Can a Sense of Shared War Experience Increase Refugee Acceptance?

Ji Yeon Hong*   Cecilia Hyunjung Mo†   Christopher Paik‡

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Abstract

Can narratives that highlight a family history of war, and hence a shared war experience, increase people's openness towards refugees fleeing conflict and persecution today? On the one hand, personal war experience or stories of their parents' and ancestors' struggles during a war can be a gateway for understanding the plight of refugees, which could elicit greater empathic concern for them. On the other hand, shining a light on one's family history of war could foment higher levels of outgroup antipathy due to heightened feelings of threat that are concomitant with war experience. To understand the effects of these countervailing forces, we leverage the context of South Korea, a useful edge case given residents have experienced the devastation of war relatively recently, and yet now live in an advanced economy that attracts asylum seekers. Employing an original representative survey, we find that war experience translates to *less* openness to refugees, unless the experience included displacement. However, when the parallels between the human costs of the Korean War and current conflicts are highlighted, refugee acceptance increases among both those with and without direct war experience, particularly among those who were displaced by the war. Moreover, this strategy is more effective than a perspective-taking exercise that does not explicitly make one's family history salient, as well as messages that highlight how one's country is underperforming relative to other countries in terms of refugee acceptance or how the presence of refugees is economically beneficial. Our findings suggest that while past war experience does not necessarily translate to more amity towards refugees, invoking shared family experiences of war does reduce anti-refugee sentiment, especially among those with a family history of forced displacement.

Keywords: outgroup bias; refugees; forced displacement; South Korea; Korean War

*Associate Professor, Division of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology; jyhong@ust.hk.

†Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; cecilia.h.mo@berkeley.edu

‡Associate Professor, Division of Social Science, New York University Abu Dhabi; christopher.paik@nyu.edu

What is the effect of war experience on outgroup attitudes? More specifically, what is the effect of enduring conflict on attitudes towards outgroups that are experiencing similar plights today? Can prior war experiences be leveraged to induce greater openness towards refugees fleeing conflict and persecution today? Families in many countries have histories of conflict that could be used to draw parallels between the experience of current conflict refugees with their family's wartime experiences. However, would such bridging efforts enable citizens to better relate to the innumerable casualties and displaced civilians from recent wars? We investigate various war-related experiences and their impact on people's attitudes towards refugees who are unrelated to their own past or ongoing war trauma, but are facing similar experiences today.[1] Specifically, we explore baseline levels of refugee acceptance by war-related experience *and* whether the effect of interventions that showcase the parallels between refugees today and the experience of natives on refugee attitudes will depend on the *perceived* personal degree of shared experience. A real and potentially ongoing experience, as opposed to an imagined one through either perspective-taking exercises (Adida, Lo, and Platas 2018) or reminders of distant ancestors (Fouka, Dinas, and Schlaepfer Forthcoming; Williamson, Adida, Lo, Platas, Prather, and Werfel 2020), arguably will be more affected by efforts to draw parallels between natives and refugees today than those without such an experience. We also contend that in invoking shared war experience to draw connections with refugees, it is important to distinguish between "war experience," which pertains to the incidence of having experienced war in the broadest sense, and "conflict refugee experience," which pertains to the specific incidence of having been displaced from one's home by war.

Understanding the precursors of outgroup attitudes and how to foster greater outgroup tolerance has become critically relevant for many countries that currently wrestle with displaced refugees escaping conflict. Over the past decade, the refugee crisis has become one of the biggest global issues challenging policy makers and citizens alike. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports that as of 2017, more than 71 million people have been affected by the crisis, including 20 million refugees, three million asylum seekers and 39 million internally displaced

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[1]Note that predictions should differ if individuals have had a fraught history with the ancestors of the refugee population. Extant research has shown that past trauma negatively shape the attitudes of victims' descendants towards the perpetrators of the trauma (e.g., Balcells 2012; Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov 2017; Lupu and Peisakhin 2017).

persons. In most (if not all) host nations, the idea of accepting refugees and integrating them as part of society has been intensely debated. The debate on refugees has taken similar forms as those on immigration policies that find sources of opposition stemming from issues of economic, cultural and security threats, but with an added sense of urgency and counter-arguments mainly based on humanitarian values. Refugees, who are displaced due to war and other types of civil strife or climate disasters, may be considered as different from immigrants who voluntarily migrate to look for better opportunities in general outside of their home countries. Given the plight of their situation, the "right thing to do" based on a humanitarian ground may be to accept asylum seekers. Hangartner, Dinas, Marbach, Matakos, and Xefteris (2019) nevertheless find that it is difficult to cultivate more openness toward asylum-seekers; a brief exposure to the refugee crisis was found to lead to more nativist and exclusionary attitudes towards refugees.

Against these outcomes, a nascent but growing literature suggests a number of strategies to reduce prejudice and increase openness towards migrants in general (e.g., Facchini, Margalit, and Nakata 2016; Bonilla and Mo 2018; Hopkins, Sides, and Citrin 2019; Fouka, Dinas, and Schlaepfer Forthcoming; Grigorieff, Roth, and Ubfal 2020; Kalla and Broockman 2020; Williamson et al. 2020), and refugees in particular (e.g., Adida, Lo, and Platas 2018; Simonovits, Kezdi, and Kardos 2018). In line with our argument in this paper, a promising strategy from the literature is one that focuses on highlighting shared experiences to encourage active "perspective-taking," sometimes referred to as "cognitive empathy," or the ability to identify and understand how a person feels and what they may be thinking (Kalla and Broockman 2020; Simonovits, Kezdi, and Kardos 2018). We note that cognitive empathy is distinctive from "affective (emotional) empathy," which is the ability to share the feelings of another, and "compassionate empathy" or "empathic concern," which moves people to take action to help the person or group one has concern for (Hodges, Kiel, Kramer, Veach, and Villanueva 2010; Zaki, Bolger, and Ochsner 2008). The works above show that fostering cognitive empathy can in turn lead to increased empathic concern and proactive support for refugees among the respondents.

However, while invoking shared experiences can encourage cognitive empathy, it can also fail to foster and even reduce empathic concern. That is, a heightened sense of war awareness may not necessarily lead to greater support of war victims. Making war experience can stoke more exclusionary views, depending on how direct, distressful and recent the experience is for the respondents. This

is especially the case for those going through the war concurrently. For example, using a family history of war and displacement be the precursor of empathy could actually lead to more antipathy towards outgroups, as the act of remembering the pain of war and its aftermath could trigger a trauma response that overwhelms any compassion for an asylum seeker. Hiers, Soehl, and Wimmer (2017), for example, find that countries that have experience with violent conflict show higher levels of anti-immigration sentiment today. A recent war experience can thus make respondents more vigilant and resistant to outsiders, hindering them from having compassionate empathy for refugees from abroad. That is, shared experience can be associated with feeling higher levels of economic, security and cultural threats against outsiders.

Another important aspect to consider here is that the response of those with war experience that did not involve forced displacement may differ from that of those who were displaced due to conflict. The latter type of shared experience with refugees may promote a sense of affective empathy that is missing among those who experienced war without being displaced, and lead to greater refugee acceptance. In other words, people's attitude towards refugees and receptivity to messages that draw parallels between contemporary refugees and their families likely depend on whether their war experience involved one's family being pushed away from their home and start anew elsewhere much like present-day conflict refugees.

We present our findings with an original representative survey conducted in South Korea, a country that provides an apt context to shed light on several important factors unaddressed in the current literature. South Korea presently stands simultaneously as an advanced economy refugees are seeking asylum from, and a country that has only recently transitioned into an economic powerhouse after a period of colonization and a war that ravaged the peninsula. Furthermore, its aspiration to become one of the world leaders has prompted its due diligence on humanitarian endeavors. At the same time, the country is still technically at war with North Korea, since the armistice agreement in 1953 brought a cessation but not the end of the Korean War. Security issues concerning North Korea's military threats therefore continue to dominate the headlines today and especially influence the national election outcomes. This not only means that some of the older generation alive experienced the trauma of the Korean War and displacement first-hand themselves, but the new generation today continues to have a type of war experience without an actual outbreak of violence. The case of South Korea therefore provides us with an invaluable opportunity to ask

questions regarding the countervailing forces that highlighting shared experiences of war-trauma may have on refugee attitudes. Specifically, it serves as a useful edge case for understanding the effects of leveraging a family history of war and forced relocation on people's openness towards refugees fleeing conflict and persecution today.

Based on our survey, we construct a "Pro-refugee index", a measure averaging responses from five different questions on refugee acceptance into a single additive index, reflecting a latent variable of pro-refugee attitudes. We find that war experience translates to *less* openness to refugees (a higher index score), unless victimization included displacement. Baseline levels of support for refugees are lower among those with war experience than those without, as they feel more threatened by refugees seeking asylum in their country, as measured by concerns regarding cultural threat and worries that asylum seekers would increase crime and pose as a security risk, and see their experience as different from that of current refugees. At the same time, if war experience involved displacement, these negative effects of war appear to be attenuated. In this setting, treating respondents with a message drawing parallels between current refugees abroad and past refugees in Korea during the Korean War ("shared experience" treatment) has a positive effect on refugee acceptance among those with and without direct war experience alike. And the effect of such a message is particularly effective among those who experienced displacement as a result of the Korean War. Moreover, making the shared family war experience salient tends to be more effective than information-correcting messages focused on moral obligations of developed states and South Korea's relative underperformance in fulfilling such obligations ("underperformance" treatment) or one aimed at correcting misconceptions about asylum seekers as economic burdens for host countries ("economic" treatment). Furthermore, perspective-taking exercises meant to take the respondents through imagination of current refugees' situation have little impact on attitudes against the refugees. In other words, narratives that directly draw parallels between themselves or their families and contemporary refugees are more effective at engendering refugee acceptance than a perspective-taking exercise that asks people to imagine the plight of refugees.

These findings together confirm our hypothesis that attitudes towards refugees depend crucially on the timing, degree and specific type of personal war-related experience. In sum, we find that general living experience of war may trigger vigilance and animosity towards asylum seekers; however, empathy-inducing messages that highlight shared war experiences between their families and

refugees today can nudge individuals to be more open to refugees. Moreover, those with forced displacement as a part of their family history of war are particularly receptive to empathy-inducing shared war experience treatments to increase tolerance towards refugees. The next section provides a conceptual framework for how tapping into shared family histories of war can lead to both more empathy and heightened levels of outgroup threat, making it an open question for whether messages that highlight how one's families' experiences during wartime to elicit empathy for refugee population today may backfire. We then discuss how the South Korean case is a useful edge case to study how shared family experiences can elicit greater support for refugees in greater depth. Afterwards, we provide details of the research design, and discuss our findings from operationalizing the design. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of the study and areas for future research.

Conceptual Framework

Shared experiences in the context of family's war trauma may operate in opposite directions to influence the respondents' acceptance of refugees. On the one hand, several works have found that invoking cognitive empathy from them is indeed an effective way to increase tolerance towards immigrants and refugees. Williamson et al. (2020), for example, find that simply priming family history, asking which was the first generation in one's family to arrive in America, lead to consistently more inclusionary attitudes towards immigrants and immigration policies in the U.S. Fouka, Dinas, and Schlaepfer (Forthcoming) similarly find that in the case of survey respondents in Germany and Greece, reminders of the past civil war experience by their ancestors lead to attitudinal and behavioral changes in favor of Syrian refugees. Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018) additionally find that while ineffective in causing general attitudinal shifts, various perspective-taking exercises meant to induce imaginary refugee experiences did move people who were already sympathetic to refugees to become proactive in their acceptance in the United States..

These recent studies on priming family history of war trauma and migration can be seen as fostering cognitive empathy among respondents, as they begin to see how their families and current refugees and immigrants are similar. But invoking a shared experience of war trauma and forced displacement may stoke more exclusionary views, depending on how direct, distressful and recent the experience is for the respondents. Numerous works in the psychology literature indeed discuss the negative effect of invoking shared negative experiences on compassion towards victims and minority

groups, when the experience is recent and emotionally taxing (e.g., Campbell, O'Brien, Van Boven, Schwarz, and Ubel 2014; Zaki 2014; Ruttan, McDonnell, and Nordgren 2015; Cameron, Harris, and Payne 2016). An experience that is imaginary or from long ago, on the other hand, may be less emotionally consuming and induce more understanding towards those currently going through similar situations, as shown in Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018) and Fouka, Dinas, and Schlaepfer (Forthcoming).

In our context, using a family history of war and displacement be the precursor of empathy could actually lead to more antipathy towards outgroups, as the act of remembering the pain of war and its aftermath could trigger a trauma response that overwhelms any compassion for an asylum seeker. In their related study, Hiers, Soehl, and Wimmer (2017) find that countries that have experience with violent conflict show higher levels of anti-immigration sentiment today. A recent war experience can make respondents more vigilant and resistant to outsiders, hindering them from having compassionate empathy for refugees from abroad. That is, shared experience can be associated with feeling higher levels of economic, security and cultural threats against outsiders.

Heightened threat reactions can be problematic to the enterprise of fostering refugee acceptance. Extant research on anti-immigrant sentiment demonstrate the significance of feelings of threat to antipathy towards foreign nationals. For example, a rich literature discusses the import of perceptions of personal economic threat vis-a-vis labor market competition that underlie people's opposition to the entry of foreigners (e.g., Harwood 1986; Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994; Dustmann and Preston 2001; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013), and related works have shown that sociotropic concerns that foreigners will lead to an overcrowded use of public goods and services stoke anti-immigrant attitudes (e.g., Cavaille and Ferwerda 2017). Some have examined the role of cultural threat, a sense that the different cultural values that foreigners bring will compromise their way of life and undermine national identity (e.g., Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin, Green, Muste, and Wong 1997; Fetzer 2000; McLaren 2001; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008; Kinder and Kam 2010; McDaniel, Nooruddin, and Shortle 2011; Bansak, Hainmueller, and Hangartner 2016), while others note anti-immigration attitudes and more generally bias against outgroups as arising from security threats (Branton, Cassese, Jones, and Westerland 2011; Fitzgerald, Curtis, and Corliss 2012; Stevens and Vaughan-Williams 2016). Further works look at a combination of different threats to explain anti-immigrant attitudes

(e.g., [Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo 2013](); [Facchini, Margalit, and Nakata 2016]()). These related works together suggest that stoking memories of family history going through a war can be both helpful—by way of increasing cognitive empathy—and harmful—by way of triggering a threat reaction—in eliciting refugee acceptance.

Leveraging the Case of South Korea

South Korea has generally experienced only a small influx of refugees, and their salience remained minimal in public discourse. The country's first legal basis for asylum seekers and refugees was established with the approval of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1993. On July 1, 2013, the National Assembly passed the Refugee Act and replaced the Immigration Control Act that previously covered the issues related to asylum seekers and refugee, becoming the first East Asian country to enact its own refugee legislation. According to the law, asylum seekers can stay in Korea and access information on legal procedures to pursue refugee status. Recognized refugees are then granted stable status of stay and work, and are eligible for social welfare services. The number of refugee acceptance nevertheless has been limited; as of 2018, 830 were accepted out of 40,470 applicants since 1994, which makes the overall acceptance rate slightly above 2 percent.[2]

Questions regarding refugee policies took an unexpected turn in 2018 when hundreds of Yemeni asylum seekers came to Jeju Island, using an institutional loophole in South Korea's visa policy specific to the tourism-dependent island.[3] Yemen has been mired in a devastating civil war since 2015 that has killed over 230,000 people, left two-thirds of its people starving, and has displaced over 3.65 million civilians.[4] This watershed moment has since led to polarizing protests and petitions both

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[2]According to UNHCR Statistics, The largest number of asylum seekers came from China with 1,413 applications in 2017, rather than countries with ongoing civil conflict. Other countries with a significant number of applicants in the same year are Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, and Nigeria. Among these asylum seekers, a handful of applicants have been accepted as refugees. Among those accepted refugees in 2017, the greatest shares came from Myanmar, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Congo DR.

[3]In December 2017, a direct flight from Kuala Lumpur to the island became available. From then on until May 30, 2018, 519 Yemenis asylum seekers who had stayed in Malaysia arrived on the island using the VISA exemption granted for 30 days for Yemeni passport holders. The number of Yemeni arrivals in the previous years sharply contrasted with the number in the first five months of 2018. For comparison, zero Yemeni entered the island in 2015, seven in 2016, and forty-two in 2017.

[4]See reports from the United Nations ([Moyer, Bohl, Hanna, Mapes, and Rafa 2019]()) and the World Food Pro-

in support and against refugee acceptance in the country, with the public opinion predominantly siding in opposition against the asylum seekers (Lee 2018).[5] On June 30, soon after the Yemenis in Jeju were covered in general news outlets and online platforms (Shin and Ma 2019; Kang and seong Lee 2019), protesters gathered to rally against the Yemenis asylum seekers. Approximately a thousand protesters chanted anti-refugee slogans such as "citizens come first, we want safety," and "fake refugees" (Kang and Sun 2018). A countering pro-refugee rally was held in a near distance, albeit in a much smaller size. A similarly-sized crowd gathered after two weeks with the same demand, while nearly 714,875 people within a month—a record number of petitioners at the time—signed a petition on the Blue House's Petition website calling for tightening the refugee law, especially against the Yemenis in Jeju Island. While the refugees have continued their temporary stay on the island, none of them have been granted permanent asylum in the country.

The case of Yemeni refugees in South Korea illuminates some of the overlooked factors in recent papers on refuge acceptance. First, testing the effects of invoking family histories that bridge the experience of current conflict refugees, who are unrelated to the their families' past war trauma, with their family's wartime experiences on engendering more empathy and openness towards refugees can be difficult, especially when one considers the case of direct and ongoing war experience. A person who lives through such experience likely has different views on refugee acceptance from those who only imagine it through perspective-taking exercises or through reflections of what their deceased ancestors may have experienced. The magnitude and direction of this effect is also difficult to test in a survey setting because of the specific context (i.e., a country at war that is also able to host outside refugees) it entails. Our survey addresses this issue with a representative sample of the general population in South Korea. The country is technically still experiencing a civil war, and a non-trivial subset of the sample actually lived through the Korean War period between 1950 to 1953 and post-war reconstruction. At the same time, a significant portion of the population mention that they and their families were not victimized by the war themselves (51 percent), despite the continuing tension with North Korea. This context therefore provides an opportunity for us to learn the effects of a direct war experience versus non-experience on attitudes toward refugees seeking to

gramme (https://www.wfp.org/countries/yemen).

[5]According to Lee (2018), the main discourses driving the rapid politicization of the Yemenis refugee issue in South Korea were anti-Muslim sentiments and potential public security threats.

flee conflict and other dangerous and unstable contexts.

Second, we are able to distinguish between different types of war experience by respondents. Empathy towards refugees plausibly increases the most when going through a similar experience of displacement; general war experience, on the other hand, may simply increase vigilance and heighten distrust of outsiders (e.g., Behnia 2004; Ehntholt and Yule 2006). In our survey, we ask respondents not only about their own or direct family's war experience, but also about their hometown location. Those with hometowns in what is currently North Korea most likely went through a history of displacement due to the Korean War. Separating the two allow us to disentangle the effects of war-related experiences absent displacement from the effect of war-related experiences that include displacement to assess how shining a light on family histories that are similar to that of present-day refugees could elicit greater openness towards refugees.

It is important to note that the respondents identifying themselves or their parents as coming from North Korea are indistinguishable from other South Koreans, other than their history of forced displacement.[6] Before the occupation by the US and the USSR in 1945 that ended the Japanese occupation since 1910, and the Korean War in 1950, Korea had long existed as one country with a strong cultural identity based on an ethnically homogeneous population speaking the same language. The separation of the Korean peninsula was determined by external powers outside the control of Koreans in the aftermath of World War II, when the United States and USSR suddenly divided the Korean peninsula along the 38th parallel into two halves, with the United States occupying the southern zone and the Soviets occupying the northern zone, which set into motion the creation of two states. The Korean War ensued shortly thereafter, as Soviet-backed leaders in North Korea sought a reunified peninsula, which resulted in four million casualties and 100,000 war orphans, and ten million people being separated from their families.

While millions of individuals displaced from their homes in what is now North Korea and their descendants settled in what is now South Korea as an outcome of the Korea War, they have since fully integrated, identify as South Korean, and face no discrimination in society. People displaced

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[6]These people refer themselves and are called as "silhyangmin" in Korean, literally translated as people who lost their hometown. The same argument does not apply however to recent defectors from North Korea. They are much more likely to identify as North Korean and may face social ostracism, as the two Koreas have existed separately over decades (Jung 2011; Rive-Lasan 2013).

from the North did not face any social or political discrimination when settling down in South Korea.[7] In fact, many of the most politically and economically successful figures in South Korea are "silhyanmin," having been displaced before or during the Korean War and never being able to return. They left part of their families in the north and have not been able to regularly communicate with them for decades.[8] In addition to being co-ethnics with a shared Korean history and language, it is unlikely that Koreans today with North Korean ties differ in their ideology, especially in regards to favoring communism. In fact, many North Korean refugees defected to the South precisely in order to avoid persecution of the communist government.[9] The South Korean government initiatives against communists that were particularly prevalent after the Korean War up to the 1980s thus targeted any population suspected of following communist ideologies, rather than those with North Korean origins. Given this context, we contend that the respondents' empathy toward refugees do not stem from their own feelings of being outsiders today, but solely from their shared experience of being forcibly displaced.

Another benefit to considering the case of South Korea is the fact that many individual-level features that are predictive of outgroup attitudes do not vary within Korea, allowing us to better identify the relationship between family histories that are similar to the experiences of refugees today—experience with war and displacement—and refugee attitudes, and whether such histories can be leveraged to induce more openness towards refugees fleeing conflict and persecution. For example, attitude towards refugees like those from Yemen are likely affected by whether asylum

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[7]Through surveying 315 North-Korea-origin residents in Seoul in the early 1980s, Park (1983) found that most of the respondents recovered their social status from the north after a short-term decline immediately following the displacement.

[8]The founder of the Hyundai conglomerate, Chung Ju-yung, is one of many well-known publicized "silhyangmin"; the first president of the Republic of Korea, Rhee Syng-man, was also born in North Korea. Rive-Lasan (2013, p.124, 128) notes that those originating from the north, compared to southern regional groups, are especially well represented within the South Korean elite, often due to their education and professional background.

[9]Many protestants residing in the north, for instance, had to leave their home and church to avoid the communist regime's prosecution against their religious belief (Hong and Paik 2020). In his work Jung (2011, p. 13) cites Chung (2009, p. 9) as noting that the war refugees became "synonymous with 'Christians' and 'Anti-communists'," and Lee (2006, p. 4) arguing that "Silhyangmin have been publicly produced as 'enunciating subjects' who speak for the anti-communist state."

seekers are from co-ethnic, co-religious groups. Unlike other host states in which refugee acceptance may vary across respondents along these important dimensions, South Korea continues to be a predominantly mono-ethnic society with minimal religious diversity and nearly zero Muslim presence. In other words, Yemenis are similarly foreign on ethnic and religious dimensions for nearly all Koreans. This setting essentially controls for much of the variations in refugee attitudes stemming from ethnic and religious diversity.

Furthermore, expressing antipathy towards racial and religious outgroups is not particularly prone to social desirability bias in South Korea, given prevalent public opposition against refugee acceptance;[10] any self-reported negative attitude towards refugees would be considered as normal and at times, even encouraged. For example, a national poll by Hankook Research conducted in June 2018 indicated that the majority of Koreans (56 percent) opposed admitting the Yemeni refugees, while only 24 percent supported letting them into the country.[11] Mainstream media outlets also frequently portrayed the Yemeni asylum-seekers as fake refugees and opportunists (Shin and Ma 2019). As such, respondents would not necessarily eschew survey responses on refugee acceptance on the grounds of appearing racist, given how commonplace anti-refugee sentiments are in the general population. In fact, when we examine our primary outcome measure, a pro-refugee index (see below for details on the measure), the average response is *not* favorable towards refugees (see Figure A.1 in the Online Appendix).[12]

Research Design

Procedures and Design

In our survey we attempt to investigate the following: (1) Does invoking shared war experience of displacement, information providing relative underperformance with regards to admitting asylum seekers, or information providing economic benefits of refugee settlement affect attitude towards

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[10]As noted above, over the month of June in 2018, a few weeks after the Yemeni asylum seekers landed, many signed an online petition asking the president's office to abolish the Refugee Law and visa exemption for the asylum seekers (https://www1.president.go.kr/petitions/).

[11]https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201806291395351626.

[12]The average pro-refugee index score is 0.40 on a scale that ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 reflects a less favorable view and 1 reflects a more favorable view towards refugees and assisting them.

refugees, when the memory is still fresh and the war is still ongoing? (2) Does the effect of war experience depend on whether displacement was part of their war experience, and if so what are their effects?

We conducted a 20-minute online survey experiment over the course of one week between April 8 and 15, 2019. This period was roughly one year after the first group of Yemeni asylum seekers arrived in Korea in 2108. By this time period, public discussions on the refugees turned mainstream despite the relatively small number of asylum seekers.[13] We partnered with the largest survey firm in Korea (Micromil Embrain; www.embrain.com) and obtained a pool of 2,000 respondents, sampled based on region, age and gender quotas that represent the general population in South Korea. We conducted a 4 (news stories) X 2 (perspective-taking condition) factorial design experiment, splitting the pool into eight equally sized groups, with each group consisting of approximately 250 respondents.[14] The respondents were assigned to first receive no news story (the "control" condition) or one of three news stories to read, designed to either (1) highlight how South Korea has been underperforming relative to other OECD countries with regards to refugee acceptance, or (2) how refugees today are like their parents or grandparents who were forcibly displaced because of the North-South separation, or (3) how refugees will not pose an economic burden to South Korea. In other words, the news stories sought to inform respondents that their country was doing relatively very little for refugees, or foster both cognitive and affective empathy towards respondents by sharing how refugees today are similar to Koreans 60 years ago, or emphasize how asylum seekers contribute to the economy of the host countries and are not economically burdensome. The translated text of these news stories are noted in Table 1 below. Immediately afterwards, respondents were randomly assigned to either receive or not receive three perspective-taking questions designed by Adida, Lo, and Platas (2018): (1) "What would you take with you, limited only to what you can carry yourself, on your journey? [Open-ended response]"; (2) "Where would you flee to or would you stay in your home country? [Open-ended response]"; and (3) "What do you feel would be the biggest challenge for you? [Open-ended response]," Randomization was successful from the perspective of achieving balance on observable demographic characteristics. Of the 35 measures, there was imbalance ($p <$

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[13] As of May 30, 2018, 519 Yemenis arrived on Jeju island.

[14] By company policy, Micromil Embrain could not include behavioral questions. As such, our outcome measures are limited to survey measures.

0.10) on only two measures (identifying as Protestant and being a resident in North Jeolla province; see Table A.5 in the Online Appendix), which is what we would expect to see by statistical chance given the number of measures for which we conducted balance tests. In addition, we also included a number of questions to verify whether the news stories and the perspective-taking exercise had their intended effects (we discuss manipulation checks under the Additional Tests section below).

Table 1: Experimental Conditions

Condition	Message Content
Control	No Message
Shared Experience Message	**Treat Current Refugees Like We Would Have Wanted Korean Refugees to Have Been Treated** 60 years ago many of our parents or grandparents were forcibly displaced because of the North-South separation and the Korean War. Fortunately they received aid from numerous countries and were able to survive through these difficult times. Many refugees from other parts of the world are similarly risking their lives today and are seeking refuge in foreign countries for their survival. Much like the international community that accepted Korean refugees when they needed asylum, Korea should consider accepting more asylum seekers.
Underperformance Information	**Korea is Underperforming Relative to Other OECD Countries with Regards to the Refugee Crisis** In recent years many OECD countries have accepted refugees from various countries victimized by political unrest and violence. According to the National Assembly Research Services (with data from UNCHR and The Asylum Information Database), the average OECD acceptance rate among those who applied for asylum was 31 percent in 2017. Relative to its economic standing, however, South Korea has admitted far fewer refugees. As an example in 2017, the country granted refugee status to only 2 percent of asylum seekers. Korea is underperforming relative to other OECD countries with regards to its response to the refugee crisis.
Economic Information	**Recent Economic Evidence Finds that Asylum Seekers are Not a "Burden" for Host Countries** According to a recent publication in Science Advances, an internationally renowned academic journal, inflows of asylum seekers do not harm the economies of host countries. The study found that as asylum seekers become permanent residents, their contributions to tax revenues can more than compensate for the public spending on asylum seekers. The study further suggests that refugees have helped to resolve shortages in industrial labor force stemming from an aging population, and they often fill jobs considered undesirable by locals. These findings suggest that the worry that that asylum seekers are a large economic burden on the host country is unwarranted.

Measures

Subjects then completed an online survey that measured political attitudes, as well as demographic characteristics. Descriptive statistics of all measures of interest can be found in Table A.3-A.4 in the Online Appendix, and exact question wordings for each measure can be found in

Table A.2 in the Online Appendix.

Pro-Refugee Index. We averaged five outcome variables described below into a single additive index reflecting a latent variable of pro-refugee attitudes, which has a high Cronbach's alpha scale reliability coefficient of 0.84. The advantage of this averaged measure is that it nets out measurement error associated with any one of the index components (Ansolabehere, Rodden, and Snyder 2008). Study participants were asked: (1) "Do you think the number of asylum seekers from foreign countries who are permitted to come to resettle in Korea should be..." (response options: "decreased a lot," "decreased a little," "left the same as it is now," "increased a little," "increased a lot"); (2) "Should Korea increase the number of refugees accepted into the country?" (response options: "Yes, regardless of what other countries do," "Yes, but only if other industrialized countries (such as the UK, Germany and United States) increase the number of refugees allowed to resettle in their country," "Yes, but only if other Asian countries (such as China, India and Japan) increase the number of refugees allowed to resettle in Korea," "No, Korea should not increase the number of refugees allowed to resettle in Korea") (3)" Do you favor or oppose accepting Yemenis refugees to settle down in the Republic of Korea once they pass the government-screening test?" (response options: "strongly disagree," "disagree," "neither agree nor disagree," "agree," "strongly agree"); (4) "Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be regarding refugees? Should the government:" (response options: "Provide no aid to refugees," "Send governmental aid to assist refugees, but not admit any refugees into Korea", "Send no governmental aid to assist refugees, but admit some refugees into Korea," "Send governmental aid to assist refugees and admit some refugees into Korea"); and (5) "The money spent to fund the ongoing presence of refugees in Korea could be better spent on the needs of Koreans." (response options: "strongly disagree," "disagree," "neither agree nor disagree," "agree," "strongly agree"). All measures were coded such that higher values reflect more openness and positive affect towards refugees.

War Experience. To assess whether a respondent experienced the Korean War, we created a dichotomous self-reported measure of war experience. We coded individuals as having had war time experience if they answered "Yes" to one of the following two questions: (1) "Did you experience the Korean War?" (response options: "Yes," and "No"); and (2) "Was your direct family (parents,

siblings, or grandparents) victimized by the Korean War?" (response options: "Yes," and "No").[15] In our main analysis we group those who said yes to both the first and the second question, and those who said yes to one of the questions as having had war experience. Those who indicated "no" to both questions were identified as those without war experience. We combined the responses from the two questions because they were highly collinear.

We further explain how we interpret the combined responses as a measure of living war-related experience here. As in other studies, the type of experience we capture can be construed as indirect, especially when the respondents say that only the family experienced the War. However even if one *perceives* herself to be not personally victimized, the Korean War is technically still ongoing and everyone living in the country, by definition, does have a war-related experience. Our context therefore illustrates the type of *perceived* living experience that other studies have yet to uncover. 49.3 percent of the respondents indicated that they and/or their family were victimized during the Korean War, where 6.8 percent indicate personal experience and 47.7 indicate that their family was victimized.

Displaced by War (North Korea Origins). As a measure of war experience that involved displacement stemming from the North-South separation, we constructed a measure based upon whether the respondent indicated that their family originated from a community in present-day North Korea.[16] Namely, we coded a respondent as having North Korea origins if s/he indicated that s/he, his/her mother, or his/her father was born in North Korea using the following three questions: (1) "Where were you born?"; (2) "Where was your father born?"; and (3) "Where was your mother born?" For each of these questions, respondents were given a list of locations including North Korea, as well as nine provinces and the eight major cities in South Korea.[17] 7 percent of the respondents indicated that they had familial ties to North Korea (see Table A.4 in the Online Appendix). As expected, 90.3 of those who note that their family originated from North Korea indicate that they

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[15]the word "victimized" in Korean translates to...

[16]We do not consider cases of displacement within South Korea, since the displaced could return back to their hometowns after the War. Those who were displaced from the north ("silhyangmin"), on the other hand, are unable to return to their hometowns and are permanently displaced.

[17]Provinces are the highest-ranked administrative divisions in South Korea and the eight cities are regarded as having special administrative divisions with equal status as provinces.

personally experienced the war and/or have close family members that were victimized by the war.

Demographic Characteristics. At the beginning of the survey before the vignettes, we asked a series of basic questions on gender, year of birth, and place of residence. After the vignettes, we asked additional demographic questions on the marital status, number of children (if any), place of birth (of self and parents), military conscription status, level of education (both for self and parents), income, religion, employment status and perceived future career prospects and income, and region of residence. 49.2 percent of the respondents were female, 62.1 percent were married, 67.6 percent had children; 61 percent completed college; 16 percent identified as Buddhist; 20 percent identified as Protestant; and 12 percent identified as Catholic. The average respondent was ideologically moderate (3.9 on a 7 point scale), and most warm to the Democratic Party of Korea (0.419 on a 0 to 1 point scale, compared to a 0.281 rating of the Liberal Korea Party and a 0.371 rating of the Justice Party), which is the dominant political party in Korea. Most respondents were from Seoul (20 percent) and Gyeonggi province (25.1 percent). Our sample is representative of the general Korean population in terms of age, gender, and region, as we adopted cross-stratified quotas on these dimensions based upon the most recent census data. Table A.1 in the Online Appendix cross-tabulates our samples, official government population data from the same month (April, 2019), and the most recently publicized Korean General Social Survey samples (2018).

Empirical Strategy

Given the employed experimental design, we test the effect of being exposed to the different pro-refugee narratives, the effect of the perspective-taking exercise, and the interactive effects of exposure to the narratives and the perspective-taking exercise with a fully-saturated "long" model (Muralidharan, Romero, and Wuthrich 2019). We estimate the following empirical specification using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS):

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 SE_i + \beta_2 U_i + \beta_3 E_i + \beta_4 PT_i + \beta_5 PT\&SE + \beta_6 PT\&U +$$

$$\beta_7 PT\&E + \gamma_1 War + \phi_1 Displacement + \sigma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i,$$

where i indexes individuals, and SE, U, E, PT, $PT\&SE$, $PT\&U$, $PT\&E$ are binary variables indicating whether the respondent received the "shared experience" message, "underperformance" information, "economic" information, the perspective-taking exercise only, the perspective-taking

exercise and the "shared experience" message, the perspective-taking exercise and the "underperformance" information, and the perspective-taking exercise and "economic" information, respectively. The reference category or base group category in the specification is non-receipt of both a message/information and perspective-taking exercise. War is a dichotomous measure for war experience and $displacement$ is a dichotomous measure for whether war experience affected included displacement, as measured by whether one's family is originally from North Korea, and hence, cannot go back to their hometown. X is a vector of individual-level controls—age, age^2, sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence—to improve the precision of estimates and to address any potential imbalance across treatment arms.[18]

We include these individual controls, as many demographic characteristics are theoretically correlated with both war experience and our outcome measures of interest. For example, absent demographic controls one could argue that any association between war experience and refugee attitudes is simply picking up the effect of age, even though that is likely not the case. While those who indicate war experience are older, the war experience measure is based upon an indicator of whether they personally experienced the Korean War or if they have knowledge that their family was victimized by the war. As such the minimum age of those who indicated having war experience and those who indicated they their families had war experience were similarly 18 (see Figure A.2 in the Online Appendix). In any case, as the war experience indicator is correlated with age, all reported analyses with regards to war experience need to account for age. Not surprisingly, those who indicated that their family originated in an area that is in present-day North Korea were also affected by the war. Nearly all (90.30 percent) of those who indicated North Korea origins reported having personally experienced the war and/or having close family that was victimized by the war, which gives us reassurance that using this measure accurately captures those who were displaced due to the war. To ensure that we could estimate the relationship between the displacement experienced by the war separate from general war experience, all reported analyses with regards to displacement control for general war experience.

We test for whether these effects are moderated by war experience generally and war experience

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[18]As noted above, of the 35 measures, there was imbalance (p-value below 0.10) on two measures (see Table A.5 in the Online Appendix.

that includes displacement by estimating the following specification:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta_1 SE_i + \beta_2 U_i + \beta_3 E_i + \beta_4 PT_i + \beta_5 PT\&SE_i + \beta_6 PT\&U_i + \beta_7 PT\&E_i + \gamma_1 War_i +$$

$$\gamma_2 War_i * SE_i + \gamma_3 War_i * U_i + \gamma_4 War_i * E_i + \gamma_5 War_i * PT_i + \gamma_6 War_i * PT\&SE +$$

$$\gamma_7 War_i * PT\&U_i + \gamma_8 War_i * PT\&E_i + \phi_1 Displacement_i + \phi_2 Displacement_i * SE_i +$$

$$\phi_3 Displacement_i * U_i + \phi_4 Displacement_i * E_i + \phi_5 Displacement_i * PT_i + \phi_6 Displacement_i *$$

$$PT\&SE_i + \phi_7 Displacement_i * PT\&U_i + \phi_8 Displacement_i * PT\&E_i + \sigma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i.$$

Our primary interest is in assessing whether the coefficients $\gamma_2 - \gamma_8$ and $\phi_2 - \phi_8$ coefficients are statistically meaningful to assess the extent to which war experience and war experience that includes displacement (e.g., family originally from North Korea) affects how the messages and perspective-taking exercises are respectively received. Since war experience is not randomly assigned, the coefficients $\gamma_2 - \gamma_8$ and $\phi_2 - \phi_8$ cannot be interpreted as causal effects without the additional assumption that having experienced the war personally or having family that was victimized by the war is uncorrelated with other individual characteristics that may differentially affect the response to the treatment. Tables A.6 and A.7 in the Online Appendix show that, while not identical, those who indicate that they experienced the war and/or their families were victimized by war are largely comparable to those who do not on most dimensions.[19] With that said, as noted earlier, we include a battery of control measures to address the potential issue that war experience is not randomly assigned, and adjust our estimates of the association between war experiences and refugee attitudes accordingly.

Results

The message designed to bridge the experience of current asylum seekers with the experience of Koreans during the Korean War seventy years ago corresponds with a 7.6 percentage point ($p < 0.01$) increase in support for more open refugee policies, as measured by our pro-refugee index (see Figure 1).[20] Of the three message strategies we explored, the shared experience message is

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[19] On 33 dimensions, there were statistically meaningful differences between those who indicated that their families are war affected and those who did not on just 9 characteristics. With regards to those who indicated having North Korea origins, and hence displaced, and those who are not, there were differences on 12 characteristics.

[20] Figure 1 summarizes coefficients from Model (2) of Table A.8.

the most effective, and reading the shared experience message focused on the parallels between displaced Koreans during the conflict in the Korean peninsula is more effective than engaging in a perspective-taking exercise that was previously found to trigger positive refugee affect (Adida, Lo, and Platas Izama 2017). The message showcasing how asylum seekers can improve the economy also has a positive effect on pro-refugee attitudes ($\beta = 4.2$ percentage points; $p = 0.02$); however, the effect is about half that of the message inciting memories of the Korean War, and the difference in effect sizes between the shared experience message and the economy-centered message is weakly statistically significant ($p = 0.08$). The underperformance information treatment does little in affecting refugee attitudes ($\beta = 3.0$ percentage points; $p = 0.11$). The perspective-taking exercise corresponds to a 3.2 percentage point increase in pro-refugee attitudes, and this effect is weakly statistically significant ($p = 0.07$), and the shared experience message is more effective than participating in the perspective-taking exercise in inciting more inclusionary attitudes ($p = 0.02$). Interestingly, when the perspective-taking exercise is married with receipt of one of the three messages, the effects of each of the messages increase. Reading any one of the messages alongside participating in a perspective-taking exercise leads to a 5.5 - 7.9 percentage point increase in support for refugee that are statistically meaningful ($p < 0.01$ in all three bundled conditions).

With that said, the perspective-taking exercise does very little to buttress the effect of receiving the shared experience message alone, as the effect size of shared experience message exposure combined with engaging in the perspective-taking exercise is only 0.3 percentage points higher than the effect of receiving the shared experience message alone, which is not a statistically meaningful change ($p = 0.87$). In other words, the most efficient strategy is to showcase the parallels between the displaced Koreans stemming from the conflict in Korea and present-day refugees. Inferences are similar if we look at each of the five component measures of the index (see Figure A.3 and Table A.8 in the Online Appendix).

One may argue that the effect size of exposure to the shared experience message on the pro-refugee index relative to non-receipt of any intervention (i.e., a pure control condition) is still modest, as it is equivalent to a 19 percent increase over the mean level of pro-refugee attitudes and the Cohen's d standardized effect size is 0.33. Nevertheless, given that efforts to elicit more positive sentiment towards foreigners have been difficult to find, where some efforts have even led to a backlash in some contexts (e.g., Gubler, Karpowitz, Monson, and Romney 2014), it is notable

Figure 1: Effect of Messages and/or Perspective-Taking on Immigrant and Refugee Attitudes

Notes: The figure plots the effect of each of the seven treatment conditions relative to receipt of no intervention with both 90 (bold) and 95 percent (non-bold) confidence intervals. The reported effects are based on models that include controls for conflict experience, as well as demographic controls (age, age², sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence).

that efforts to engender positive refugee sentiment can be fruitful in our case.

Adjusting for a wide range of demographic characteristics that are correlated with direct experience with the Korean War like age, we find that experience with conflict, as measured by a self-report of personal or direct family experience victimization during the Korean War, have more anti-refugee (β = -1.94 percentage points; p = 0.05; see the "Experienced War" estimate at the bottom of Figure 1). This relationship between war experience and greater antipathy towards asylum

seekers stems from feelings of cultural threat,[21] concerns that asylum seekers would worsen crime,[22] worries that asylum seekers would not help the economy,[23] and worries that asylum seekers pose a national security risk.[24,25]

However, those who report being displaced in that their family originated from a region in present-day North Korea have slightly more pro-refugee ($\beta = 2.5$ percentage points; $p = 0.23$; the "Displaced by War" estimate at the bottom of Figure 1), though the estimate is not statistically meaningful.[26] Displacement has a different relationship with immigration and refugee attitudes

[21]Cultural threat was measured with the following question: "Would you say that Korea's cultural life would be undermined or enhanced by refugees coming to live here from other countries?" (response options: "cultural life would be undermined much," "cultural life would be somewhat undermined," "cultural life would be undermined little," "neither undermined nor enhanced," "cultural life would be enhanced little," "cultural life would be somewhat enhanced," "cultural life would be enhanced much").

[22]Crime threat was measured with the following question: "Do you think Korea's crime problems would be made worse or better by refugees coming to live here from other countries?" (response options: "would be made much worse," "would be made somewhat worse," "would be made little worse," "would be made neither worse nor better," "would be made little better," "would be made much better").

[23]Economic threat was measured by the question: "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?: Refugees can help the Korean economy. Response Options: 1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4 = Agree; and 5 = Strongly Agree)." Note that this question was also used as a manipulation check question for our economic information measure (see below).

[24]Security threat was measured with the following question: "Do you think Korea's national security would be made worse or better by refugees coming to live here from other countries?" (response options: "would be made much worse," "would be made somewhat worse," "would be made little worse," "would be made neither worse nor better," "would be made little better," "would be made much better").

[25]To explore these mechanisms, we conduct mediation analyses using tests proposed by Imai, Keele, and Tingley (2010). Treating war experience as a treatment measure, we find that 67 percent of the negative association between war and the pro-refugee index is mediated by our cultural threat measure; 82 percent of the negative association is mediated by our crime threat measure; 71 percent of the negative association is mediated by our security threat measure; and 49 percent of the negative association is mediated by our economic threat measure.

[26]Estimates of general war experience and displacement effects, and their statistical significance, are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of demographic controls. However, we report effects that include demographic controls, as the inclusion of demographic controls increases precision of estimates and allows us to better estimate the correlation between more direct experience with war and displacement and our outcomes of interest. Furthermore, our message treatment effect estimates are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of these pre-treatment covariates, since our

than general war time experience, controlling for age, ideology, and party identification, and other measures that could be correlated with immigration/refugee attitudes and experience with conflict (e.g., income, education level, religion, etc.). This speaks to the possibility that perspective-taking and empathy-enhancing efforts may not have an unalloyed positive effect, as direct experience with conflict does not necessarily translate to more openness to asylum seekers and foreigners, in general.

Figure 2: War Experience Interactive Effects on Pro-Refugee Index

Notes: The figure plots the effect of each of the seven treatment conditions relative to receipt of no intervention with both 90 (bold) and 95 percent (non-bold) confidence intervals. The reported effects are based upon models that include demographic controls (age, age^2, sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence).

When we examine how experience with conflict and displacement interacts with each of the treatment conditions, we see that those who indicate personal or familial victimization during the war are *not* any more sensitive to the messages designed to elicit more positive affect towards refugees. However, those who have been displaced themselves, based upon a measure of whether respondents report that their family originated in regions that are in present day North Korea,

randomization was successful (see Table A.8 in the Online Appendix.

where over 90 percent also note war victimization, are particularly receptive to the message about how asylum seekers today are needing assistance in the way that Koreans did during the Korean War (see Figure 2). This suggests that while some respondents in the said group may have North Korean ties predating the Korean War, most of them were displaced as a direct cause of of the war and none of them can return back to North Korea.[27] Those with ties to communities in present-day North Korea are 20.4 percentage points ($p = 0.01$) more receptive to assisting asylum seekers after receiving the shared experience message than those who are not, which is a 51.5 percent increase over the mean level of the pro-refugee index measure and a robust Cohen's d standardized effect size of 0.89. When we conduct mediation analyses (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010), we find that 34 percent of the moderating effect is mediated by a drop in cultural threat, 51 percent is mediated by a drop in concern that asylum seekers pose a crime risk, and 26 percent is mediated by a drop in concern that asylum seekers are a national security risk. The shared experience message is also clearly more compelling than the perspective-taking exercise to those with ties to North Korea than those without, as those with ties to North Korea are not particularly moved by the perspective taking exercise ($p = 0.74$) than those with no such ties, and when the perspective-taking exercise is combined with exposure to the shared experience message, the interactive effect is actually slightly smaller than the interactive effect of the shared experience message receipt alone ($\beta = 17.4$ percentage points; $p = 0.02$).

It is again worth noting that those who originated from communities in North Korea are ethnically the same as those who originated from communities in present-day South Korea. Those from the two Korea have a shared ethnicity, language, and history, and are separated due to exogenous factors rather than internal divisions. As such, having family connections with North Korea would not have led to being discriminated against in South Korea, as the North-South division was created by outside parties and not necessarily a reflection of divisions within the Korea. Essentially, those who note that their family originated from North Korea are not distinct from those who did not in any way that is relevant to refugee sentiment apart from being separated from family and not being able to go to their hometown.

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[27]Figure 2 summarizes coefficients from Model (3) of Table A.9 in the Online Appendix.

Additional Tests

Manipulation Checks. We included a number of questions to verify whether the news stories and the perspective-taking exercise had their intended effects. Reassuringly, we find that those who receive the shared experience message, which argues that the refugee today are suffering like Koreans suffered a few decades ago, translates to greater *disagreement* that Koreans have suffered more historically (β = -4.6 percentage points; $p < 0.01$; see Figure A.4 in the Online Appendix). In other words, respondents who receive the shared experience message are more likely to view the challenges of present-day refugees to be similar to the challenges faced by Koreans a few decades ago. This translates to a 6.5 percent decrease over the mean level of people's reported sense that Koreans have historically suffered more than most, which the median respondent believes to be true[28]. Receipt of the underperformance information alone or the economic information alone has no such effect ($p = 0.25$ and $p = 0.28$, respectively). Receipt of the perspective-taking exercise also translates to people drawing parallels between Koreans decades ago and asylum seekers today (β = -3.5 percentage points; $p = 0.04$). Interestingly, bundling receipt of the perspective-taking exercise with receipt of the shared experience message does not strengthen the connections people draw between natives during the Korean War and asylum seekers today (β = -3.0 percentage points; $p = 0.07$). With that said, receipt of the perspective-taking exercise in conjunction with each of the messages slightly increases perceptions that asylum seekers have suffered like Koreans, though these increases are not statistically meaningful.

Next, in order to assess whether people who received the underperformance information were more likely to report the accurate asylum seeker acceptance rate, which is a meager 2 percent, we asked "What percent of applicants from various countries, including defectors from North Korea, have been granted refugee status since 1994?" (Response Option: 0 - 100 percent (open-ended question)). Note that the vast majority of individuals (85 percent) over-estimated Korea's acceptance rate, where the median respondent indicated a 10 percent acceptance rate, and among the individuals who were incorrect, the average response was a whopping 20 percent acceptance rate. Only 6 percent of respondents thought the asylum seeker admission rate was lower than the actual rate.

The underperformance information message clearly indicated that very few asylum seekers are

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[28]4 on a 5 point scale, where 1 = strongly disagree; 3 = neither agree nor disagree; and 5 = strongly agree.

granted asylum–a 2 percent acceptance rate in Korea compared to a 31 percent acceptance rate in other OECD countries. Receipt of this message translated to a 22 percent increase in accuracy on an open-ended question asking "What percent of applicants from various countries, including defectors from North Korea, have been granted refugee status since 1994?" ($p < 0.01$), regardless of whether the respondent received the message by itself or with the perspective-taking exercise. This is a 246 percent increase over the mean level of this knowledge question (see Figure A.5 in the Online Appendix).

Next, to assess whether the shared experience message translated to an increased sense that asylum seekers today are experiencing the challenges that they or their parents/grandparents experienced during the Korean War, which was argued in the shared experience message, we asked "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?: Koreans have suffered historically more than other people (Response Options: 1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4 = Agree; and 5 = Strongly Agree)." The majority of respondents (70 percent) felt that Koreans have historically suffered more.

Finally, to assess whether those who received the economic information treatment were more likely to indicate that refugees are good for the national economy, as argued in the economic information, we asked "How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?: Refugees can help the Korean economy. Response Options: 1 = Strongly Disagree; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree; 4 = Agree; and 5 = Strongly Agree)." A minority agreed with this statement (20 percent).

The economic information treatment also worked as intended; the message increased people's sense that "refugees can help the Korean economy." We see that the effect of receiving the economic information alone on beliefs that refugees are good for the national economy is 4.3 percentage points ($p = 0.03$). When the information is coupled with the perspective-taking exercise, the effect increases to 6.3 percentage points ($p < 0.01$), though the effect of receiving the economic information alone versus receiving the bundled treatment with the economic information are not meaningfully different ($p = 0.33$; see Figure A.6 in the Online Appendix). The shift corresponds to over a 10 percent increase over the mean level of people's reported assessment that refugees help (rather than harm) the economy. No such change occurs among those who did not receive the economic information ($p = 0.24 - 0.98$).

Placebo Test. To further assess the validity of our experiment, we conducted a placebo test. More specifically, we examined whether any of our treatment conditions had an effect on a measure that none of the treatments were designed to affect: university admissions policy preference. This outcome measure is the only measure that was included in the survey for the purposes of conducting a placebo test; the question was written to be completely orthogonal to the topic of refugees, and the designed treatment messages and perspective-taking exercise should *not* have any effect on it. To that end, we ask the following question near the end of the experiment: "Should Korean universities have full rights to select students?" (response options: "Yes, completely free from any government regulations (1)," "Yes, but only under loose government regulation (2)," "Yes, but only under strict government regulation (3)," "No, government should control the college student selection (4)".) Reassuringly, we find that none of the messages and/or the perspective-taking exercise had an effect on this measure that is orthogonal to each of the treatment conditions ($p = 0.28 - 0.90$ see Figure A.7 in the Online Appendix). This provides further assurance that the treatment effects we detected are valid.

Conclusion

Can narratives that highlight a family history of war, and hence a shared war experience, increase people's openness towards refugees fleeing conflict and persecution today? We provide evidence from South Korea, a country that has experienced a rapid transformation from a war-torn nation receiving international aid into an advanced economy in just two generations. Recent memories of displacement, civil war, and poverty remain salient and ingrained among many, while they grapple with the consequences of living in an advanced economy that provides development aid and applications for asylum. In other words, the circumstances of war and refugees is less distant or hypothetical for many Koreans, providing a useful edge case to consider the effects of shared war experience, and the extent to which interventions that draw parallels between war refugees and themselves reduces antipathy toward asylum seekers. Given that many countries have had histories of conflict themselves and are now host nations of refugees, the Korean case serves as a useful guide on what type of war experience elicits more refugee acceptance and how long it may take for the shared experience to engender empathy rather than trigger outgroup threat. Arguably, Koreans have both (1) high levels of cognitive empathy and understanding of refugees

today and (2) strong feelings of outgroup threat that is often concomitant with war experience. Koreans from older generations have experienced the destabilizing forces of war in real life, while the younger generation grew up hearing stories about the difficulties experienced by their parents and grandparents. All Koreans also continue to be reminded that the two Koreas are technically still at war with each other today. The countervailing pressures of eliciting memories of war to foster sympathy for refugees fleeing war and persecution are high, which gives us an opportunity to assess the upper bound of both the relationship between war experience and refugee acceptance alongside the effect that narratives that bridge the experience of asylum seekers fleeing devastation and their family's experience experience with war have on refugee acceptance among advanced economies.

Leveraging an original survey, we find that war experience translates to *less* openness to refugees. Baseline level of support for asylum seekers is lower among those who report that their families were victimized by the war, unless victimization included displacement. That is, in spite of the fact that those with direct war experience have a more intimate understanding of the plight of refugees today (e.g., have more cognitive empathy), they have less inclusionary attitude given stronger feelings of threat (e.g., cultural threat, security threat, economic threat) coming from the unforgotten war trauma. However, when the the parallels between the circumstances of Koreans during the Korean War in the 1950s and refugees today are experimentally invoked, refugee acceptance increases, particularly among those who experienced the trauma of displacement during the war. This moderating effect, where those who have been displaced due to the war being more receptive to the shared experience prime, is driven by reductions in outgroup threat levels. We thus find that a strategy that magnifies the similarities between the experience of Koreans during the Korean War and that of asylum seekers today is more effective than a perspective-taking exercise that does not make one's family history salient, messaging that highlights how little the nation is doing relative to other countries for asylum-seekers, or information regarding the economic value-add of refugees.

Overall, our findings support works promoting the use of narratives that highlight shared experiences between refugees and their families as a major treatment that can foster acceptance by invoking empathy. However, we add additional nuance to extant work, showcasing why both the timing and type of shared experience matters for the treatment to be more or less effective. Future research should further examine the effects of a shared war experience narrative when one's family history with war is very distant, where threat triggered by experiencing the trauma of war is lower

and intimate understanding of the circumstances of refugees are low to examine the lower bound of the effect we detect, as perspective-taking exercises or messages informing individuals about the economic benefits of hosting refugees may be more fruitful among such a population.

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Online Appendix

Can a Sense of Shared War Experience

Increase Refugee Acceptance?

A Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Sample Representativeness

	(1) **Our Samples** **(April, 2019)**	(2) **Official Monthly** **Population Data** **(April, 2019)**	(3) **KGSS** **(2018)**
AGE			
18-29	0.187	0.184	0.166
30-39	0.171	0.165	0.136
40-49	0.201	0.193	0.171
50-59	0.199	0.198	0.177
60+	0.243	0.261	0.349
GENDER			
Male	0.508	0.499	0.495
Female	0.492	0.501	0.505
REGION			
Seoul	0.2	0.188	0.199
Gyeonggi	0.251	0.253	0.293
Incheon	0.059	0.057	
Daejeon	0.03	0.029	0.1
North Chungcheong	0.029	0.031	
South Chungcheong	0.035	0.041	
Sejong	0.006	0.006	
Gwangju	0.028	0.028	0.101
North Jeolla	0.033	0.035	
South Jeolla	0.033	0.036	
Daegu	0.05	0.047	0.26
Ulsan	0.025	0.022	
North Gyeongsang	0.042	0.052	
South Gyeongsang	0.066	0.065	
Busan	0.068	0.066	
Gangwon	0.029	0.030	0.034
Jeju	0.016	0.013	0.008

Table A.2: Survey Question Wordings

[[Vignette treatment]]

Described in Table 1

[[Perspective taking treatment]]

Please answer the following questions while imagining that you are a refugee fleeing persecution in a war-torn country.
What would you take with you, limited only to what you can carry yourself, on your journey? [Open-ended response]
Where would you flee to or would you stay in your home country? [Open-ended response]
What do you feel would be the biggest challenge for you? [Open-ended response]

[[Outcome measures]]

[INCREASE NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKER]
Do you think the number of asylum seekers from foreign countries who are permitted to come to resettle in Korea should be...
  - Decreased a lot (1)
  - Decreased a little
  - Left the same that it is now
  - Increased a little
  - Increased a lot (5)

[INCREASE NUMBER OF REFUGEES]
Should Korea increase the number of refugees accepted into the country?
  - No, Korea should not increase the number of refugees allowed to resettle in Korea (1)
  - Yes, but only if other Asian countries (such as China, India and Japan) increase the number of refugees allowed to resettle in Korea
  - Yes, but only if other industrialized countries (such as the UK, Germany and United States) increase the number of refugees allowed to resettle in their country
  - Yes, regardless of what other countries do (4)

[SEND AID TO ASSIST REFUGEES]
Which comes closest to your view about what government policy should be regarding refugees? Should the government:
  - Provide no aid to refugees (1)
  - Send governmental aid to assist refugees, but not admit any refugees into Korea
  - Send no governmental aid to assist refugees, but admit some refugees into Korea
  - Send governmental aid to assist refugees and admit some refugees into Korea (4)

[ACCEPT YEMENI REFUGEES]
Do you favor or oppose accepting Yemenis refugees to settle down in the Republic of Korea once they pass the government-screening test?
  - Strongly Oppose (1)
  - Oppose
  - Neither Favor nor Oppose
  - Favor
  - Strongly Favor (5)

[SPENDING ON REFUGEES A PRIORITY]

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The money spent to fund the ongoing presence of refugees in Korea could be better spent on the needs of Koreans.
 - Strongly Disagree (4)
 - Disagree
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - Agree
 - Strongly Agree (1)

[[Manipulation Check]]

[CORRECT NUMBER OF ASYLUM SEEKERS]
What percent of applicants from various countries, including defectors from North Korea, have been granted refugee status since 1994?
(Sliding scale from 0 to 100%)

[KOREANS HAVE SUFFERED MORE] Koreans have suffered historically more than other people.
 - Strongly Disagree (1)
 - Disagree
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - Agree
 - Strongly Agree (5)

[REFUGEES CAN HELP ECONOMY] Refugees can help the Korean economy.
 - Strongly Disagree (1)
 - Disagree
 - Neither Agree nor Disagree
 - Agree
 - Strongly Agree (5)

[[Mechanisms]]

[CULTURAL THREAT] Would you say that Korea's cultural life would be undermined or enhanced by refugees coming to live here from other countries?
 - Cultural life would be undermined much (1)
 - Cultural life would be somewhat undermined
 - Cultural life would be undermined little
 - Neither undermined nor enhanced
 - Cultural life would be enhanced little
 - Cultural life would be somewhat enhanced
 - Cultural life would be enhanced much (7)

[CRIME THREAT] Do you think Korea's crime problems would be made worse or better by refugees coming to live here from other countries?
 - Would be made much worse (1)
 - Would be made somewhat worse
 - Would be made little worse
 - Would be made neither worse nor better
 - Would be made little better
 - Would be made somewhat better
 - Would be made much better (7)

[Security Threat] Do you think Korea's national security would be made worse or better by refugees coming to live here from other countries?
- Would be made much worse (1)
- Would be made somewhat worse
- Would be made little worse
- Would be made neither worse nor better
- Would be made little better
- Would be made somewhat better
- Would be made much better (7)

[Policy Attitude: University Admissions] Should Korean universities have full rights to select students?
- Yes, completely free from any government regulations (1)
- Yes, but only under loose government regulation
- Yes, but only under strict government regulation
- No, government should control the college student selection (4)

[[Experience of War]]

[War Experience: Self] Did you experience the Korean War? (Yes (1) or No (0))
[War Experience: Family] Was your direct family (parents, siblings, or grandparents) victimized by the Korean War? (Yes (1) or No (1))

[[Displaced by War (North Korea Origins)]]

[Birthplace][1] Where were you born?
[Paternal Birthplace] Where was your father born?
[Maternal Birthplace] Where was your mother born?

- Seoul
- Gyeonggi
- Incheon
- Daejun
- Chungcheong North
- Chungcheong South
- Sejong
- Gwanju
- Jeolla North
- Jeolla South
- Daegu
- Ulsan
- Gyeongsang North
- Gyeongsang South
- Busan
- Gangwon
- Jeju
- North Korean Territory
- Overseas

---

[1]Coded as 1 if "North Korean Territory" selected; 0, otherwise.

- I don't know

[[Control Variables]]

[AGE] In what year were you born? (4 digits between 1900-2001)

[GENDER] I identify my gender as:
- Male (0)
- Female (1)

[IDEOLOGY] In general, do you think of yourself as . . .
- Extremely liberal (1)
- Liberal
- Slightly liberal
- Moderate, middle of the road
- Slightly conservative
- Conservative
- Extremely conservative (7)

[FEELING THERMOMETER OF POLITICAL PARTIES][2]
Please tell us how favorable you are to members of the following groups being YOUR NEIGHBORS a 0-100 scale.
Ratings between 50 and 100 mean that you feel favorable and warm toward having members of the group as neighbors.
Ratings between 0 and 50 mean that you don't feel favorable toward members of the group being your neighbor and
that you don't care too much for that group.
You would rate the group at the 50 mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward member of the group being your neighbor.
- Democratic Party of Korea:
- Liberty Korea Party:
- Bareunmirae Party:
- Party for Democracy and Peace:
- Justice Party:

[CONSCRIPT] Please check the relevant category for the way that you fulfilled your conscription duty
- Served in the military (including professional military member) (1)
- Served in support arms training/public services/medical/professional technician (1)
- Did not serve yet (expect to fulfill in the future) (0)
- Exempt (0)
- Not applicable (0)

[INCOME] What is your annual household income?

[MARITAL STATUS] Please indicate your marital status:
- Unmarried (0)
- Civil Union (1)
- Married (1)
- Separated (0)
- Divorced (0)

---

[2]Recoded to 0 to 1 scale.

v

- Widowed (0)

[CHILDREN] How many children do you have?[3]
- 0
- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4 or more

[EDUCATION] What is the highest level of school you have completed?[4]
- Elementary school
- Middle school
- High school
- 2-year University
- 4-year University
- Post-graduate
- No formal education

[RELIGION] What is your religious preference?
- Buddhism
- Protestant
- Catholic
- Some other religion (Please specify:)
- None

[[RELIGIOSITY] How often do you attend religious services?
- Never (1)
- Once a year or less
- A few times a year
- Once or twice a month
- Once a week
- More than once a week (6)

How measures were coded are indicated in parentheses. For scales, only the minimum and maximum values are indicated.

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[3]Created a binary variable for having children, where 1 indicates if they have 1 or more children, and 0 indicates 0 children.

[4]Created a binary variable for having completed 4-year college.

Table A.3: Summary Statistics: Assignment and Outcome Measures

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Group Assignment					
Control Group	0.129	0.336	0	1	2000
Shared Experience Message	0.125	0.330	0	1	2000
Underperformance Information	0.124	0.329	0	1	2000
Economic Information	0.127	0.333	0	1	2000
Perspective-Taking (PT)	0.127	0.333	0	1	2000
Shared Experience Message + PT	0.121	0.326	0	1	2000
Underperformance Information + PT	0.125	0.331	0	1	2000
Economic Information + PT	0.123	0.328	0	1	2000
Outcome Measures					
Pro-Refugee Index	0.397	0.229	0	1	2000
Increase Number of Asylum Seeker	2.406	1.060	1	5	2000
Increase Number of Refugees	1.889	1.141	1	4	2000
Accept Yemeni Refugees	2.729	0.948	1	5	2000
Send Aid to Assist Refugees	2.687	0.955	1	4	2000
Spending on Refugees a Priority	1.37	0.955	0	4	2000
Manipulation Check					
Shared Experience Message:					
Koreans Have Suffered More	3.822	0.780	1	5	2000
Underperformance Information:					
Correct Number of Asylum Seekers	0.088	0.283	0	1	2000
Economic Information:					
Refugees Can Help Economy	2.688	0.959	1	5	2000
Mechanisms					
Cultural Threat	3.190	1.282	1	7	2000
Crime Threat	2.767	1.138	1	7	2000
Security Threat	3.067	1.119	1	7	2000
Placebo Measure					
Policy Attitude: University Admissions	1.946	0.732	1	4	2000

Table A.4: Summary Statistics: Demographic Characteristics

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Experienced War	0.493	0.5	0	1	2000
Displaced by War	0.067	0.25	0	1	2000
Age	45.483	14.472	18	80	2000
Female	0.492	0.5	0	1	2000
Ideology (Liberal → Conservative)	3.866	1.179	1	7	2000
Feeling Thermometer (FT): Liberal Korea Party	0.281	0.282	0	1	2000
FT: Democratic Party of Korea	0.419	0.278	0	1	2000
FT: Justice Party	0.371	0.273	0	1	2000
Served in Military	0.448	0.497	0	1	2000
Logged Income	6.089	0.733	2.303	12.206	2000
Married	0.621	0.485	0	1	2000
Have Children	0.676	0.468	0	1	2000
Completed 4-Year College	0.61	0.488	0	1	2000
Buddhist	0.157	0.363	0	1	2000
Protestant	0.199	0.399	0	1	2000
Catholic	0.116	0.32	0	1	2000
Identify with Another Religion	0.009	0.094	0	1	2000
Religiosity	4.634	1.767	1	6	2000
Seoul	0.2	0.4	0	1	2000
Gyeonggi	0.251	0.434	0	1	2000
Incheon	0.059	0.236	0	1	2000
Daejeon	0.03	0.171	0	1	2000
North Chungcheong	0.029	0.169	0	1	2000
South Chungcheong	0.035	0.185	0	1	2000
Sejong	0.006	0.077	0	1	2000
Gwangju	0.028	0.165	0	1	2000
North Jeolla	0.033	0.179	0	1	2000
South Jeolla	0.033	0.179	0	1	2000
Daegu	0.05	0.217	0	1	2000
Ulsan	0.025	0.158	0	1	2000
North Gyeongsang	0.042	0.199	0	1	2000
South Gyeongsang	0.066	0.247	0	1	2000
Busan	0.068	0.252	0	1	2000
Gangwon	0.029	0.168	0	1	2000
Jeju	0.016	0.126	0	1	2000

Table A.5: Balance Test

Variable	(1) Control	(2) T1	(3) T2	(4) T3	(5) T4	(6) T5	(7) T6	(8) T7	(9) Joint Test
War Experience	0.486	0.482	0.506	0.465	0.539	0.492	0.472	0.498	0.803
Displaced by War	0.077	0.044	0.057	0.091	0.087	0.054	0.052	0.073	0.292
Age	45.293	44.402	46.028	46.091	46.299	45.293	44.616	45.829	0.766
Female	0.429	0.498	0.522	0.492	0.504	0.500	0.508	0.482	0.579
Ideology (Liberal ¿ Conservative)	3.900	3.771	3.838	3.969	3.976	3.913	3.784	3.767	0.224
Feeling Thermometer: Liberal Korea Party	0.273	0.256	0.273	0.290	0.281	0.277	0.293	0.308	0.612
Feeling Thermometer: Democratic Party of Korea	0.424	0.422	0.388	0.415	0.411	0.418	0.455	0.416	0.374
Feeling Thermometer: Justice Party	0.383	0.387	0.336	0.361	0.376	0.352	0.402	0.370	0.166
Served in Military	0.498	0.454	0.421	0.457	0.413	0.421	0.448	0.465	0.579
Logged Income	6.149	6.098	6.162	6.097	6.037	6.056	6.120	5.986	0.125
Married	0.653	0.598	0.628	0.614	0.634	0.612	0.600	0.624	0.929
Have Children	0.718	0.643	0.684	0.685	0.677	0.674	0.632	0.690	0.545
Completed 4-Year College	0.653	0.566	0.611	0.591	0.650	0.595	0.628	0.580	0.373
Buddhist	0.181	0.185	0.158	0.150	0.134	0.165	0.112	0.167	0.340
Protestant	0.154	0.181	0.243	0.252	0.197	0.219	0.188	0.159	0.044
Catholic	0.112	0.108	0.093	0.083	0.142	0.107	0.152	0.131	0.208
Identify with Another Religion	0.008	0.016	0.008	0.004	0.008	0.008	0.016	0.004	0.748
Religiosity	4.780	4.699	4.510	4.488	4.622	4.566	4.676	4.722	0.521
Seoul	0.185	0.213	0.251	0.205	0.165	0.194	0.200	0.188	0.446
Kyeungido	0.251	0.249	0.287	0.252	0.280	0.223	0.204	0.261	0.438
Incheon	0.066	0.052	0.053	0.063	0.055	0.079	0.052	0.053	0.906
Daejeon	0.039	0.028	0.016	0.031	0.024	0.045	0.024	0.033	0.656
North Cheungchung	0.035	0.028	0.020	0.024	0.039	0.017	0.040	0.033	0.704
South Cheungchung	0.042	0.052	0.028	0.031	0.028	0.025	0.036	0.041	0.737
Sejong	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.008	0.012	0.004	0.008	0.897
Kwangju	0.042	0.020	0.016	0.012	0.035	0.033	0.040	0.024	0.295
North Jeolla	0.027	0.036	0.032	0.024	0.059	0.033	0.044	0.008	0.095
South Jeolla	0.019	0.044	0.040	0.028	0.043	0.025	0.020	0.045	0.437
Daeku	0.035	0.032	0.049	0.059	0.039	0.050	0.076	0.057	0.344
Ulsan	0.019	0.036	0.028	0.035	0.020	0.017	0.024	0.024	0.805
North Gyeongsang	0.050	0.040	0.032	0.035	0.035	0.050	0.036	0.053	0.895
South Gyeongsang	0.085	0.068	0.061	0.067	0.043	0.074	0.064	0.061	0.761
Pusan	0.058	0.060	0.036	0.083	0.055	0.083	0.092	0.078	0.219
Gangwon	0.023	0.016	0.028	0.043	0.051	0.029	0.024	0.016	0.206
Jeju	0.019	0.020	0.016	0.004	0.020	0.012	0.020	0.016	0.840
Proportion	0.130	0.124	0.123	0.127	0.127	0.121	0.125	0.122	

Notes: T1 denotes receipt of the shared experience message; T2 denotes receipt of the underperformance information; T3 denotes receipt of the economic information; T4 denotes receipt of the perspective-taking exercise; T5 denotes receipt of the shared experience message and the perspective-taking exercise; T6 denotes receipt of the underperformance information and the perspective-taking exercise; and T7 denotes receipt of the economic information treatment and the perspective-taking exercise. Each column displays the mean value of each variable for those assigned to each of our experimental conditions. The last column indicates the p-value from a joint orthogonality test of treatment arms.

Table A.6: Difference Between War Affected and Non-War Affected

Variable	(1) Did Not Experience War	(2) Experienced War	(3) Difference Test (p-value)
Age	41.606	49.478	0.000
Female	0.530	0.452	0.000
Ideology (Liberal → Conservative)	3.753	3.982	0.000
Feeling Thermometer: Liberal Korea Party	0.260	0.303	0.001
Feeling Thermometer: Democratic Party of Korea	0.423	0.415	0.532
Feeling Thermometer: Justice Party	0.378	0.364	0.263
Served in Military	0.405	0.491	0.000
Logged Income	6.087	6.090	0.907
Married	0.559	0.684	0.000
Have Children	0.594	0.759	0.000
Completed 4-Year College	0.593	0.626	0.127
Buddhist	0.137	0.177	0.015
Protestant	0.184	0.214	0.093
Catholic	0.110	0.122	0.423
Identify with Another Religion	0.008	0.010	0.591
Religiosity	4.812	4.450	0.000
Seoul	0.187	0.213	0.146
Gyeonggi	0.246	0.256	0.623
Incheon	0.057	0.061	0.721
Daejeon	0.032	0.028	0.685
North Chungcheong	0.029	0.030	0.803
South Chungcheong	0.042	0.028	0.092
Sejong	0.008	0.004	0.269
Gwangju	0.038	0.017	0.004
North Jeolla	0.037	0.028	0.260
South Jeolla	0.031	0.036	0.532
Daegu	0.048	0.051	0.798
Ulsan	0.029	0.022	0.377
North Gyeongsang	0.042	0.041	0.844
South Gyeongsang	0.065	0.066	0.931
Busan	0.064	0.072	0.475
Gangwon	0.030	0.028	0.880
Jeju	0.015	0.017	0.659
Proportion	0.507	0.493	

Notes: Each column displays the mean value of each variable for those assigned to the indicated group. The last column indicates the p-value from testing the difference in means between the two groups.

Table A.7: Difference Between Displaced (North Korea Origins) and
Non-Displaced (No North Korea Origins)

Variable	(1) Not Displaced	(2) Displaced	(3) Difference Test (p-value)
Age	44.625	57.433	0.000
Female	0.492	0.478	0.739
Ideology (Liberal → Conservative)	3.860	3.940	0.447
Feeling Thermometer: Liberal Korea Party	0.275	0.367	0.000
Feeling Thermometer: Democratic Party of Korea	0.419	0.417	0.924
Feeling Thermometer: Justice Party	0.370	0.386	0.500
Served in Military	0.446	0.463	0.715
Logged Income	6.083	6.170	0.184
Married	0.607	0.806	0.000
Have Children	0.658	0.918	0.000
Completed 4-Year College	0.601	0.731	0.003
Buddhist	0.161	0.097	0.050
Protestant	0.189	0.336	0.000
Catholic	0.113	0.157	0.128
Identify with Another Religion	0.010	0.000	0.254
Religiosity	4.673	4.090	0.000
Seoul	0.192	0.306	0.001
Gyeonggi	0.246	0.321	0.053
Incheon	0.055	0.119	0.002
Daejeon	0.029	0.037	0.608
North Chungcheong	0.031	0.007	0.119
South Chungcheong	0.036	0.022	0.396
Sejong	0.006	0.007	0.821
Gwangju	0.030	0.000	0.042
North Jeolla	0.034	0.022	0.477
South Jeolla	0.035	0.007	0.087
Daegu	0.050	0.037	0.501
Ulsan	0.027	0.000	0.053
North Gyeongsang	0.044	0.007	0.041
South Gyeongsang	0.068	0.030	0.084
Busan	0.071	0.030	0.069
Gangwon	0.028	0.037	0.553
Jeju	0.017	0.007	0.415
Proportion	0.933	0.067	

Notes: Each column displays the mean value of each variable for those assigned to the indicated group. The last column indicates the p-value from testing the difference in means between the two groups.

Table A.8: Main Effects

| Variables	(1) Pro-Refugee Index	(2) Pro-Refugee Index	(3) Increase Number of Asylum Seeker	(4) Increase Number of Asylum Seeker	(5) Increase Number of Refugees	(6) Increase Number of Refugees	(7) Send Aid to Assist Refugees	(8) Send Aid to Assist Refugees	(9) Accept Yemeni Refugees	(10) Accept Yemeni Refugees	(11) Spending on Refugees a Priority	(12) Spending on Refugees a Priority
Shared Experience Message	0.067***	0.076***	0.132***	0.138***	0.110***	0.124***	0.035	0.040	0.022	0.029	0.037*	0.046**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Underperformance Information	0.014	0.030	0.073***	0.087***	0.027	0.052	-0.004	0.009	-0.018	-0.002	-0.006	0.004
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Economic Information	0.033*	0.042**	0.069***	0.078***	0.045	0.062**	0.033	0.041	0.010	0.016	0.009	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Perspective-Taking (PT)	0.026	0.032*	0.046**	0.053***	0.019	0.029	0.030	0.033	0.001	0.009	0.035*	0.038**
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Shared Experience Message + PT	0.066***	0.079***	0.090***	0.102***	0.087***	0.105***	0.051*	0.063**	0.015	0.029	0.085***	0.094***
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Underperformance Information + PT	0.052***	0.055***	0.097***	0.098***	0.065**	0.072**	0.039	0.040	0.016	0.018	0.043**	0.047**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Economic Information + PT	0.062***	0.066***	0.100***	0.102***	0.085**	0.094***	0.054*	0.056**	0.028	0.030	0.045**	0.047**
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Experienced War		-0.019*		-0.026**		-0.006		-0.013		-0.029***		-0.023*
		(0.010)		(0.012)		(0.017)		(0.014)		(0.010)		(0.011)
Displaced by War		0.025		0.020		0.024		0.021		0.047**		0.015
		(0.021)		(0.024)		(0.036)		(0.029)		(0.022)		(0.022)
Age		0.002		-0.000		-0.003		0.004		0.001		0.005**
		(0.002)		(0.003)		(0.004)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Age^2		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000		-0.000
		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)		(0.000)
Female		-0.049***		-0.062***		-0.039		-0.046*		-0.043**		-0.057***
		(0.018)		(0.022)		(0.032)		(0.026)		(0.019)		(0.019)
Ideology (Liberal → Conservative)		-0.017***		-0.028***		-0.024***		-0.015**		-0.012**		-0.009
		(0.005)		(0.006)		(0.008)		(0.007)		(0.005)		(0.006)
FT: Liberal Korea Party		-0.004		0.033		-0.010		-0.021		-0.014		-0.011
		(0.020)		(0.024)		(0.034)		(0.029)		(0.021)		(0.021)
FT: Democratic Party of Korea		0.011		-0.046		0.019		0.018		0.038		0.027
		(0.027)		(0.031)		(0.045)		(0.038)		(0.029)		(0.031)
FT: Justice Party		0.227***		0.253***		0.271***		0.257***		0.221***		0.134***
		(0.027)		(0.032)		(0.046)		(0.039)		(0.030)		(0.031)
Served in Military		-0.011		-0.030		0.038		-0.032		0.001		-0.031
		(0.019)		(0.022)		(0.033)		(0.027)		(0.020)		(0.019)
Logged Income		0.007		0.013		0.012		0.005		0.007		-0.001
		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.011)		(0.010)		(0.007)		(0.007)
Married		-0.018		0.008		-0.032		-0.035		-0.013		-0.019
		(0.019)		(0.023)		(0.036)		(0.029)		(0.019)		(0.020)
Have Children		0.025		0.009		0.050		0.037		0.015		0.014
		(0.022)		(0.028)		(0.040)		(0.033)		(0.023)		(0.025)
Completed 4-Year College		0.006		0.014		0.000		-0.001		-0.011		0.029***
		(0.010)		(0.012)		(0.018)		(0.015)		(0.011)		(0.011)
Constant	0.357***	0.187**	0.276***	0.141	0.242***	0.138	0.533***	0.308***	0.423***	0.233***	0.312***	0.116
	(0.014)	(0.081)	(0.016)	(0.099)	(0.022)	(0.140)	(0.019)	(0.117)	(0.015)	(0.084)	(0.015)	(0.087)
Observations	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000
R-squared	0.011	0.191	0.020	0.152	0.009	0.107	0.004	0.133	0.003	0.162	0.013	0.137

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The omitted category for our treatment measure indicators is the control condition. In specifications with demographic controls (columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14), region of residence and religion are also included as control measures. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A.9: Interactive Effects

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Pro-Refugee Index		
Shared Experience Message	0.065***	0.065***	0.065***
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Underperformance Information	0.043*	0.025	0.043*
	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Economic Information	0.061***	0.043**	0.062***
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Perspective-Taking (PT)	0.033	0.030	0.033
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Shared Experience Message + PT	0.078***	0.068***	0.077***
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.023)
Underperformance Information + PT	0.049**	0.051***	0.049**
	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Economic Information + PT	0.067***	0.063***	0.067***
	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Experienced War	-0.012		-0.006
	(0.025)		(0.027)
Shared Experience Message X Experienced War	0.021		-0.000
	(0.037)		(0.038)
Underperformance Information X Experienced War	-0.027		-0.036
	(0.038)		(0.039)
Economic Information X Experienced War	-0.041		-0.044
	(0.037)		(0.038)
Perspective-Taking (PT) X Experienced War	-0.002		-0.006
	(0.035)		(0.037)
Shared Experience Message + PT X Experienced War	0.000		-0.019
	(0.036)		(0.038)
Underperformance Information + PT X Experienced War	0.010		0.004
	(0.037)		(0.038)
Economic Information + PT X Experienced War	-0.002		-0.007
	(0.037)		(0.038)
Displaced by War		-0.033	-0.031
		(0.045)	(0.048)
Shared Experience Message X Displaced by War		0.204***	0.204**
		(0.079)	(0.081)
Underperformance Information X Displaced by War		0.054	0.070
		(0.070)	(0.073)
Economic Information X Displaced by War		0.005	0.022
		(0.064)	(0.068)
Perspective-Taking (PT) X Displaced by War		0.019	0.021
		(0.061)	(0.064)
Shared Experience Message + PT X Displaced by War		0.165**	0.174**
		(0.069)	(0.072)
Underperformance Information + PT X Displaced by War		0.042	0.040
		(0.090)	(0.093)
Economic Information + PT X Displaced by War		0.029	0.031
		(0.075)	(0.077)
Age	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Age2	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Female	-0.049***	-0.050***	-0.051***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Ideology (Liberal → Conservative)	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.018***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
FT: Liberal Korea Party	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
FT: Democratic Party of Korea	0.012	0.009	0.012
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
FT: Justice Party	0.224***	0.229***	0.225***
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Served in Military	-0.011	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Logged Income	0.008	0.007	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Married	-0.019	-0.018	-0.018
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Have Children	0.024	0.024	0.025
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Completed 4-Year College	0.007	0.006	0.006
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Constant	0.179**	0.189**	0.189**
	(0.081)	(0.081)	(0.081)
Observations	2,000	2,000	2,000
R-squared	0.192	0.194	0.197

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. The omitted category for our treatment measure indicators is the control condition. In specifications with demographic controls (columns 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 14), region of residence and religion are also included as control measures. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure A.1: Distribution of Pro-Refugee Index (Density Plot)

kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 0.0451

Figure A.2: Age Distribution by War Experience

Figure A.3: Main Effects for Each Outcome Measure Separately

Notes: The figure plots the effect of each of the seven treatment conditions relative to receipt of no intervention with both 90 (bold) and 95 percent (non-bold) confidence intervals. The reported effects are based upon models that include the same set of pre-treatment controls that were included in the main treatment effect specifications for the index: conflict experience, as well as demographic measures (age, age^2, sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence)

Figure A.4: Manipulation Check: Shared Experience Message

Koreans Have Suffered More Historically than Others

Notes: The figure plots the effect of each of the seven treatment conditions relative to receipt of no intervention with both 90 (bold) and 95 percent (non-bold) confidence intervals. The reported effects are based upon models that include the same set of pre-treatment controls that were included in the main treatment effect specifications: conflict experience, as well as demographic measures (age, age^2, sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence).

Figure A.5: Manipulation Check: Underperformance Information

Correct Number of Asylum Seekers

Notes: The figure plots the effect of each of the seven treatment conditions relative to receipt of no intervention with both 90 (bold) and 95 percent (non-bold) confidence intervals. The reported effects are based upon models that include the same set of pre-treatment controls that were included in the main treatment effect specifications: conflict experience, as well as demographic measures (age, age^2, sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence).

Figure A.6: Manipulation Check: Economic Information

Refugees Can Help the Economy

Notes: The figure plots the effect of each of the seven treatment conditions relative to receipt of no intervention with both 90 (bold) and 95 percent (non-bold) confidence intervals. The reported effects are based upon models that include the same set of pre-treatment controls that were included in the main treatment effect specifications: conflict experience, as well as demographic measures (age, age^2, sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence).

Figure A.7: Effect on Placebo Outcome Measure (University Admissions Policy))

Notes: The figure plots the effect of each of the seven treatment conditions relative to receipt of no intervention with both 90 (bold) and 95 percent (non-bold) confidence intervals. The reported effects are based upon models that include the same set of pre-treatment controls that were included in the main treatment effect specifications: conflict experience, as well as demographic measures (age, age^2, sex, ideology, party identification, military conscription status, income, marital status, number of children, education level, religion, religiosity, and region of residence).