due to Lack of Cash (Y/N 3 Months)	-0.00	-0.01	4,374	1,296	0.104	0.309
	(0.02)	(0.01)				
	[0.97]	[0.41]				
Some School-Aged Children Missed School (Y/N Last 3 Months)	-0.03	-0.04	4,374	1,296	0.416	0.099
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.41]	[0.16]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 21: Domain 6 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
d6 index	0.03	0.06	3,403	953	-0.143	0.300
	(0.07)	(0.06)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
Input into Earning an Income	0.01	0.01	3,403	953	0.736	0.503
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
Input into Type of Work	-0.00	0.02	3,403	953	0.755	0.447
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
Input into Childbearing	0.02	0.00	3,202	943	0.706	0.852
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
Input into Children's Education	0.02	-0.01	3,202	943	0.706	0.731
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
Male Adults Ranked Above Female Adults for Foood	0.02	-0.05	1,773	723	0.403	0.138
	(0.04)	(0.04)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 22: Domain 7 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
d7 index	0.27***	-0.02	6,863	1,919	0.018	0.672
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[0.00]	[0.51]				
Days Happy (30 Days)	0.12***	-0.02	6,853	1,919	0.302	0.299
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.00]	[0.31]				
Days Calm and Peaceful (30 Days)	0.10***	-0.01	6,860	1,919	0.282	0.616
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.00]	[0.51]				
Days Down Hearted and Sad (30 Days)	-0.09***	-0.01	6,853	1,919	0.590	0.655
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.00]	[0.51]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 23: Domain 8 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
d8 index	0.06	-0.00	3,320	950	-0.044	0.972
	(0.07)	(0.05)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr1 bin	-0.02	0.00	3,320	950	0.326	0.992
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr2 bin	-0.02	-0.00	3,267	949	0.173	0.892
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr4 bin	-0.03	0.02	3,320	950	0.580	0.380
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr5 bin	0.00	0.04	3,320	950	0.503	0.182
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr7 bin	0.02	-0.05	1,318	649	0.375	0.185
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr9 bin	0.08	-0.02	1,090	573	0.394	0.616
	(0.05)	(0.04)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr11 bin	0.07	-0.05	2,265	849	0.300	0.138
	(0.04)	(0.03)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr12 bin	0.02	0.02	3,320	950	0.570	0.496
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr13 bin	-0.03	0.02	3,320	950	0.686	0.539
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr14 bin	-0.04	0.01	3,320	950	0.928	0.381
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				
sdr15 bin	-0.02	-0.01	3,320	950	0.721	0.777
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[1.00]	[1.00]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 24: Domain 9 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any M (naive p-valu
d9 index	0.14	0.03	3,538	969	0.001	0.516
	(0.07)	(0.05)				
	[0.10]	[0.68]				
Percetion of Same Sector Other Countries Businesses	0.02	-0.02	2,385	842	0.535	0.461
	(0.04)	(0.03)				
	[0.68]	[0.68]				
Overall Economic Effect of Refugees on Uganda	0.08**	0.00	3,420	967	0.599	0.866
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.04]	[1.00]				
Personal Economic Effect of Refugees on Self	0.10**	-0.00	3,467	968	0.607	0.882
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.01]	[1.00]				
Reugees Can Support Themselves Financially	-0.03	0.04	3,404	967	0.656	0.153
	(0.03)	(0.03)				
	[0.68]	[0.37]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.

Table 25: Domain 10 : Components

	Any Cash	Any Mentorship	Obs.	Indiv.	Control Mean	Cash = Any Ment. (naive p-value)
d10 index	0.23***	-0.09*	3,544	969	-0.007	0.053
	(0.06)	(0.05)				
	[0.00]	[0.07]				
pol2 bin	-0.06**	0.01	3,540	969	0.205	0.532
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.04]	[0.12]				
pol3 bin	-0.08***	0.02*	3,540	969	0.177	0.097
	(0.02)	(0.01)				
	[0.01]	[0.07]				
pol4 bin	-0.07***	0.03*	3,540	969	0.179	0.075
	(0.02)	(0.02)				
	[0.01]	[0.07]				
pol5 bin	-0.05*	0.04*	3,544	969	0.350	0.085
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.07]	[0.07]				
pol6 bin	-0.07***	0.03*	3,544	969	0.233	0.069
	(0.03)	(0.02)				
	[0.01]	[0.07]				

NOTES— Main sample only. The Any Cash coefficient can be interpreted against Control. The Any Mentorship coefficient can be interpreted against Cash. Clustered standard errors reported in parentheses. Robust q-values adjusted for multiple hypothesis corrections reported in square brackets. Naive p-value testing Any Mentorship against Cash reported in the last column. Row 1 shows an Anderson (2008) summary index.