Review

This report examines the voluntary movement of Syrian refugees in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon, focusing on the economic and social factors that influence their decisions. When the study was conducted in 2019, the Syrian conflict had displaced over half of the country’s population, with more than 5.6 million registered as refugees abroad and another 6.2 million internally displaced. 

The analysis includes: (a) a review of international experience to identify the key push and pull factors influencing return movements; (b) an assessment of the conditions faced by Syrians in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, examining how these conditions relate to the identified push and pull factors; (c) an analysis of the voluntary return of approximately 100,000 Syrian refugees between 2015 and 2018 to determine the relative importance of these factors in shaping return decision; and (d) simulations and a scenario-based approach to project how these factors might influence future refugee mobility patterns.  

Key messages: 

  • Refugee return is a complex and multifaceted process, often characterised by iterative, staggered, or cyclical movements. It is not a simple, linear event. Refugees, acting rationally within a set of constraints, make decisions to maximise their well-being and that of their families. This can lead to unconventional coping strategies, such as the dispersal of family members between exile and return locations, or circular movements. 
  • International experience suggests four key factors influencing refugee mobility: peace, security, and protection; livelihoods and economic opportunities; housing, land, and property; and infrastructure and access to services. These factors interact in complex ways, with their impact varying across refugee situations and individuals. While formal peace agreements can trigger large-scale returns, spontaneous returns to conflict-affected areas are not uncommon. Poverty in the country of asylum can drive return, but conversely, refugees with higher socioeconomic status may have a greater propensity to return than those impoverished by displacement. Returning refugees do not necessarily return to their original places of origin, even with reintegration assistance. Refugees from rural areas increasingly return to cities, and there may be sizable secondary displacement of returning refugees. Return presents unique challenges for women, who may have fewer opportunities to acquire skills or capital in exile and face difficulties securing livelihoods, reclaiming property, and accessing essential services upon return. 
  • Syrians face persistent hardships both inside and outside Syria. While countries of asylum offer better access to services and livelihood opportunities compared to conflict-intensive regions within Syria, this is not always true for other regions. Refugees often face a trade-off between security and quality of life, with short-term security often coming at the cost of lower human capital accumulation, disproportionately impacting Syrian children and youth. Syrian women face additional challenges, including increased economic responsibilities, limited access to social and economic life, and heightened gender-based violence. 
  • Returns to date have been small-scale and selective due to persistent concerns about insecurity in Syria. Refugees who are single, or male, or not members of a nuclear family have been more likely to return. Conditions in Syria have predictable and monotonous effects on the return of refugees, i.e. better security and service access in Syria consistently increase returns. Host country conditions are more complex; a lower quality of life in exile doesn’t always increase returns. For example, more education increases return at primary education level but not at secondary or tertiary education levels. Surveys suggest a complex interplay of economic and psychological factors, and the future mobility of Syrian refugees could differ significantly from past patterns. 
  • Simulations confirm the importance of both security and service provision for future refugee returns. Service restoration is more effective in mobilising refugees when security is less of an issue. The international community has a diverse policy toolkit to assist refugees, host countries, and Syrians in Syria, including subsidies (return assistance), per capita transfers within Syria, and service restoration. The simulations suggest that: (1) “corner solutions” (using only one policy tool) are inefficient because the problems addressed by these tools are interconnected and a more comprehensive approach is needed; (2) policies should be adaptive, shaped by conditions on the ground, for example, insecurity in Syria is a major deterrent to return and reduces the effectiveness of service restoration efforts, therefore with improvements in security, more resources can effectively be allocated to restoring services; and (3) the policy objective should be to maximise the welfare of all involved, including refugees (both those who return and those who remain in exile), host communities, and Syrians in Syria. Maximising refugee returns is a poorly defined objective and may come at the expense of overall welfare. 

The report concludes that the return of refugees is a complex process that is influenced by multiple factors including peace, security, and protection; livelihoods and employment; housing, land, and property rights; and infrastructure and services. Security is the most important driver of return, but service restoration is also crucial. The study emphasises that maximising returns at any cost is not a viable policy objective. Instead, the focus should be on maximising the well-being of refugees, host communities, and Syrians in Syria.